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 Abstract 
Human cognition has long been thought to exceed that of other animals; however, what it 
is that makes humans “so smart” continues to be questioned. Gentner argues that 
language and relational reasoning together elevate human cognition and she takes a 
developmental approach to support her theory. This project takes a similar approach to 
Gentner’s. I  examined the relationship between language and relational reasoning in 
children, specifically as they are learning the relational terms for right and left as 
compared to relations for terms that they already know (i.e., above/below). What sets this 
project apart from Gentner’s work is that I also looked at the effect of lateralization on 
children’s performances as well the neural mechanisms underlying these same relational 
judgments in adults. Some of the neural mechanisms underlying relational reasoning in 
humans and monkeys are known. However, it is not known whether one set of relations 
(i.e., above/below) should be advantaged over the other (i.e., right/left) in both verbal and 
nonverbal modalities. To answer this question, I have developed a set of tasks to examine 
the following queries: 1) how verbal and nonverbal knowledge of above/below/right/left 
develops from 5 years to 10 years of age, 2) whether verbal knowledge aids performance 
on a nonverbal task that requires judgments of these relations, 3) whether strength of 
handedness promotes either verbal or nonverbal performance, and 4) what the neural 
correlates of these judgments are. 
 
The chapters of this thesis are organized to address each question separately. In the first 
chapter, I give a general overview of the work already done regarding these questions. In 
Chapter 2, I describe the spatial relational task used to investigate each question. 
Chapters 3-6 report on the findings from each of my four questions and Chapter 7 
provides a general discussion of what this research adds to the current literature. 
 
Overall, my findings suggest that language is not necessary for relational coding to 
emerge, verbal and nonverbal knowledge of relations follow different developmental 
trajectories, lateralization (handedness) does not aid in learning relations, and the two sets 
of spatial relations are represented differently in the brain. 
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 Chapter 1 General Introduction 
 
The uniqueness of human intelligence has been debated for centuries with various 
capacities being proposed as distinguishing human intelligence from that of other animals 
(e.g., Darwin 1871; Descartes 1637/1985; Hume 1739/1978). Gentner (2003; 2010) 
argues that it is having the capability for language and relational reasoning, both 
separately and when used together, that promotes human cognition to higher capacities 
than other animals. She takes a developmental approach to support her theory and I will 
add to her work by adding two other dimensions to my investigations: 1) effects from 
lateralization of the body and brain, and 2) the underlying neural mechanisms that 
support such processes.  
 
Gentner (2003) considers “relational terms” to be any term that references a comparison 
to another object, where the reference could be relatedness, hierarchical, social 
communicative, causal, etc. For purposes of this thesis, I use “relation” to refer only to 
the relative spatial position of one object in comparison to another. Although animals 
show some evidence of both language and relational reasoning, humans seem to far 
surpass animal performance. Considering relational knowledge in itself, even humans’ 
closest living relative, the chimpanzee, shows a limited capacity for relational coding 
(e.g., Penn et al. 2008). The inability of nonhuman primates (e.g., chimpanzees and 
capuchins) to combine more than one relation (attend to more than one relation) 
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 illustrates the limitations of their relational reasoning abilities (Fragaszy et al. 2011; la 
Cour et al. 2014).  
 
In this thesis, I address how humans deal with spatial relational information. I do this by 
answering a series of questions: 1) how verbal and nonverbal knowledge of 
above/below/right/left develops from 5 years to 10 years of age, 2) whether verbal 
knowledge aids performance on a nonverbal task that requires judgments of these 
relations, 3) whether lateralization (as measured by strength of handedness) promotes 
either verbal or nonverbal performance, and 4) what the neural correlates of these 
judgments are. Incidentally, I organize this introduction and thesis according to these 
questions and address each in order. Specifically, in this first chapter, I give a general 
overview of the work already done regarding these questions, tackling each question in 
order. In Chapter 2, I describe the spatial relational task used to investigate each question. 
My task design was based on work by Goodwin et al (2012) and inspired by the work of 
Hermer and Spelke (1994, 1996), so I will describe these studies in more detail and in 
separate subsections of this first chapter. Chapters 3-6 report on the findings from each of 
my four questions, respectively, and Chapter 7 provides a general discussion of what this 
research adds to the current literature. 
 
My focus on language goes beyond Gentner’s thesis and will serve as a crux of my 
investigation as it has been shown to facilitate the extraction and encoding of relational 
information (Hayward and Tarr 1995). However, the exact role that language plays 
remains unclear. While some findings indicate that language plays a critical role in the 
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 development of and ability to make relational judgments (Hermer and Spelke 1996; 
Hermer-Vazquez et al. 1999; Hermer-Vazquez et al. 2001; Loewenstein and Gentner 
2005); other studies suggest a less vital role (Landau and Hoffman 2005; Hupbach et al. 
2007; Ratliff and Newcombe 2008). Some researchers have looked to developmental 
disorders in an attempt to provide evidence for the interdependence of language and 
spatial cognition (e.g., Williams syndrome: Karmiloff-Smith et al. 1997; Brock 2007), 
but there is no consensus in this line of work either (Bellugi et al. 1988; Musolino et al. 
2010). An additional potential source of insight on the role of language in relational 
knowledge comes from animal studies, which I will use to supplement the arguments for 
and against the role of language throughout this thesis. 
 
 What is relational reasoning? 1.1
 
Fluid reasoning ability – the capacity to think logically and solve problems in novel 
situations – is strongly linked to the development of other cognitive abilities and to 
academic achievement (reviewed in Wright et al. 2008). Relational reasoning is one 
aspect of fluid reasoning, where analogical reasoning and spatial relational reasoning are 
two types of specialized relational reasoning which require similar general comparison 
skills. The ability to make general relational judgments is thought to be central to human 
intelligence in that it promotes higher cognition (Gentner 2003; Gentner 2010; Halford et 
al. 2010) – including math and science skills (National Research Council 2006) – and is a 
skill set rarely attributed to animals. It appears to be bolstered by language (e.g., Hayward 
and Tarr 1995; Hermer-Vazquez et al. 2001; Loewenstein and Gentner 2005; however 
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 see Munnich & Landau 2003 for a review of contradictory findings) and is shaped by 
culture and linguistic specificities (e.g., Hespos and Piccin 2009; Bowerman 1996).  
 
Evidence for human superiority in relational reasoning has been gathered from animal 
studies. In comparison to other animals, only humans over 5 years of age appear to be 
able to make relational (transitive) inferences reliably in one trial by integrating multiple 
premises (e.g., Halford 1984; Halford 1993). In fact, chimpanzees, monkeys, rats and 
pigeons are capable of learning serial orderings when items are introduced in sequential 
order (and presumably some overlearning occurs), but the human capacity seems to be of 
a much greater order, even at an early age. On an evolutionary note, recent studies have 
suggested that humans begin with the same spatial reference frames as the other great 
apes, but develop additional reference frames throughout development which reflect their 
specific language and culture (e.g., Haun et al. 2006a, Haun et al. 2006b; Gentner 2007). 
Specifically, allocentric frames of reference – where the location of an object is 
determined by its relation to the environment or other object – appear first, then become 
progressively more relative (Rigal 1994; Wassman and Dasen 1998; Moraleda et al. 
2013). For example, frames of references begin universally with respect to the 
environment in absolute terms (e.g., cardinal direction), then move to less fixed, more 
relative terms with respect to other objects (or object parts, like “fronts”), with some 
cultures coding location in egocentric terms (i.e., in object-to-self terms). 
 
However, the relation between culture (human and animal) and frame of reference is not 
entirely clear-cut. For example, the scale of the environment being coded has an effect on 
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 the frame of reference selected and applied (e.g., Ratliff and Newcombe 2008). 
Furthermore, nonhuman primates have difficulty in aligning manipulable objects in 
allocentric space (Fragaszy et al. 2011) despite this generally being an easy task for 
(Western) humans (Scott et al. 2006) and despite preferring an absolute (allocentric) 
frame of reference in a hidden-object-search task (Haun et al 2006a). Further muddying 
the picture, there is some evidence that the shift from allocentric to egocentric incurs a 
cost: children who do not make the switch master their linguistic coding system as early 
as 4 years (Wassman and Dasen 1998; Brown and Levinson 2000), whereas children who 
switch to a relative-coding system continue to confuse the associated labels into 
adolescence (Rigal 1994). Thus, although those individuals without access to linguistic 
representations – such as animals and young children – are often found to not be able to 
make the same types of complex relational judgments that individuals with linguistic 
access – such as human adults – can make, they can excel at some types of spatial coding. 
Nevertheless, language is often pointed to as an accelerant for the development of 
superior relational reasoning abilities. 
 
 Development of relational reasoning in humans 1.1.1
Piaget argued that children cannot perform classical analogy problems until they reach 
the stage of formal operations (around age 11 years) because they lack the capacity to 
represent the necessary relations (Inhelder and Piaget 1958). Children seem to fail 
because they rely on lower-order relations that do not complete the analogy, such as 
picking a perceptual match over a relational match (Piaget et al. 1977; Sternberg and 
Downing 1982). Although fluid reasoning develops greatly between ages 5-10 years – 
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 with strong effects on later achievement (Ferrer and McArdle 2004) – the slow 
development of this type of reasoning may be due to limitations in general knowledge or 
lack of familiarity with the items to be compared or the relations to be matched 
(Goswami and Brown 1989). Familiarity with relations can come from experience 
manipulating objects or from learning the labels associated with the relations. Some 
researchers have suggested that knowledge of the corresponding labels is tightly linked to 
nonverbal performance (Hermer-Vasquez, et al. 2001; Shusterman 2006); however, this 
thesis will address this potential linkage directly. 
 
Relative to other terms, relational language comes into a child’s vocabulary slowly and in 
a specific progression (Brown 1973). For instance, in English, concrete nouns are learned 
first, then verbs and even later prepositions (Gentner and Boroditsky 2001; Gentner and 
Bowerman 2009). Many spatial concepts are universal (Bowerman 1989; Talmy 1983), 
such as containment and support, and the terms which describe these are acquired in a 
specific order. Thus, the emergence of nonverbal understanding of these spatial concepts 
appears in the same order; and this occurs similarly across all languages (e.g., Slobin 
1973 in Gentner and Bowerman 2009). However, that is not to say that the linguistic 
label and corresponding concept co-occur or co-emerge: it has yet to be determined 
whether one always appears before the other.  
 
More specific to the current project, the terms for right and left are learned around the age 
of 6 or 7 while above and below are learned around the age of 3 (Martin and Sera 2006). 
Initial knowledge of the terms right and left has been linked to a child’s ability to identify 
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 relative positions of objects within their own body-centered coordinates (i.e., egocentric 
frame of reference), sometimes mapping one of these directions to their dominant hand 
despite not showing any correlation of strength of handedness to score on a left-right 
discrimination test (Rigal 1974; Rigal 1994). However, although 7-year-olds are able to 
correctly discriminate their own left and right body parts, it has been suggested that only 
about half of 11-year-olds can apply the labels left and right to other persons’ bodies 
correctly (Dellatolas et al. 1998; Rigal 1994). It may be that the case of applying the 
correct label to another’s body is more of a mental rotation problem, which appears to be 
inherently more difficult, particularly for women (Voyer et al. 1995). According to 
Benton (1968) an adult level of left-right orientation is normally attained around 12 years. 
In consideration of these studies, it is evident that some sort of development must take 
place before these concepts are acquired. What is not clear is whether this development 
stems from experience or is more physiological and independent of experience (e.g., 
maturational), particularly in terms of the underlying neural substrates.  
 
In terms of experience, it should be noted that not all cultures code relations 
egocentrically, but rather they code relative locations according to their absolute cardinal 
directions (e.g., the cup is northeast of the plate; Levinson 2003), an environment-
centered frame of reference. In terms of maturation, I will explore the possibility that the 
slow development of left-right knowledge is due to relatively slow development of the 
associated neural areas in Chapter 6, although indirectly by looking at neural activation in 
adult brains. Since adult brains are already mature, I will use knowledge about the order 
of maturation of brain areas to draw conclusions about the role of maturation. For 
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 example, if differential neural activation is indicated in areas of the brain that are known 
to mature later in life, then such a finding could suggest that maturation is more involved 
in the emergence of that skill than experience is. I will discuss the development of the 
human brain as it pertains to relational reasoning in section 1.3. 
 
 Reasoning in other animals 1.1.2
Humans are not the only animals with some capacity for relational reasoning (Thompson 
et al. 1997; Cook and Wasserman 2007; Fagot and Thompson 2011): relational 
judgments are ecologically relevant for all animals, although the extent to which these 
judgments are similar to the human ability or are less abstract in nature is hotly contested 
(Cheng and Newcombe 2005).  
 Nonhuman primates. Being our closest living relatives, primates are widely 1.1.2.1
considered the best species for comparison to humans in search of evolution of human 
intelligence. Relational reasoning, as it is considered critical for development of higher 
cognition, should be present in some species of primates – especially those most related 
to us, such as chimpanzees – if this ability evolved independently of language. However, 
if language truly is responsible for its development, then only individuals with symbolic 
representation (i.e., experience with symbol use) should illustrate relational reasoning 
(Premack 1983). Most studies with other primates have used analogical reasoning tests, 
such as relational-match-to-sample paradigms, particularly ones which test same-different 
relations or matrix reasoning. Some researchers believe analogical thinking (Gentner et 
al. 2001; Holyoak and Thagard 1997; Sternberg 1977) or perception of sameness (French 
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 1995) is uniquely human, while others maintain that there must be some phylogenetic 
antecedents to such cognitive capacity, even if the capacity is more limited in other 
animals (Cook and Wasserman 2007). The current literature is thus riddled with 
contradictory evidence for (Gillan et al. 1981; Boysen and Berntson 1995; Thompson et 
al. 1997; Premack 1983) and against the necessity of symbolic representation (Fagot and 
Oden 2011; Wasserman et al. 2001; Goodwin et al 2012; for evidence in birds see Cook 
and Wasserman 2007) for relational reasoning.   
 
In terms of evidence against the role of language, or symbolic representation more 
generally, Fagot and Thompson (2011) gave 29 symbol-naive baboons a same-different 
relational match test. Although, only 6 monkeys reached passing criterion, even without 
language these 6 animals were able to accomplish “higher-order” relational reasoning. 
However, in a different study by Thompson and colleagues (1997) a language-trained 
chimpanzee and three language-naïve, but symbol-trained chimpanzees were given this 
same task with the result that both groups of chimps performed equally well. The 
language-trained chimpanzee had been taught at the age of 5 years to combine “words” 
(tiles with symbols printed on them) to communicate with researchers (Premack 1976), 
while the symbol-trained chimpanzees had been trained to associate a token (heart-
shaped) with the concept same and a different token (diagonally-shaped) with the concept 
different and to associate Arabic numerals to numerical arrays (Boysen 1993; Boysen and 
Bernston 1989). The one chimpanzee who had been taught neither language nor tokens 
could not perform the task.  It appears that symbol-training (functional token) was just as 
helpful as language-training (propositional string) in enhancing relational ability. So, 
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 even if it isn’t necessary to perform relational matching, having access to symbolic 
representation seems to boost performance.   
 
On the other hand, Goodwin and colleagues (2012) were able to train symbol-naïve 
monkeys to make spatial relational judgments. In their study, they examined two 
monkeys’ ability to categorize a dot’s position as being above, below, to the right or to 
the left of a line. Although they were interested in how a rule would be represented in 
neural activity, they found evidence that the two monkeys treated above-below judgments 
differently than left-right judgments. Not only were these monkeys more accurate at right 
and left decisions (or the rule that induced a right or left decision) than at above and 
below decisions (or the rule that induced an above or below decision), but their neural 
activity was stronger for left-right judgments as well (Figure 1.1). This seems counter-
intuitive considering it contradicts findings from human performance comparing these 
two relational planes. Humans have sometimes been shown to be less accurate in making 
left-right decisions as compared to above-below decisions on a nonverbal task (Dessalegn 
and Landau 2008). One could make the argument that this difference arises within the 
primates because of locomotive differences – humans are bidpedal, monkeys are 
quadrupedal – and thus the ecological and physiological constraints have resulted in 
different evolutionary trajectories. However, a different interpretation is the left-right 
advantage could be explained by an order of acquisition effect: these monkeys were 
trained on left-right judgments first, and then were trained on above-below judgments. At 
least linguistically, humans learn above-below before left-right; although, it is yet to be 
determined, behaviorally, whether this difference exists nonlinguistically in humans. I 
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 will answer the question concerning human behavior in Chapter 4 and the question 
regarding human neural activity in Chapter 6. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Dynamic Spatial Categorization task from Goodwin et al. (2012), adapted from 
their Figure 1. A) The sample is presented first then the boundary (i.e., left-right rule) followed by 
up to two choice screens. B) The same task except that the boundary changes to a horizontal 
orientation (i.e., above-below rule). C) The same task except now the boundary cue precedes the 
sample cue. This task served as the basis of my task design. 
 
 Rats, humans & the blue wall task. The search for evidence beyond nonhuman 1.1.2.2
primates has focused on lab animals, such as rats. One popular, yet, controversial task 
that has been implemented as a test for relational ability is the blue wall task. This task 
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 involves a small rectangular room in which one short wall was painted blue (Figure 1.2; 
although in some studies the wall was painted a different color). One of the first studies 
compared performances of young children (18-24 months) and rats (Hermer and Spelke, 
1994; Hermer and Spelke 1996) and found their performances to be similar: neither was 
able to reliably utilize the feature cue – the blue wall – to guide their reorientation to the 
correct location of a hidden object. Instead, both relied on geometric cues (placing their 
performance at 50%, or chance), indicating that each group had only the simplest 
relational ability: that the object was to the left of the short wall without the ability to 
distinguish between the two short walls. It is unlikely that young children and rats are 
encoding the relation left of, but rather are matching a visual representation (of long wall 
left of short wall) instead of a specific relationship (of long wall left of blue short wall) or 
propositional string.  
 
Adults perform the test quite well; but, only when they have available to them internal 
speech (Hermer-Vazquez et al. 1999): when researchers placed headphones over the ears 
of adult participants, adult performance fell to the levels of children and rats. The 
researchers argued that it was the ability to encode the target as left of or right of the blue 
wall (the landmark feature) that led to successful performance, and thus, language was 
necessary to perform ”higher-order” relational reasoning such as that requiring the coding 
of features. Furthermore, when Hermer and colleagues (2001) tested 5-7-year-olds they 
found that only those children who could correctly produce the words left and right could 
succeed on the task; again, suggesting that language was key to enhanced relational 
performance. 
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Figure 1.2 The "blue" wall task from Hermer and Spelke (1994, 1996) and Hermer-Vazquez et 
al. (2001). The dark, thicker line between corners C and N demarcates the blue wall in the room. 
The “x” in the corner “C” represents the hidden object. 
 
The re-orientation effects reported by Hermer and colleagues (Hermer and Spelke 1996; 
Hermer-Vazquez et al. 1999; Hermer-Vazquez et al. 2001) have been shown to vary as a 
function of room size and other variables unrelated to linguistic knowledge, such as when 
explicit instructions are given (Ratliff and Newcombe 2008). Ratliff and Newcombe 
(2008) suggest that both geometric and feature cues are utilized by humans, but in 
different degrees depending on the uncertainty of the information provided by each, as 
well as their salience. For instance, humans can successfully shift their frame of reference 
strategy from a relative (e.g., egocentric) to an absolute (e.g., environment-centered) 
system when appropriate landmarks are available for external reference (Li and Gleitman 
2002).  
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 In their study, Li and Gleitman presented English speakers with a table and asked them to 
reproduce what they saw on a table behind them. The default frame of reference for 
English speakers was egocentric, so they would arrange the items from left to right; 
however, by manipulating landmark cues the researchers were able to get these adults to 
switch to a room-centric (environment-centered) frame of reference based on cardinal 
direction. They interpreted this flexibility in frame of reference coding as suggesting that 
language itself may not be the key causal factor in choice of spatial perspective and 
pointed to prior evidence on rotation problem solution from infants (Acredolo 1979) and 
from laboratory animals (Restle 1975) to support the interpretation of their findings. Li 
and Gleitman (2002) concluded that humans and animals approach spatial problems 
differently depending on the availability and suitability of local cues. This not only 
suggests that landmarks are only as good as their perceived utility, but also that humans 
are not bound to one encoding system and rather choose one according to the information 
available. Furthermore, it suggests that language, when engaged, biases users to a specific 
frame of reference, but does not bind users to that frame of reference when it is not 
engaged; an interpretation supported by Talmy (1983) and Haun et al. (2006a). 
 
 Relational reasoning in humans who do not have language 1.1.3
It should now be clear that there is mixed evidence on the role of language in human 
cognition. Similarly, there is mixed evidence on the role of symbolic representation 
(which includes language) as indicated in the research on animal performance. Studies on 
infants (section 1.1.3.1) suggest that they can make simple categorical, spatial relational 
judgments, yet studies on young children suggest that relational reasoning is dependent 
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 on having access to labels to represent relations. Studies on populations that are still 
developing relational language (section 1.1.3.2), such as Nicaraguan Sign Language 
users, corroborate studies on young children – another group of people who are learning 
to match labels to relations. However, this disjointed story of language sometimes being 
necessary and sometimes not being necessary for spatial relational judgments needs to be 
explained. 
 
 Infants. Infants are able to discern the positions of objects located in space and can 1.1.3.1
identify spatial relational categories (see Bjorkland 2012, p.234). For instance, Gava, 
Valenza and Turati (2009) used a habituation-dishabituation visual preference paradigm 
to test newborns’ abilities to differentiate between left and right spatial relations. Using a 
static solid vertical bar and a blinking solid square that would appear on one side of the 
bar, these experimenters habituated newborns to the square being on one side of the bar 
(either left or right) and then gave infants the choice of two novel scenes: a square on the 
same side of the bar but in a new location versus a square on the opposite side of the bar. 
Newborns preferred to look at the scene which showed the blinking square on the 
opposite side of the vertical bar, indicating that they had categorized the relative position 
of the squares to the line and preferred to look at the new category over the habituated 
category. Gava et al. (2009) were additionally able to show that newborns could 
discriminate within category stimuli – which is important for drawing conclusions on 
whether infants can categorize based on exemplars since, for such a conclusion, it must 
be shown that exemplars are perceived as being different (Quinn 2002) – and that their 
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 preferences were not based solely on distance from the bar. Quinn (2007) has found 
similar results for left-right and above-below relational categories across a number of 
different paradigms. 
 
 Developing languages. Evidence from a developing language suggests that having 1.1.3.2
access to labels is critical for relational reasoning. Pyers et al. (2010) studied three 
generations of Nicaraguan Sign Language (NSL) users and measured their performance 
on the blue wall task described previously (section 1.1.2.2). These groups of adults 
represent groups at different stages of language development. The first cohort, the oldest 
generation, was responsible for the creation of NSL but the language in their form was 
quite rudimentary. The second cohort, about 10 years younger, added words and rules to 
the new language, but their use of it was still limited compared to more advanced 
languages. The third cohort had developed relational language and was much more 
consistent in their use of it. In comparing reorientation and search performance for these 
three groups, Pyers and colleagues (2010) found that the third cohort excelled at the task 
compared to the other two groups, and concluded that it was because they were able to 
linguistically encode the location of the hidden object as to the left of the blue wall.  
 
 How does language enhance reasoning? 1.2
 
Language has been shown to facilitate the extraction and encoding of relational 
information (Hayward and Tarr 1995). Some researchers even suggest that language 
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 precedes the ability to encode and remember spatial information. There are a number of 
studies that suggest that language is required for remembering locations for hidden 
objects (some of which I have already discussed: Hermer-Vasquez et al. 1999; Hermer-
Vasquez et al 2001; Pyers et al. 2010). But it doesn’t necessarily have to be the case that 
language precedes or is necessary before nonverbal judgments can be made, as suggested 
by the infant studies (Gava et al. 2009; Quinn 2007) and some animal studies (Cook and 
Wasserman 2007; Fagot and Oden 2011; Goodwin et al. 2012). In this section, I will 
discuss possible roles of language in nonverbal spatial reasoning. 
 
 Labels are necessary for encoding and remembering space? 1.2.1
 Infant and children studies. A number of studies have shown that providing 1.2.1.1
children, or even infants, with a familiar label enhances their ability to perform relational 
judgments. In a study with 18-month-olds, Casasola (Casasola 2005) found that infants 
who heard the familiar word on while being habituated to a support event in a 
dishabituation task looked longer at a containment event whereas infants who heard only 
a generic word, a novel word or silence looked equally long at a new support event and a 
containment event. These findings led Casasola to conclude that infants who heard the 
familiar word had formed the abstract category of “support” whereas infants who did not 
hear the familiar word were not able to form the category. To what extent infants formed 
the category on the spot versus accessed the pre-existing category (assuming the familiar 
word had a corresponding pre-formed category) is not clear.  
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  Preschoolers also seem to do better with remembering a spatial category when they are 
provided with a familiar label at the encoding stage of the task. Loewenstein and Gentner 
(2005) described where they were hiding an object as they hid it in the view of the child 
(e.g., I’m putting the cup on top). Those children who received a familiar label were 
better able to remember where they had seen the object hidden and to find the 
corresponding position on a matching structure than children who heard a generic word 
(e.g., I’m putting the cup here). Again, the necessary category was better accessed when 
a familiar label was provided, whereas a generic term was not sufficient. 
 Cross-linguistic studies. A different method of examining the influence of 1.2.1.2
language on relational judgments is to test individuals from different cultures who speak 
different languages. Hespos and Piccin (2009) found that 5 month old infants were 
sensitive to tight/loose fit relationships of objects and containers under conditions of 
covering and occlusion. Hespos and Spelke (2004) similarly found that infants are 
sensitive to different conditions of support and containment. However, adults from 
different cultures showed differential sensitivity to these relations according to how their 
language encodes the relations. For instance, adult English speakers – whose language 
does not code tightness of fit – were not sensitive to tightness of fit relationships even 
though infants of the same culture were sensitive to these relationships. Adult Korean 
speakers – whose language does code tightness of fit – were sensitive to these relations, 
as were Korean infants. Hespos and Piccin (2009) suggest that language underlies this 
sensitivity as fit relationships are obligatorily marked in Korean. These results suggest 
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 that language plays a role in how spatial relations are automatically encoded in adults, but 
that infants are prepared to notice a greater range of spatial relations.  
 
Consistent with findings on the effects of language on cognition, Levinson (1996)  
showed that whether a language codes spatial information in terms of north-south 
(cardinal) or left-right (relational) coordinates affects speakers’ representations of object 
locations (see also, Levinson 2003; Li, Shusterman and McNaughton, under revision). 
However, it should be noted that the facilitative role of language has not always been 
found in spatial tasks (Munnich and Landau 2003) and individuals are able to shift from 
their preferred frame of reference to a different one in order to successfully encode a 
spatial or relational location (Gentner 2007; Li, Shusterman and McNaughton, under 
revision). Therefore, although language appears to affect encoding of spatial relations and 
locations, its primacy has not always been shown, its effects may only be temporary, and 
it is possible to override its influence (and limitations). 
 
 Possible mechanisms by which language affects relational reasoning 1.2.2
Before examining some possible mechanism by which language might promote relational 
reasoning, it will be useful to explore one proposal for how relational reasoning develops: 
the “career of similarity” hypothesis. This account is particularly relevant since it seems 
also to explain some of the animal literature which has suggested that perceptual features 
are the most salient in matching paradigms: paradigms that are most commonly used in 
testing relational reasoning. Therefore this account has the potential to offer a common 
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 ground from which animal and human reasoning each begin and where language might 
enter to promote reasoning. 
 
 Career of similarity. The “career of similarity” hypothesis was first introduced by 1.2.2.1
Quine (1960) then updated by Gentner and Ratterman (1991; see also Gentner, 2003). 
This hypothesis explains infants’ perception as initially directed by “brute” similarity 
(i.e., perceptual matching) and later by “theoretical” similarity (i.e., conceptual 
matching), meaning infants initially fail to recognize similarity in more complex 
situations than just superficial similarities. Gentner and Ratterman (1991) then 
“amplified” Quine’s account of developmental shift by more explicitly laying out how 
the progression from “brute” perceptual similarity to “theoretical” perceptual similarity 
occurs. They suggest that infants stop responding merely to overall similarity and begin 
to be more selective in their attention. Then, infants use their selective attention to move 
beyond simple object similarity and begin to focus on relational similarity, which 
requires a concept formation rather than just perception. One way infants achieve this 
progression from object to relation as the focus of similarity is by comparing across 
situations.  
 
Christie and Gentner (2010) suggest that it is only when children have an appropriate 
point of comparison, such as seeing two or more exemplars or when given a prompt to 
make a comparison, that relational information comes to the forefront of attention and 
overshadows mere perceptual similarities. This is where language enters the process. 
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 These researchers (Christie and Gentner 2010; Christie and Gentner 2013) argue that 
labels trigger the comparison process that leads to new relational abstractions. However, 
language alone cannot succeed in this process: without an appropriate comparison (two 
exemplars rather than one) only the objects themselves appear salient and therefore any 
label provided, which is meant to aid the comparison, is automatically attributed to the 
objects rather than the relationship between them. On the other hand, only seeing two 
exemplars and no label is similarly not sufficient to trigger the appropriate comparison 
process. These accounts suggest that relational judgments are developed early in life, but 
gradually as children learn their language and culture. As such, language may then be 
acting to progress relational reasoning to a new level, although exactly how it 
accomplishes this transition remains unclear. 
 
 Possible mechanisms by which language helps. There are several ways in which 1.2.2.2
the results of current studies can be combined and interpreted, each of which leads to a 
different, although not necessarily mutually exclusive, theory of how language might 
affect relational reasoning1. One conception is that language provides a scaffold that 
potentiates comparison (Christie and Gentner 2013) by binding together relevant 
elements for comparison (Hermer and Spelke 1994; Hermer-Vazquez et al. 1999; 
Hermer-Vazquez et al. 2001; Loewenstein and Gentner 2005) and structuring the 
comparison (particularly when linguistic structure matches the logical or visual structure; 
Dessalegn and Landau 2008; Franconeri et al. 2012; Roth and Franconeri 2012).  
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 For example, Hermer and colleagues (Hermer-Vazquez et al. 1999) argued that although 
different aspects of a problem are accessible without access to linguistic encoding (e.g., 
long wall left of short wall, blue short wall), binding of the different aspects is impossible 
without language. In this way, language is acting as a mediator between the visual system 
(what one sees) and the cognitive system (how one categories what is seen). Also, when 
linguistic information is provided in a similar structure as the comparison (e.g., showing a 
square that has a green left side and red right side, then pointing out that the green is to 
the left versus the red is to the right; from Dessalegn and Landau 2008) then binding is 
likely made easier through this parallel structure. It has been argued that this is because 
the linguistic information maps directly onto the incoming visual information (Roth and 
Franconeri 2012), which diminishes the need for additional cognitive manipulation. It 
follows then, that labels invite comparison, particularly when the information it provides 
matches the perceptual/relational information at hand. In short, language may be acting to 
unify information into a single representation whereby the representation can then be 
manipulated or acted upon more flexibly and subsequently used to make a direct 
comparison to an existing structure (e.g., to decide whether two structures are the same or 
different).  
 
Another possibility is that language provides a mode of thinking about a problem (Slobin 
1987) by providing a category into which the problem constituents can be parsed (e.g., 
Lupyan and Casasanto 2015) which in turn directs attention to the relevant elements 
(Boutennet and Lupyan 2015). This possible mechanism pushes the effect of language to 
preceding stimulus experience by directing attention to the relevant stimulus attributes in 
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 a rapid and automatic manner, in addition to affecting later cognitive processing. From 
this view, language acts to create categories into which stimuli are to be slotted, thereby 
biasing (or warping) subsequent perception to match the established category, which will 
vary by a particular language (i.e., culture; reviewed in Lupyan 2012). This process is 
best described by Lupyan (2012) using an example from the color literature:  
In the case of color, this means that after learning that certain colors are called 
“green,” the perceptual representations activated by a green-colored object 
become warped by top-down feedback as the verbal label “green” is co-activated. 
This results in a temporary warping of the perceptual space with greens pushed 
closer together and/or greens being dragged further from non- greens. Viewing a 
green object becomes a hybrid visuo-linguistic experience. 
As such, this alternative mechanism of language differs from the previously described 
possible mechanism in three important ways: 1) the effect of language is immediate, 
occurring simultaneously with perceptual processing rather than in a more sequential 
order, 2) language has a modifying effect rather than a mediating effect, and 3) its effect 
is evident at the attention-level of cognition rather than at the deeper, later occurring 
comparison-level. 
  
A third, more simple possibility is that language does something else (like simply provide 
a robust memory strategy for maintaining the goal of the task at hand), although this 
hypothesis is more difficult to test. One commonality between each of these proposals is 
that language is viewed as separate from the spatial representational system and that these 
two systems interact. In any case, language might also be considered as either obligatory 
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 or optional. Language-as-obligatory assumes that verbal and nonverbal systems are 
intertwined such that nonverbal reasoning is dependent upon language acquisition and 
that language activation is automatic, while language-as-optional considers them as 
completely separate systems that must be co-engaged such that success in one modality is 
relatively independent of success in the other. Lupyan (2012) laid out a similar argument 
for language’s rapid and automatic influence on “non-verbal” cognition: language affects 
online visual/perceptual processing and is not as deep as Whorf’s (1956) proposal that 
language directly alters cognition such that they are equivalent. Although Lupyan thinks 
that language has an automatic effect on reasoning, he also believes these effects are 
transient. Landau and colleagues (Landau and Dessalegn 2008; Landau and Lakusta 
2009) have reached similar conclusions that language effects are transient, but they take 
the position that language must be intentionally engaged before its effects can be seen. 
These potential mechanisms will be further explored in Chapter 4. 
 
 What are the underlying neural mechanisms? 1.3
 
Aside from investigating the role of language in the development and promotion of 
relational reasoning, it is important to examine the underlying neural mechanisms 
associated with this type of reasoning. Forthcoming research by Kojori et al. (under 
review; in Krawczyk 2012) has revealed that areas of the prefrontal cortex (PFC), 
occipital cortex and parietal cortex are increasingly involved in the processing of 
relational information as relational complexity increases. Supporting evidence for the role 
of PFC has been provided by a number of different lab groups (Waltz et al. 1999; 
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 Christoff et al. 2001; Bunge et al. 2005; Wendelken et al. 2012) each pointing to left-
lateralization of such processes in PFC. Other researchers have found areas such as basal 
ganglia (Melrose et al. 2007), inferior parietal lobule (Wendelken et al. 2011), cerebellum 
and visual cortex (Kalbfleisch et al. 2007) to be co-activated with PFC in certain 
relational reasoning tasks, indicating that a network of neural areas associated with this 
type of reasoning is distributed and extends far beyond the borders of PFC. Additional 
evidence suggests high overlap between visual relational reasoning and semantic 
analogical reasoning (Ferrer et al. 2009; Krawczyk et al. 2010) with respect to the brain 
areas engaged. 
 
The dependence of relational reasoning on PFC and the slow development of this brain 
area have led some researchers to suggest that relational knowledge development follows 
PFC development (Robin and Holyoak 1995; Halford et al. 2010). Since PFC is 
evolutionarily late-emerging (Preuss 1995; but see also Fuster 2008), some researchers 
suggest that relational reasoning is restricted to apes (Thompsen and Oden 2000) or may 
even be uniquely human (Penn et al. 2008). However, PFC is not the only brain area in 
which relational processing occurs, therefore, it would be inappropriate to draw a direct 
link between to the two. In the next sections, I will briefly discuss some important aspects 
of brain development in relation to reasoning abilities and will further explore previous 
findings linking specific brain areas to relational reasoning in both children and adults. 
 
 Lateralization and handedness 1.4
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 In light of the neural findings described above, it may be tempting to conclude that 
relational reasoning is left-lateralized in the brain; however, the role of brain 
lateralization in cognition is still not well understood, even in the non-human research 
(e.g. Hopkins et al. 2007). Lateralization is common in other animals (Vallortigara 2006) 
both in terms of hemispheric specialization and handedness, pawedness or eyedness 
(including visual field biases; see also Fagard 2006 for overview of a special issue of 
Developmental Psychobiology). There are evolutionary benefits to lateralization 
including more efficient brain use at the individual level and predictive group behavior at 
the population level (Vallortigara 2006).  
 
Lateralization of behavior has been linked to hemispheric specialization beyond motoric 
control (with each hemisphere controlling the contralateral side of the body) to emotional 
processing. For example, Casasanto and colleagues have shown that positive valence is 
often attributed to the same side as one’s dominant hand, both in adults (Casasanto 2009; 
Casasanto and Jasmin 2010) and in children (Casasanto and Hennetz 2012). Similar 
findings for other apes have been recorded by Quaresmini et al. (2014). Thus, 
lateralization is important for the organization of cognition even if its evolutionary 
benefit to human cognition is unclear. 
 
Some consider the preponderance of right-handedness in humans to be a consequence of 
left hemisphere specialization of language (Annett 2002), while others consider these to 
be relatively independent (Kinsbourne 1997; Witelson 1990). Michel and colleagues 
(2013) go so far as to argue that the development of handedness contributes to the 
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 development of language in children, as they move through a series of sensorimotor skills 
(as first suggested by Arbib 2006). Although Michel and colleagues concentrated on 
strength of handedness, some researchers have suggested that right-handedness alone is 
the key to language, demonstrating that left-handers have language pathologies or are 
more susceptible to cognitive pathologies (Smith et al. 1989), such as left-right confusion 
(Hannay et al. 1990, but see Jordan et al. 2006 for null findings). Furthermore, left-right 
confusion has been linked to perception of symmetry (Brandt and Mackavey 1981; 
although see Sholl and Egeth 1981 for opposing evidence), which the human body 
displays particularly well. I will explore these potential differences in my study of 
handedness effects on verbal and nonverbal performance in Chapter 5. 
 
Others argue that, handedness aside, the hemispheres are differentially used for various 
cognitive tasks. For example, some have suggested that language acquisition begins in 
the right hemisphere earlier in life but then shifts to the left-hemisphere such that early-
learned words continue to be processed later in life predominately by the right 
hemisphere while later-learned words are processed by the left hemisphere (Bowers et al. 
2013). In fact, the right hemisphere has been implicated in certain cases of recovering 
from aphasia, although only for certain types of lesions (Anglade et al. 2014). Aside from 
language, a left hemisphere advantage for processing categorical relations (i.e., is a dot 
above/below a line) and a right hemisphere advantage for processing coordinate spatial 
relations (i.e., is the dot near/far from a line) has been suggested by Niebauer (2001) and 
others (e.g., Kosslyn 1987). Furthermore, there appears to be a right lateralization for 
spatial working memory and left lateralization for nonspatial working memory (although 
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 not conclusively; D’Esposito et al. 1998). I will examine my findings for supporting 
evidence of hemispheric specialization in Chapter 6. 
 
 What about shifting the frame of reference? 1.4.1
In the task I have designed (see Chapter 2), participants must be able to shift the frame of 
reference in order to encode the appropriate relation. That is, the location of the stimulus 
(on the screen) must sometimes be ignored in order to encode the experimentally correct 
relation. In this way, the relative location of the stimulus (global spatial information) on 
the screen sometimes mismatches the relation depicted within the stimulus (local spatial 
information): in these cases, an incongruence is apparent which may distract from the 
participant’s goal to encode only the relation depicted within the circle. Effects of 
irrelevant location information on judgments have been demonstrated many times in the 
literature. The typical effects rendered are usually response time measurements, and two 
domains of studies, those of the Simon effect (see Simon 1969) and the spatial Stroop 
effect (MacLeod, 1991), have illustrated such effects in both developmental and neural 
studies. In a Simon task, the relevant stimulus feature is a nonspatial physical feature, 
such as color or shape, and the irrelevant stimulus feature is the location in which it 
appears. The Simon effect refers to the fact that responses are faster when the stimulus 
location corresponds to the location of the assigned response (e.g., the stimulus requires a 
left key-press and appears on the left side of the screen) than when it does not (e.g., the 
stimulus requires a left key-press and appears on the right side of the screen). The spatial 
Stroop task provides a similar spatial incongruency as the Simon task, wherein the 
stimulus location is irrelevant.  
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In the spatial Stroop task, the relevant stimulus dimension is a word or symbolic feature 
that conveys spatial information, where a left key-press to the word LEFT is faster when 
the word appears on the left side of the screen than when it appears on the right side of 
the screen. These tasks tap similar neural areas such as anterior cingulate, supplementary 
motor area, visual association areas, inferior temporal cortex, inferior parietal areas, 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal areas, and caudate nucleus (Peterson et al. 
2002). One study investigating neural areas activated by the Simon task indicated similar, 
but adjacent areas: pre-supplementary motor area, superior parietal lobule and cuneus 
(Wittfoth et al. 2006). Interestingly, within the Simon task, location-based incongruencies 
additionally activated the left fusiform gyrus (Wittfoth et al. 2006). These studies set up 
comparisons for my own study, which compares congruency of the stimulus position to 
the spatial relation it depicts with incongruency of stimulus position and spatial category 
depicted. This comparison, in my study, can potentially provide answers about response-
selection processes and particularly account for shifting attention between spatial 
relations: processes that some researchers propose are influenced by language (refer back 
to section 1.2). 
 
 The developing brain 1.4.2
The human brain develops from center-to-peripheral and backwards then forwards such 
that the PFC is one of the last cortical areas to develop (see Qiu et al. 2015 for review). 
Over the first year of life, the total volume of the brain increases by 101%, but only 
increases by 15% over the second year: these increases are due largely to gray matter 
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 growth and less so to white matter growth (Knickmeyer et al. 2008) which follows a 
prolonged developmental trajectory, continuing to develop through adolescence (Qiu et 
al. 2015). Gray matter comprises neurons while white matter comprises the connections 
between neural areas. It appears that brain development follows a hierarchy such that the 
most basic, receptive (sensory) areas develop and connect first, and the integrative, 
higher-level cognitive processing areas develop and connect later in life (Guillery 2005). 
In this way, the infant brain is characterized by dense, local connections whereas 
development slowly adds long-distance connections both within and between 
hemispheres (e.g., Wendelken et al. in press): this likely explains why infants start out as 
information-processing machines and slowly develop into reasoning beings. 
 
Infants are not born with all their inter-cortical connections, although they are largely 
born with the spatial distribution of cortical thickness that they will have as an adult. Li et 
al. (2015) showed that the infant brain is fluctuating in cortical thickness and asymmetry 
during the first 2 years of life, although they found that overall spatial distribution of 
thickness was largely consistent across these ages and reflected similar structural 
differences as is seen in adulthood. They (Li et al. 2015) took MRI scans of infants from 
0, 1, and 2 years of age and calculated changes in cortical thickness and asymmetry. They 
found that over the first year of life infant brains got thicker, particularly in areas that 
started out thicker such as prefrontal, temporal, and inferior parietal cortices, as well as 
insula cortex and orbitofrontal cortex: areas, they suggest, largely corresponding to 
heteromodal association cortices. Areas that showed less growth were those that were 
classified as thin and were mainly found in the precentral gyrus, postcentral gyrus, 
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 paracentral lobule, superior parietal cortex, and occipital cortex: regions which largely 
correspond to unimodal cortices. These findings support the conclusions of Guillery 
(2005) that sensory (unimodal) areas develop first and higher-level cognitive areas and 
connections (heteromodal) develop later. 
 
Over the second year of life, however, fewer cortical regions got thicker – particularly, 
the slow-growth areas from year 1 plus posterior portions of cingulate sulcus, occipital 
pole, and entorhinal cortex – while some got thinner – particularly, bilateral medial 
superior frontal, bilateral orbitofrontal, bilateral superior temporal cortex, right frontal 
pole, right inferior frontal gyrus, and right cuneus cortex (Li et al. 2015). It is interesting 
infants as young as 3 days old are able to categorize spatial relations (Gava et al. 2009) 
when there is so much growth still happening in neural areas associated with relational 
reasoning; however, since these infants were performing basic spatial categorization (i.e., 
the judgments were largely based on perceptual information rather than purely relational 
information) it is unlikely their PFC was necessary for making these judgments. Since my 
task, described in Chapter 2, has a basic reasoning component (congruent trials) in 
addition to a purely relational component (incongruent trials), I would expect to similarly 
find a lack of PFC control over the basic reasoning judgments, although I may find 
activation for the pure (incongruent) relational judgments: these findings are discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
 
The language areas of the brain, on the other hand –the involvement of which in 
relational reasoning is contested – appear to be developed earlier in life2. These language 
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 areas include left inferior frontal gyrus (Broca’s area) and extend to left superior temporal 
lobe (Wernicke’s area) for most right-handed individuals, although females tend to be 
more bilateral in their language areas as are left-handed persons (however, for 
contradictory evidence see Plante et al. 2006; Sommer et al. 2008). These structures are 
thought to be generally responsible for verbal production (Broca’s Area) and 
comprehension (Wernicke’s Area) and are present at birth, although the pathway which 
connects the two will continue to develop into toddlerhood (Perani et al. 2011). These 
structures are present in other primates, as homologues (Petrides and Pandya 2009). 
However, there is accumulating evidence that these so-called language areas have other 
functions as well. Recent evidence links the functioning of the language areas with 
inferior PFC in human adults (Lupyan and Mirman 2013; Lupyan et al. 2012), which 
suggests the traditional language areas are activated in cognitive controls tasks, such as 
those involved in categorization. Furthermore, there is evidence of differential neural 
activation for early-learned words compared to later-learned words in areas outside of 
these traditional areas: the precuneus shows increased activity for early-learned words 
while lateral inferior PFC areas show increased activity for later-learned (Fiebach et al. 
2003). 
 
 Mapping brain development to relational reasoning development 1.4.3
The development of relational reasoning appears to follow the slow maturation of the 
brain, and particularly the PFC, such that reasoning ability increases with age, 
presumably as the necessary neural connections are made. Aside from relational 
reasoning, PFC houses many executive functions including rule switching and working 
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 memory (e.g., Wendelken et al. 2012). Working memory activity is also correlated with 
age and appears to be housed in the superior frontal sulcus (extending anteriorly to 
precentral sulcus) and the intraparietal cortex, bilaterally (Klingberg et al. 2002). Both of 
these areas, plus the inferior parietal cortex, are also correlated to working memory 
capacity (with respect to working memory activity), but only on the left side. Therefore, 
as these brain areas continue to develop, working memory skills increase which likely 
further promote relational reasoning abilities.  
 
Aside from the connections that continue to form from infancy through adolescence, 
children gradually come to use the same neural areas that adults engage while performing 
specific tasks. For example, by the age of 6 years children engage the same set of brain 
regions as adults during analogical reasoning (Wright et al. 2008; Wendelken et al. 2011). 
However, the process by which these regions are formed into a reasoning network 
continues to be refined throughout adolescence. Wendelken et al. (2015) provide a sketch 
of the changing connectivity – both increasing and decreasing connections – between key 
frontal and parietal areas that are part of a developing reasoning network which appears 
to stabilize around age 14 years. However, Richland et al. (2006) demonstrated that 
children between ages 9-11 years can reliably make correct relational matches even in the 
face of distracting information, so even if the neural connections are still being solidified, 
children may be capable of successful cognitive reasoning, though likely through 
alternative neural pathways and cognitive strategies from what they will use as adults. 
This is an important point to take note of: sometimes behavior appears the same despite 
the underlying neural correlates being different. Such a distinction is particularly 
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 important to make whenever cross-sectional or cross-species comparisons are made, 
regardless of whether these comparisons are of behavior or neural correlates. 
 
Three studies by Bunge and colleagues offer a case in point, providing evidence for 
differential activation in PFC and strategy use between children and adults. Wendelken et 
al. (2011) provided evidence for increased functional selectivity across ages 6-18 years in 
rostrolateral PFC (RLPFC) and inferior parietal lobule (IPL): at first these two neural 
areas were activated indiscriminately for first-order and second-order relational 
judgments, then activation for first-order relations diminished with age whereas 
activation for second-order relations stayed elevated. These researchers suggested that 
increased functional selectivity in RLPFC could be partly accounted for by cortical 
thinning in IPL.  
 
Crone and colleagues (2009) demonstrated a developmental shift of neural activation 
patterns for adolescents (8-12-year-olds) compared to adults in PFC areas as they 
performed relational problems, which could indicate that children are solving these 
problems differently than adults. Behavioral evidence suggests that children initially 
neglect to consider more than one dimension when searching for possible dimensional 
changes in a Raven’s Progressive Matrices test. Specifically, 8-12 year old children 
exhibited similar response times to adults on problems with two dimensions to consider, 
but performed with much less accuracy. Children performed more slowly than adults on 
problems with no or only a single relation to consider, but were more accurate on these 
problems than the 2-relation problems, yet still less accurate than adults. These findings 
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 suggest children may not be exploring all the available options in search of the correct 
one and that children failed to allocate sufficient time to the higher relation problems as 
compared to adults. Similar results have been obtained for older low-performing 
individuals (9-14 year olds and adults), which may suggest a deficit in working memory 
information organization (e.g., monitoring or manipulating the available options).  
 
Lastly, Bunge and colleagues (Wright et al. 2008) demonstrated age-related changes in 
the recruitment of VLPFC as well as temporal cortex and other cortical regions for 
processing the retrieval of individual semantic relations in a 4-item analogy task. They 
further found age-related changes in RLPFC where this region is engaged by children (6-
13-year-olds) in analogy trials as it is for adults but, too late to have an effect on 
behavior. From the results of Bunge and colleague’s studies, we expect to find increasing 
performance with increasing age of participants in our own relational judgment task, 
which will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
It appears that there is differentiation in activity between anterior and posterior regions 
within PFC generally as well as within specific areas of PFC (Krawczyk et al. 2011; 
Wendleken et al. 2012; Bunge et al. 2005). For example, Wendelken et al. (2012) 
discovered a domain-specific gradient along the anterior portion of the middle frontal 
gyrus (an area of the RLPFC considered to be domain-general for relational integration) 
where visuo-spatial judgments activated areas dorsal to the areas activated by semantic 
judgments. In my own neural study, I will check for differential neural activity in anterior 
and posterior regions of brain areas: these results are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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 Development of attention networks 1.4.4
Additional networks that seem to vary according to ventral and dorsal pathways may also 
be identified in my study. In particular, my task may involve activation of attention 
networks since it is dynamic and requires the participant to shift their frame of reference 
(see Chapter 2). The dorsal attention network, which is thought to be responsible for 
focusing attention on a task via top-down processing, consists of bilateral intraparietal 
sulcus and frontal eye fields (Farrant and Uddin in press) while the ventral attention 
network responds to unexpected events to break ones attention in a bottom-up fashion 
and includes the neural areas of the temporoparietal junction and ventral frontal cortex, 
mostly in the right hemisphere.  
 
Other attention networks have been described previously in different terms. For example, 
others have divided attention networks into three parts: orienting, alerting and executive 
(Pozuelos et al. 2014). The orienting network comprises the superior parietal cortex, 
temporoparietal junction and frontal eye fields and is responsible for shifting attention to 
exogenous cues. The alerting network involves the locus coeruleus and areas of the 
frontal and parietal cortices: these areas are responsible for sustained attention and 
response readiness. The executive network comprises the anterior cingulate cortex lateral 
and ventral PFC and the basal ganglia and is responsible for processing conflict. These 
described networks develop asymmetrically, each following a separate trajectory, with 
alerting appearing to mature first and executive attention appearing last. This possibly 
illustrates what has been measured in cognitive development studies of children moving 
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 from primarily bottom-up attention mechanisms to better top-down attentional capacities 
(Pozuelos et al. 2014; Farrant and Uddin in press). I should note that the technique used 
in my neural study primarily records only from cortical areas, therefore the subcortical 
areas described in these studies – such as basal ganglia and locus coeruleus – will not be 
investigated in this thesis.  
 
 Mapping relational reasoning in the adult brain 1.4.5
Many researchers have attempted to pinpoint areas of the brain that are preferentially 
activated for a number of processes, including working memory and relational reasoning 
(see Appendix C). Many studies of relational reasoning have focused on the connections 
between prefrontal cortex and parietal areas and are especially focused on executive 
functions such as task switching and rule learning, as evidenced by the previous 
discussion of studies with children. These fronto-parietal connections are well 
documented and central to spatial encoding in humans (Wendelken et al. 2008; 
Amorapanth et al. 2009; Wendelken et al. 2012; Cocchi et al. 2013) and monkeys 
(Chafee and Goldman-Rakic 2000). Activity in parieto-occipital cortices during spatial 
relational reasoning is also well documented (Ruff et al. 2003). More recently, the 
superior temporal lobe has been implicated in spatial awareness as well. In fact, the 
superior temporal gyrus (STG) subserves spatial awareness and encoding in monkeys 
(bilaterally), but only the right STG is thought to house this processing in humans, while 
the left STG has been adapted to language processing (Karnath et al. 2005): yet another 
link of space and language.  
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  Dichotomies in representation. I might expect to find differential activity between 1.4.5.1
above-below and left-right relational planes considering there have been a number of 
such dichotomies discovered in other arenas of spatial reasoning. Some studies have 
focused on dichotomizing and dissociating general mechanisms for such spatial processes 
as navigation (e.g., route vs. survey encoding: Shelton and Gabrieli 2002), perspective 
taking (e.g., first vs. third person perspective: Vogeley and Fink 2003) and working 
memory (e.g., spatial vs. nonspatial working memory: D’Esposito et al. 1998). For 
example, the medial prefrontal and medial parietal cortex are associated with egocentric 
encoding of space (e.g., route encoding: Shelton and Gabrieli 2002; 1st person 
perspective: Vogeley and Fink 2003). In terms of visuo-spatial decision making, Zacks 
and Michelon (2005) did not find areas of the brain that were selectively activated for 
left-right decisions in a frame of reference task, but did find selective activation for 
determining whether objects were the same or different, despite their different 
orientations. In my own project, I will look for differential neural activity between above-
below judgments and left-right judgments (see Chapter 2 for description of task). 
 
 Dissociations in representation. Krawczyk et al. (2008) examined analogical 1.4.5.2
matching abilities of two patient populations: one group had PFC damage and the other 
had temporal lobe damage. Although both patient groups performed worse than the 
healthy controls, individuals with damage to the temporal lobes had intact goal 
maintenance and resistance to distraction, while individuals with damage to PFC were 
less able to overcome these distractions. In short, patients with frontal lobe damage erred 
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 in making perceptual or semantic matches rather than the correct relational matches on 
the analogy problems. Additional lesion studies have revealed a double dissociation 
between relational reasoning and both episodic memory and semantic knowledge: 
temporal lobe patients show impairment on declarative recognition memory for names 
while prefrontal patients show impairment on second-order relational reasoning (e.g., 
Waltz et al. 1999). For example, PFC patients are successful on relational problems 
where only one relation has to be considered, but fail when two or more relations are 
required for a comparison (e.g., matching items in an analogy task for both shape and 
color). However, aphasics are more impaired on low-dimensional categorizations (i.e., 
objects with few shared features such as “things that are green”) than on high-
dimensional categorizations (i.e., objects with many shared features such as “farm 
animals”; Lupyan and Mirman 2013). This may seem odd since detecting perceptual 
similarities have been shown to develop first and to take precedence in comparison tasks. 
Together, these neurological findings provide further evidence that, although language 
supports cognitive functioning, reasoning and categorization are possible without access 
to it. Therefore, I may not find neural activation in language-related areas. On the other 
hand, I may find that language-related areas are differentially activated for the two 
relational planes. 
 
 Sex differences in spatial ability and neural activity 1.5
 
That males outperform females on spatial tasks is almost expected in spatial research 
today and in terms of cognitive functioning it appears to be the most predominant sex 
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 difference studied (Kimura 1999). Some suggest these differences do not emerge until 
age 10 (e.g., Maccoby and Jacklin 1974), but others suggest differences can be seen by 
preschool (e.g., Levine et al. 1999; Bjorklund 2012). Children are learning to form and 
use cognitive and real maps to help them navigate and make sense of their surroundings 
around the preschool and early school years (Bjorklund 2012). During this time of 
learning, males generally show better performance on spatial-orientation and spatial-
visualization tasks while females perform better on memory tasks (Bjorklund 2012). 
However, these findings should not suggest that males are “naturally” better at spatial 
tasks. For example, Levine, Vasilyeva, Lourenco, Newcombe and Huttenlocher (2005) 
found that boys and girls from low socioeconomic status (SES) families did not differ in 
performance on these tasks; only children from middle and high SES families displayed a 
male advantage. The source of some of the differences could be related to parent-child 
interactions during play: children who hear more spatial language from their parents have 
higher spatial skills and better spatial language skills (Pruden et al. 2011) suggesting that 
the activities in which children participate (such as block building) can compound or 
create sex differences. 
 
Finding sex differences at such a young age as preschool has implication for schooling 
and other educational techniques given that spatial skills have been linked to 
achievements in the sciences, math and engineering (Ehrlich et al. 2006; Stieff et al. 
2013; Uttal et al. 2013a; Uttal et al. 2013b). Furthermore, in light of the findings for SES, 
there must be an environmental influence that propels boys to be advantaged over girls. If 
this environmental influence stems from the school system, then measures must be taken 
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 to give girls the same opportunities to practice their spatial skills. Parents could also be a 
source of differentiation in how they speak to their sons versus their daughters. The most 
highly robust findings of the male advantage are on mental rotation tasks (e.g., Voyer et 
al. 1995). Again, some researchers attribute this isolated difference to biological 
predispositions (e.g., Kimura 1999; Geary 2006), but environmental factors such as child-
initiated activities cannot be ignored, especially if these two combine to create even 
larger differences (Baenninger and Newcombe 1995).  
 
To help answer the nature-nurture question, Baenninger and Newcombe (1989) 
performed a meta-analysis of spatial training effects and concluded that spatial skills can 
be enhanced, but more importantly that males and females improve equally, even with 
brief training (for similar findings see Stieff et al. 2013; Uttal et al. 2013a). Thus, since 
brief training is equally as effective as sustained practice, then even a few minutes taken 
for a class lesson can have huge benefits for girls, who may not be getting the same 
sustained practice that boys get from their play behavior. Due to the mixed findings on 
sex differences, and the ensuing implications for any differences, I will test for a male-
advantage in each of my studies where such comparisons are possible (Chapters 4-6). I 
will further explore the educational implications and applications in the General 
Discussion (Chapter 7). 
 
Kessler and Wang (2012) suggest that the difference between the sexes in spatial ability 
has less to do with general spatial ability, but they suggest it has more to do with 
individuals’ social skills, such as empathy and embodiment. Their argument is that 
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 individuals with high social skills are able to take the place of another easily and 
automatically, and, therefore, should be very good at mental rotation in perspective 
taking to see exactly what another sees; whereas, individuals with low social skills should 
be less able to perform embodied processing in part because they are less empathetic, but 
should be good at perspective taking when only considering what is in the other person’s 
line of sight (since no embodiment is required in that process). These predictions are in 
part based on developmental trajectories since perspective-taking in terms of “line of 
sight” is developed by age 2 and in part because autistic children and most primates can 
do “line of sight” but not embodied perspective taking; embodied perspective taking does 
not develop until age 4 or 5 years. When embodiment skill is considered, it becomes 
evident that those individuals who have higher social skills (i.e., more empathetic) are 
better at embodiment problems, although slower to compute the solution. This last 
finding could explain any difference of reaction time between the sexes in my own study, 
expecting, then, that females will be slower than males but be just as accurate in problem 
solving. 
 
When looking at left-right confusion specifically, there is again an apparent sex 
difference: women confuse these relations more than men (Jordan et al. 2006; Hirnstein 
et al. 2009). Although this has been shown time and time again by measures of self-report 
(Hannay et al. 1990; Jordan et al. 2006; Wolf 1973), it has not always shown in 
performance (Teng and Lee 1982; Manga and Ballesteros 1987; Snyder 1991). It appears 
then, at least, that women are more likely than men to report that they are less competent 
at left-right judgments regardless of their actual competence (although Jordan et al., 
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 2006, found that women’s self-assessment were better correlated to their actual abilities 
than were men’s assessments).   
 
In terms of sex differences in neural activity, it has been shown that women are more 
efficient than men in terms of neural processing in a visuospatial task without concurrent 
performance differences (Christova et al. 2008). Furthermore men and women appear to 
differentially activate the two hemispheres in certain tasks, further providing supporting 
evidence of a difference in strategy use (Georgopoulos et al. 2001). Additionally, it has 
been shown that sex differences may exist across a number of cognitive tasks despite 
performance differences, with men showing stronger neural signals and signals in a larger 
number of areas (Bell et al. 2006; Weiss et al. 2003; Thomsen et al. 2000). With respect 
to hemispheric differences in language processing, it has not always been shown that men 
are more lateralized than women (Plante et al. 2006; Sommer et al. 2008). In Chapter 6, I 
will examine potential sex differences in neural activity, particularly in terms of 
hemispheric differences. 
 
 Hypotheses and aims 1.6
I have developed a set of tasks to examine four questions in a series of four studies: 1) 
how verbal and nonverbal knowledge of above/below/left/right develops from 5 years to 
10 years of age, 2) whether verbal knowledge aids performance on a nonverbal task that 
requires judgments of these relations, 3) whether strength of handedness promotes either 
verbal or nonverbal performance, and 4) whether the neural correlates of these judgments 
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 differ across relational plane (above-below vs. right-left) or congruency type (congruent 
vs. incongruent). 
 
A question that underlies all of these studies concerns the connection between language 
and spatial cognition. Although we will not attempt to answer whether spatial language is 
equivalent to spatial cognition, especially in development (e.g., Hendricks et al. 2010), 
there is ample evidence that language plays a role in higher-level reasoning and problem 
solving (e.g., Baldo et al. 2010). The question we aim to answer is how language (e.g., 
having the relational term for a relative position) is related to relational reasoning (e.g., 
identifying relative spatial location of an object). Previous research has indicated that 
monkeys are able to successfully make relational judgments, even without language to 
guide their performance (Goodwin et al. 2012); therefore, it is not likely that language is 
necessary for this processing. 
 
In the first study (Chapter 3) I summarize a study that investigated the order of 
development of verbal and nonverbal knowledge of the four relations from ages 5 to 10 
years. Comparing across age groups, we (Scott et al. 2015a) attempted to capture the 
change in structure and gain of information in the cognitive system as development 
progressed. We hypothesized that chunking would lead to a systematic decrease of the 
entropy in the cognitive organization of relational concepts as an increasing number of 
different relational tasks were performed more similarly with increasing age. We 
expected concomitant improvement in performance across multiple relational tasks with 
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 age, culminating with minimum cluster entropy at age 10 years and near adult levels of 
performance. 
 
In the second study (Chapter 4) I sought to better understand the role of language in 
making nonverbal dynamic relational judgments. We (Scott, Georgopoulos, Sera, to be 
submitted) did this in two ways. First, we examined developing knowledge of a broader 
set of relations than had been studied previously, both verbally and nonverbally. This 
enabled us to address the hypothesis determining whether language acquisition was 
critical for successful performances. Thus, if language systematically precedes and causes 
the ability of nonverbal relational judgments to emerge (i.e., that nonverbal performance 
is language acquisition-dependent), we should find better nonverbal performance along 
the vertical (above-below) relational plane than the horizontal (right-left) plane, since 
knowledge of the words above and below precedes knowledge of the words right and left. 
Second, we manipulated the accessibility of language, which sheds light on whether 
language use is the critical factor, in spite of the available vocabulary. Thus, if having the 
labels is not enough, then we should find no correlation between verbal and nonverbal 
performance, but we should see overall improvement in the nonverbal task when children 
are primed to apply a linguistic strategy (i.e., to use labels). 
 
In the third study (Chapter 5) I explored the potential role of handedness in verbal and 
nonverbal performance. Handedness is often attributed to lateralization of the brain (e.g., 
Smith et al. 1989; Knecht et al. 2000a; Knecht et al. 2000b) and the evolution of the 
language areas (Hewes 1973; Hopkins et al. 2007); therefore, degree of handedness may 
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 contribute to left-right performance on the nonverbal task. However, knowledge of which 
hand is which (through one’s own handedness), outside of any potential effects from 
brain lateralization, is an important but relatively unstudied parameter in relational 
reasoning research. Since the dominance of one hand over the other creates an asymmetry 
– which could be used as a strategy for telling left from right – I will explore the 
development of this knowledge as well as the development of handedness, including how 
each measure relates to verbal and nonverbal performance. I hypothesized that if 
handedness was a true measure of left-hemisphere development (and subsequently 
language development) then I expected to see a positive correlation of performance to 
degree (or strength) of handedness. I also examined the strength of footedness and degree 
of eyedness.  
 
In the final study (Chapter 6) I investigated the underlying neural mechanisms of 
nonverbal performance. Our (Scott, Sera, Leuthold, Georgopoulos, submitted) broad 
predictions were that the two sets of spatial relations (or relational planes: above-below 
vs. left-right) are represented in the brain differently despite a lack of matching 
differential results in performance (i.e., all adults should perform a simple relational task 
perfectly). Specifically, we expected to find areas of the brain that are differentially 
activated for one set of relations compared to the other set. We also expected to find 
differential neural activity for the two types of congruencies: congruent trials versus 
incongruent trials. It might be the case that left-right reasoning taps into the same neural 
areas used in reasoning about incongruencies – where the relative position of something 
does not match its global position; therefore, we compared the activity maps of relational 
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 plane differences and congruency differences to check for shared areas of differential 
activity. I will also draw comparisons Goodwin et al.’s (2012) findings. Unlike Goodwin 
and colleagues (2012) - who recorded only from monkeys’ frontal and parietal areas, 
areas associated with spatial relational reasoning (Friedman and Goldman-Rakic 1994; 
Chafee et al. 2007) – we conducted a whole-brain analysis. Nevertheless, in my analyses 
we will pay special attention to frontal and parietal activity. Research looking specifically 
at the evolution of fronto-parietal connections suggests these pathways emerged early in 
primate evolution and are responsible for mediating ethologically relevant movement 
patterns (Kaas et al. 2012), so it is likely that I should similarly find differential activity 
in both frontal and parietal areas, if these two brain areas are equally important in making 
relational judgments of the sort I examine in this thesis.  
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 Chapter 2 Overview of Methods: Nonverbal Task 
 
 
 Introduction 2.1
 
The experimental portion of this dissertation is divided into four chapters, each 
examining nonverbal performance on above, below, right and left using the same 
computerized task. The first experiment (Chapter 3) concentrates on comparing the 
development of nonverbal knowledge of these relations to developing verbal knowledge 
of the associated labels. The second experiment section (Chapter 4) focuses on the direct 
link between verbal and nonverbal performance and includes a discussion of how 
language may enhance nonverbal reasoning. The third experiment (Chapter 5) considers 
the possible role of handedness in the development of both verbal and nonverbal 
knowledge. The fourth experiment (Chapter 6) uses a modified version of the task and is 
devoted to examining the neural correlates of adult performance on the nonverbal task; 
specifically, whether above-below relations are neurally coded differently than left-right 
relations. Therefore, in this chapter, I will describe the nonverbal task used in these 
experiments. 
 
My nonverbal task design is based on the work of Goodwin and colleagues (2012) who 
measured the performance of macaque monkeys. I used this task in order to maintain a 
comparative component with which I can potentially collate and extrapolate findings 
from my study and Goodwin’s in future work. I kept the design as simple as possible in 
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 order to yield clear results which I could confidently interpret. In designing the task, I 
kept a number of factors in mind: 1) keep it as similar to Goodwin’s so that any 
comparisons to the monkey data would be appropriate, 2) keep it entertaining enough to 
hold children’s attention, and 3) keep the response basic enough to be implemented in an 
MEG machine without biasing neural activity. To achieve this, I did two things: 1) in the 
behavioral study, I made a computer task which used a touch screen so that children 
could indicate the exact relation they wished to relay to the experimenter, and 2) in the 
MEG study, I provided adults with a button box which mapped directly to the relations 
with which they were responding. 
 
 Nonverbal spatial reasoning task 2.2
I based the design of my task on Goodwin et al.’s task (Figure 1.1). Similar to their task, 
my task was dynamic, was presented via a computer, and tested participants’ abilities to 
make correct judgments of above-below and left-right. However, unlike Goodwin et al., 
the dot and line were presented simultaneously and there was an added layer of 
complexity: my task included both congruent and incongruent trials. Incongruent trials 
were trials in which the object-centered frame of reference (the relation of the dot and 
line) indicated a spatial relation that differed from the environment-centered frame of 
reference (the relation of the entire stimulus to the computer screen). Only incongruent 
trials required relational reasoning for successful judgments, while congruent trials could 
be successfully judged using perceptual matching. Therefore, in my analyses of this task, 
I made two comparisons: relational plane (above-below vs. left-right) and congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent). 
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 Materials and design.  2.2.1
This task required the participant to encode and remember on which side of the line a dot 
had appeared. The dot could appear above, below, to the left or to the right of the line 
(Figure 2.1A). The dot and line were encompassed by a circle and the whole stimulus 
could appear in 1 of 4 quadrants on the screen (Figure 2.1B), in one of 12 places around 
the perimeter of the computer screen. The stimuli appeared in each of these locations 
three times within a trial set for a total of 48 trials, but the order of presentation was 
randomized for each person. The participant had to remember the dot’s relative position 
for 3 seconds before responding by touching the computer screen on the same relative 
side of a new line. The circle measured 225 pixels in diameter, the line bisected this circle 
and the dot was displaced straight out from the center of the line by 56 pixels.  
 
The relative position of the stimulus on the computer screen could either match or 
contradict the internal relation represented. Therefore, each relation was either congruent 
or incongruent. Trials where the relative location of the stimulus on the screen matched 
the relation depicted by the dot and line were congruent (stimulus at top of screen, dot 
above line); trials where these relationships did not match were incongruent (stimulus at 
top of screen, dot below line; see Figure 2.1C for an example). For the congruent trials, 
children would be correct 100% of the time if they followed a strategy of touching 
exactly where they saw the stimulus, thereby (perhaps) not encoding the actual relation. 
For the incongruent trials children could only answer correctly by using flexible 
relational coding.  
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In the three studies with children (Chapters 3-5) auditory feedback was provided to the 
child on each trial: a 3 second clip of applause was played after a correct answer; a 1 
second zapping sound was played after an incorrect response. Children started with the 
same set of 8 training trials before moving on to the test trials. The experimenter never 
provided verbal relational terms to describe the position of the dot to the line. The only 
terms used were “here” and “there” to we could avoid providing the child with a verbal 
strategy for the game. 
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Figure 2.1 Illustration of nonverbal task used for the studies with children. (A) Set of all four 
stimuli types illustrating spatial relations of above, below, right and left. (B) The four quadrants in 
which the stimuli appeared. Every relation appeared in each quadrant three times. Each quadrant 
was divided into sub-quadrants for a total of 16 possible locations on the computer screen; 
however, stimuli only appeared in the 12 locations along the perimeter of the screen so stimuli 
never appeared near the center of the screen. Above trials were congruent when the stimulus 
appeared in quadrants 1 or 2, but incongruent when they appeared in quadrants 3 or 4. The 
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 opposite was true for below trials. Similarly, trials in which the stimulus for right were congruent 
were when they appeared in quadrants 2 or 3, and incongruent when they appeared in quadrants 1 
or 4. The opposite was true for left trials. (C) Illustration of the screen progression of two trials 
for the nonverbal task and the amount of time each screen was displayed. The upper-most panel 
shows the first screen (an example of above incongruent trial), the middle panel is the distracter 
screen (static snow), and the lower-most panel shows the response screen. The second example 
trial depicts a congruent left trial. Figure originally published in Scott et al. (2015a) 
 
 Procedure  2.2.2
Instructions provided to each child were as follows: “I am going to show you how to play 
this computer game. It is kind of hard to explain so I am going to tell you how to play the 
game, then we are going to play together, and then I will let you play on your own. In this 
game there is a circle and it going to appear anywhere on the screen. There is going to 
be a line that goes through the middle of the circle and there is going to be a dot on one 
side of this line. You have to remember which side of the line you saw the dot. Then the 
circle is going to disappear and the screen will do something funny [white noise]. Then 
the screen will split in half and each side will be a different color. If you can imagine that 
the line that goes through the middle of the screen is just like the line that went through 
the middle of the circle then I want you to touch the screen on the side of the line that the 
dot appeared. Do you understand how to play the game? Are you ready to try a few with 
me?”  
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 Then, the experimenter showed the child how to play the game by performing the first 
three trials of the game correctly then purposely answered incorrectly on the 4th trial to 
show them what happened when an incorrect answer was provided. This way, the 
children were also introduced to the feedback sounds: an applause followed correct 
responses, but a zapping sound followed an incorrect response. When the 8 training trials 
were finished, the experimenter asked, “Do you think you know how to play the game?” 
If children said “yes” then the test trials were started and the child was no longer 
provided with verbal feedback. If a child responded that they did not understand the 
game, then the 8 training trials were done again. An example of what the child saw is 
illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
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 Figure 2.2 Illustration of progression of one trial for the nonverbal task and the amount of time 
each screen is displayed. The upper-most panel shows the first screen (an example of “below” 
congruent trial), the middle panel is the distractor screen (static snow), and the lower-most panel 
shows the response screen and the child making a correct response. 
 
 Pilot study 2.3
Thirteen children were recruited to participate in a pilot study. The purpose of the study 
was to test the experimental methods and decide on the most appropriate parameters for 
the computerized nonverbal task. Specifically, the parameters that were altered included 
exposure time to stimulus (0.5 seconds to 2 seconds), length of the white noise delay (1 
second to 5 seconds) and time to respond (5 seconds to 10 seconds). Also, the size of the 
stimuli, location of the stimuli on the screen and the exact appearance of the stimuli (e.g. 
form and color) were adjusted. The parameters I selected yielded results that 
differentiated the age groups (e.g., not all participants were performing at ceiling). The 
data collected from these individuals were not used in any analyses. 
 
 Adult study design 2.4
Participants performed a slightly altered version of the same computerized nonverbal task 
given to children. Again, the dot and line were encapsulated by a circle (Figure 2.3A) that 
measured 225 pixels in diameter: the line bisected the circle and the dot was displaced 
straight out from the center of the line by 56 pixels. Also the same, was that the stimuli 
appeared in one of 12 positions along the perimeter of the screen and were defined by 
quadrants (Figure 2.3B). Each relation appeared in each position once for a total of 48 
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 unique trials. The position of the stimulus was either congruent or incongruent with their 
locations on the screen (Figure 2.3B).  
 
A trial progressed as a series of 3 screens, followed by 1 second of empty black screen: 
(1) the stimulus appeared against a black background for 1 second, (2) replaced by static 
white noise for 3 seconds, (3) replaced by a response screen that disappeared after a 
response was given or after 5 seconds had passed. The response screen comprised a 
single orange line against a black background: the line bisected the entire screen in the 
same direction as the line that had bisected the circle earlier in the trial. Responses were 
provided via a button box onto which the relations directly mapped (i.e., right button = 
right, top button = above, etc.). No training was provided. Participants received only 
verbal instructions and received no feedback on any trial to avoid eliciting an 
experimentally irrelevant neural response. Responses were provided for every trial and 
we recorded whether participants pressed a button prior to the appearance of the response 
screen (this occurred only 6 times over 576 trials: 1% of all trials). 
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Figure 2.3 Illustration of computer task used in adult study. A) Example of each of four 
spatial relation stimuli. B) Each stimuli appeared in each subquadrant 3 times. C) Progression of 
two trials: the upper panel illustrates a below congruent trial, the lower panel illustrate a right 
incongruent trial (NB: this drawing is not to scale and does not reflect the actual stimulus size 
with respect to the computer screen). 
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 Chapter 3 Development of verbal and nonverbal 
knowledge of four relations in 5-10-year-olds as entropy 
reduction 
 
 Overview 3.1
In this chapter, I summarize the results of Scott et al. (2015a): a study which investigated 
the order of skill acquisition in verbal and nonverbal judgments of above, below, left and 
right relations. In that work, we applied an information theoretic approach to also assess 
quantitatively the gain of knowledge across various elements of the cognitive domain of 
spatial, relational knowledge, as a function of development. Specifically, we examined 
changing spatial relational knowledge from ages 5 to 10 years. Our analyses consisted of 
a two-step process. First, we performed a hierarchical clustering analysis on children’s 
verbal and nonverbal spatial relational performances to determine which aspects of verbal 
and nonverbal knowledge were performed similarly by each age group as well as to 
discover how the verbal and nonverbal performances clustered together. We next used 
two measures of entropy to capture the gradual emergence of order in the development of 
relational knowledge. These measures of “cognitive entropy” were defined based on two 
independent aspects of chunking, namely (1) the number of clusters formed at each age 
group, and (2) the distribution of verbal and nonverbal performances across the clusters. 
We found that both measures of entropy decreased with age in a quadratic fashion and 
were positively and linearly correlated. The decrease in entropy and, therefore, gain of 
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 information during development was accompanied by improved performance. These 
results document, for the first time, the orderly and progressively structured “chunking” 
of decisions across the development of spatial relational reasoning and quantify this gain 
within a formal information-theoretic framework.  
 
 Introduction  3.2
 
Decisions are made across all domains of knowledge, including spatial, perceptual, 
linguistic, conceptual and social domains. However, these knowledge domains are 
structured and restructured gradually throughout cognitive development. Piaget was the 
first to suggest that adaptive mechanisms, such as assimilation and accommodation 
(Piaget 1964 1977), guide the emergence of different cognitive abilities across domains. 
He suggested that these mechanisms work through the addition and alteration of 
knowledge structures and that the subsequent cognitive abilities emerge in a predictable 
order. However, Piaget was not able to precisely define these mechanisms, yet they 
remain important for understanding how children eventually come to represent the world. 
Many researchers have provided evidence in support of Piaget’s (1955) stages (Pascual-
Leon, 1970; Flavell 1971; Fischer 1980; Demetriou 2013), but operationalizing the 
mechanisms that drive cognitive change through restructuring has remained elusive.  
 
Previous attempts to operationalize these mechanisms were grounded in dynamic systems 
approaches. For example, van Geert (1998) used a dynamic systems approach to model 
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 Piaget’s mechanisms of cognitive change, an approach that describes developmental 
order as being driven by self-organization (e.g., Thelen and Smith 1994; Spencer et al. 
2012). Stephen, Dixon and Isenhower (2009) also relied on self-organization as the 
process driving structural change in their study of cognitive development, and like our 
approach, they used the construct from information theory known as entropy. Entropy is a 
powerful approach for studying development, because it provides a method for 
quantifying how characteristics (e.g., skills, knowledge) are related and change over time.  
 
Information theory was first used to study how information is processed and stored, 
especially in terms of efficiency (Shannon 1948; Newell et al. 1958). It has often been 
applied to the study of memory (Miller 1956; Simon 1974; Ericsson et al. 1980; Cowan 
2001), but in this paper we apply information theory – and specifically entropy – to 
quantify the structural change in developing cognition and to discover the developmental 
order of those constructs. Specifically, we offer a method for applying it to the emergence 
of spatial relational reasoning in 5-10 year olds: that is, children’s ability to recognize the 
relative position of one object with respect to another as being above, below, right, or left.   
 
We chose to investigate spatial relational reasoning because this ability, and spatial 
thinking more broadly, has been implicated in promoting other cognitive skills (National 
Research Council 2006; Uttal et al. 2013a; Uttal et al. 2013b). For example, the National 
Research Council (2006) reported that spatial thinking provided a means of representing 
a problem abstractly which could then be reasoned about and solved through mental 
manipulation: a skill that is necessary for problem solving in science and mathematics. In 
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 addition, relational reasoning, broadly defined, has been proposed as a cognitive feat that 
separates humans from other animals, especially when combined with linguistic abilities 
(Gentner, 2003; Gentner 2010). There have been many recent attempts to explain how 
relative spatial positions are categorized (in infants: Quinn 1994; Gava et al. 2009; in 
healthy and disordered cognition: Hayward and Tarr 1995; Landau and Hoffman 2005; in 
computational models: Regier and Carlson 2001; Lipinski, et al. 2012) and how the 
ability to represent relative location interacts with language (Loewenstein and Gentner 
2005; Dessalegn and Landau 2008; Ratliff and Newcombe 2008; Shusterman et al. 2011). 
Because much previous work has centered on the role of human language in relational 
reasoning, we investigated the development of spatial relational knowledge across the 
verbal and nonverbal modalities. Furthermore, we chose to compare above/below with 
right/left since these represent spatial relational planes (i.e., vertical and horizontal, 
respectively) which are learned at different ages. That is, 5 year olds have been shown to 
know the verbal terms above and below, but it is typically around 6 or 7 years of age that 
children master the terms right and left (Clark 1980; Cox and Richardson 1985; Martin 
and Sera 2006). 
 
Since spatial relational reasoning is poorly understood in terms of which knowledge 
domains are in place first (e.g., verbal or nonverbal) and how this knowledge is 
restructured across development, we were interested in identifying the organizing 
principles that governed the reorganization of children’s knowledge structures. There are 
a number of different ways in which spatial reasoning could be structured. For example, 
the knowledge structure of different spatial relations could be based on the specific 
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 identity of the relation (e.g., above) such that all instantiations of the relation are 
performed equally well. On the other hand, the modality in which the relation is 
experienced (verbal or nonverbal) or the plane to which the relation belongs (e.g., vertical 
or horizontal) could be major factors in organizing spatial relational knowledge. To 
investigate the nature of changing conceptual organization over 6 years of development, 
we focused on the information theoretic process known as “chunking”.  
 
Chunking consists of combining individual items into units (chunks) which can then be 
processed efficiently given their smaller number (Miller 1956). Miller gave the example 
of recalling 5 monosyllabic words (e.g., cat, dog, bee, rat, cow) rather than 15 phonemes 
(or letters: c, a, t, d, o, g, etc.), where words are chunks of 3 phonemes (or letters). 
Different types of information (e.g., words, images, etc.) can be chunked differently (e.g., 
as sentences, scenes, etc.) and within different capacities of memory (remembering lists 
of letters versus lists of digits; Miller 1956; Simon 1974), and the chunking of 
information is based largely on the current structure of a cognitive hierarchical 
organization (e.g., Larkin et al., 1980). For example, experts already have large chunks of 
like information organized together, making for quick retrieval, whereas novices are still 
learning how to organize information in the new context (e.g., chess: Chase and Simon 
1973). Novices must discover on their own the optimal organization of new information 
with respect to already held concepts, whether to integrate new concepts with old ones or 
form new chunks in memory. For example, a chess master “sees” the relationships 
between pieces on the board (e.g., attack or defend) and combines the position of pieces 
into meaningful chunks, whereas novices are more likely to remember only the position 
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 of single pieces on the board (Chase and Simon 1973). This suggests that chunking 
begins on an item-by-item basis with each individual piece of information being 
processed separately; then, after a set of similar items (or, in the case of chess, positions) 
have been chunked together, new but similar information can be processed as if it 
belonged to the previously formed group. Taken together, chunking expedites learning of 
similar tasks and aids in organizing new knowledge with other knowledge like it. In this 
sense, chunking makes stored information more accessible and optimizes decision-
making. By studying how information is processed and stored over human development, 
it would be possible to identify which parts of knowledge domains (or specific skills) are 
acquired first and provide structure to other areas, and at what points in development 
certain skills are performed similarly and when learning accelerates. 
 
It has been previously demonstrated that infants have some capacity to chunk incoming 
information according to spatial, perceptual, linguistic, conceptual or social similarities 
(Feigenson and Halberda 2008; Stahl and Feigenson 2014). For example, Feigenson and 
colleagues presented 16-month-old infants with arrays of 4-6 same or similar objects 
(e.g., balls, dolls, cars, or cats) and recorded their looking time as the objects were 
retrieved, one at a time, after being hidden for a short period. When the objects were 
spatially or categorically grouped, infants would look longer at the hiding spot for objects 
that had not yet been retrieved (to come into view), indicating that infants expected at 
least one more object to be retrieved. Clearly, then, chunking is available to infants; 
therefore, it is a potentially powerful tool for discovering the order, or progression, of 
concept development (e.g., in the spatial, perceptual, linguistic, conceptual or social 
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 domains). To our knowledge, however, this approach has not been applied to any domain 
of conceptual development.  
 
In summary, the main goal of this paper is to offer an example of this new approach to 
the study of cognitive development. We demonstrate the approach using data from one of 
our current studies on the development of spatial relational knowledge in 5-10-year-olds. 
Specifically, we document how knowledge of the spatial relations above, below, right 
and left changes over development and how these concepts are reorganized with 
increasing age, knowledge and skill. We used hierarchical clustering analyses to identify 
conceptual “chunks”, and information theoretic methods to quantify the amount of 
organization in the cognitive system by measuring the amount of entropy at each age 
group. Specifically, we document how knowledge of the spatial relations above, below, 
right and left becomes more unified across six years of life as different instantiations of 
these relations gradually become “chunked” together.  
 
We propose that chunking together different instantiations of spatial relational 
information is at the core of this conceptual change. However, we had no a priori 
expectation of which aspects of spatial relational information would be chunked together 
at each age group. Thus, we sought to discover the organizing principles through which 
chunking acted. As mentioned earlier, there were a number of different organizing 
principles that could direct chunking (see also Methods section below). We also 
examined the “chunks” with respect to the amount of entropy, or uncertainty, in the 
system. Fewer chunks indicate well-structured organization in the system and lower 
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 entropy, whereas many chunks indicate little structural organization and higher entropy. 
Our two measures of entropy were: 1) cluster entropy, which involves the number of 
clusters at each age, and 2) task entropy, which involves the distribution of the 16 tasks 
across the clusters at each age group. So, the amount of entropy in the chunks (i.e., task 
entropy) could be used as a measure of how the concepts are structured in the cognitive 
system (i.e., what organizing principles govern each structure), while the entropy within 
an age group (i.e., cluster entropy) reflects the changing amount of structure in the 
cognitive system with development. Comparing across age groups, we were able to 
capture the change in structure and gain of information in the cognitive system as 
development progressed. We hypothesized that chunking would lead to a systematic 
decrease of the entropy in the cognitive organization of relational concepts as an 
increasing number of different relational tasks were performed more similarly with 
increasing age. We expected concomitant improvement in performance across multiple 
relational tasks with age, culminating with minimum cluster entropy at age 10 years and 
near adult levels of performance. Remarkably, until our study, verbal and nonverbal 
knowledge of these four spatial, relational concepts had not been examined in a single 
cross-sectional study. 
 
 Methods  3.3
 Participants 3.3.1
Children between the ages of 5,0 and 10,11 were recruited from the Minneapolis-St. Paul 
metro area. These children came mostly from middle to high SES Caucasian families. We 
chose this age range because at the age of 5 years children have been shown to have some 
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 spatial relational knowledge, and at 10 years their relational knowledge should be close to 
adult levels. Each of 6 age groups (5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10) included 10 boys and 10 girls for 
a total of 120 children. To ensure that the entire range within each age group was 
represented, both younger and older children at each age group participated so that the 
mean age was at the midpoint for each group. The children had no known cognitive or 
language deficits. An additional 19 children were tested but their data were not used: 13 
participated in pilot work, while the 6 other children were discovered to have a known 
cognitive disorder when they came to the lab or were consistently exposed to a language 
other than English at home. This research complied with University of Minnesota IRB 
approval and HIPAA protocols. 
 
 Tasks  3.3.2
Children performed a total of 16 tasks of spatial relational reasoning. Four spatial 
relations were investigated: above, below, right and left. Knowledge of each relation was 
tested in two conditions within each of two modalities: verbal production, verbal 
comprehension, nonverbal congruency, and nonverbal incongruency (4 relations x 2 
conditions x 2 modalities = 16 tasks; see below for additional task details). Children 
always performed the nonverbal tasks before the verbal tasks to avoid priming children 
with a verbal strategy for the nonverbal tasks and always performed the comprehension 
tasks last in order to avoid giving children the correct label for each relation before they 
performed the verbal production tasks. Some may argue that each instantiation of a 
spatial relation should not be considered separate tasks, but we chose this approach 
because we were interested in trying to capture how decisions across various 
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 instantiations of relational tasks were chunked together as a function of development. 
Again, we had no a priori expectation of which aspects of spatial relational information 
(e.g., relation type, relational plane, modality of task, task condition, or no pattern) would 
be chunked together at each age group and from which we could interpret an underlying 
cognitive mechanism. However, it should be pointed out that this study was focused only 
on spatial tasks, and, hence, a possible extension of this approach to other domains will 
need to be explored in future studies. 
 Nonverbal conditions These tasks were described in the General Methods section. 3.3.2.1
For this set of analyses, we treat each relation within each condition of congruency as 
separate “tasks” and refer to them as such throughout this chapter. 
 Verbal conditions. The eight verbal tasks consisted of a tic-tac-toe-like magnetic 3.3.2.2
board with a circle in the middle square (modified from Cox and Richardson 1985). 
Children were first required to say the location of a magnet on the board with respect to 
the circle (production), then asked to place a magnet onto the board with respect to the 
circle (comprehension; see Figure 3.1). The magnet could be placed above, below, to the 
right or to the left of the circle. 
 
In the production task, parents were allowed to watch their child’s performance upon 
request so long as they did not interact with or speak to their child. In these cases, the 
parent played the role of the confederate; however, the parent did not actually participate 
in the game beyond sitting behind the other tic-tac-toe board completely out of their 
child’s view. The instructions provided to the child were as follows:  
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 In this game, I am going to put a magnet on the board and you need to tell 
[confederate’s name or parent] where the magnet is in terms of this circle 
(experimenter points at the circle). [Confederate’s name or parent] cannot see 
your board so you need to be as specific as possible. If you tell her/him where the 
magnet is in terms of the circle then s/he will know exactly where to place their 
magnet so that their board looks just like yours. 
 
For the comprehension condition, the instructions were as follows:  
In this game I am going to tell you where to place a magnet on the board in terms 
of this circle (experimenter points at the circle). You put the magnet where I tell 
you in terms of the circle.” Then, children were told, “Put the boy (or dog, etc.)  -
above (or below, right, left) the circle.  
No feedback was provided to children with respect to correctness of their response. Trials 
progressed in sets of four wherein each relation was seen only once per set. The order the 
relations were given within a set was randomized using a Latin square design. 
Performance in these tasks, and in the nonverbal tasks, was quantified as percent correct. 
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Figure 3.1 Verbal task. Illustration of the apparatus for the verbal task. Each object represents 
the exact appearance of each magnet. The “cat” is in the above position; the “child” is in the right 
position; the “dog” is in the below position; and, the “house” is in the left position. 
 
A potential caveat in this design is that the house is a potential confound due to its 
“other” category placement as an inanimate object. However, it is equally unlikely that 
any of these objects would be seen as naturally appearing above an orange circle (which 
perhaps could be construed as a sun even though no story line was provided and the only 
label attributed to the orange circle was “circle”). Nevertheless, subsequent analyses 
showed the house was not a confound: children were just as likely to incorrectly 
place/label the position of the house as they were the other three magnets. 
 
The confederate had the order of magnet location already written on their score sheet so 
they did not actually have to place the magnets on the board, but did so anyway to keep 
up the premise of the game. In this way the confederate did not have to see the child’s 
board in order to know if the instruction was correct. Occasionally, there was 
experimenter error in placing a magnet out of order and these cases were marked on the 
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 score sheet (n=3); however these cases were not removed from analyses. Answers were 
considered correct if they produced a relative term that was closely related (similar to 
Cox & Richardson 1985). For instance, the child could produce “on top” for “above”. 
 
 Hierarchical tree clustering 3.3.3
We hypothesized that a key mechanism in the development of relational knowledge is the 
progressive treatment of different tasks as the same (i.e., they become chunked) such that 
more items should be packed into fewer clusters with increasing age. We tested this 
hypothesis by conducting a hierarchical tree clustering analysis (Shepard 1980) of 
performance on the 16 tasks for each of 6 age groups, separately. We then searched for 
consistent grouping (i.e., chunking) of task performance to find out whether a knowledge 
structure had been formed that represented particular organizing principles or task 
characteristics (e.g., modality, condition, relation or plane). If tasks consistently chunked 
together from one age to the next (e.g., two tasks chunk at age 5 then appear as a chunk at 
each subsequent age), then it can be argued that each task that joins the chunk later in 
development (e.g., age 7) has been assimilated with the previously chunked tasks, or that 
the chunk at 5 years of age has been modified to accommodate the new skills at the later 
age.  
 
Hierarchical cluster analyses can be used to find the general factors that underlie general 
performance on a set of tasks as it clusters individual task performances according to 
their shared factors and organizes the clusters by their similarity (Shepard 1988; Corter 
1996). It is a useful analysis for capturing progressive similarity of items. In our study, 
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 clusters were formed based on performance as measured by percentage of correct trials. 
The tasks that fell into a cluster, then, can be judged to be performed similarly well or 
similarly poorly consistently across all individuals in the group. In hierarchical tree 
clustering, clusters are scaled in distance starting an origin that starts at 0 for items that 
are the most similar and ends at 25 for items that are the most different. Therefore, the 
further from the origin that a cluster forms, the less similar the items are within the 
cluster. Furthermore, items that are placed adjacently along the origin (i.e., at the bottom 
of each panel in Figure 3.2) are more closely related than items placed farther apart. To 
examine the content of the clusters (i.e., tasks) we cut the tree at scale interval 3 (blue line 
across tree structures in Figure 3.2) and considered tasks to be chunked only if they 
formed a cluster by scale interval 2. Below scale interval 3, we considered clustered items 
(tasks) to be reasonably similar with performance being neither completely equal nor 
completely different. In this way, items in a cluster could represent tasks performed at 87 
and 88% or tasks performed at 45 and 42%, etc. (percentages taken from 5 year olds’ 
dendrogram). Cutting the trees at interval 6 (and counting only clusters formed by scale 
interval 5) – which makes the items in the clusters less similar to each other – yielded 
similar results, thus the choice of interval size does not change the results substantially. 
SPSS for Windows (version 21) was used for this analysis (method: between-group 
linkage; measure: squared Euclidean distance). 
 
 Cognitive entropy measures 3.3.4
Since relational knowledge is less developed at age 5 years than at later years, we 
hypothesized that relational concepts would be poorly connected (i.e., not chunked 
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 together) at 5 years of age and, therefore, entropy would be highest at that age.  We 
further hypothesized that entropy would decrease with increasing age, and in doing so 
would capture the structure that is added as knowledge is gained and suggest which 
different concepts have become connected or unified. Finally, we expected that a 
decrease in entropy (i.e., reflecting a gain of information) would be accompanied by an 
improvement in performance. 
 
We identified and measured two sources of entropy. One was cluster entropy, 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶, 
referring to the number of clusters in a tree (i.e., at each age group), with respect to the 
maximum of 16 possible clusters, whereas the other was task entropy, 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇, referring to the 
distribution of tasks (𝑇𝑇 = 16) across clusters (at each age group). We calculated each 
entropy measure separately (Shannon, 1948), assessed their change during development, 
and evaluated their relation to each other, as follows. 
 
The cluster entropy for a given tree is: 
  
   𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 = log2𝑁𝑁 bits 
  
where 𝑁𝑁 is the number of clusters in the tree. For example, for a tree with 16 clusters,  
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 = log216 = 4 bits, and, for a tree with 2 clusters,  𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 = log22 = 1 bit. With regard to 
task entropy, it should be noted that chunking cannot dictate by itself how the chunked 
items (tasks) would be distributed across the chunks (clusters). For example, if the 16 
tasks were distributed across two clusters, then in an isotropic distribution each cluster 
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 should contain 8 tasks; however, in any number of different anisotropic distributions the 
two clusters could contain 10 and 6 tasks or 2 and 14 tasks, etc. Then, to find the task 
entropy for a given tree (age group) with 𝑁𝑁 clusters, let 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 be the number of items (tasks) 
in the 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ cluster, where 𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑁𝑁. Then, the task entropy of the 𝑇𝑇 = 16 tasks for this tree 
(in bits), where p is the probability of finding that distribution, is:  
𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 = −�𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖) log2𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖)  
where 
      𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖) = 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇   
and 
 
     max 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 = 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 
 
Since the maximum task entropy is limited by the number of clusters in a tree, we defined 
the tree-specific (i.e., age-specific) task entropy 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇′  as a fraction of max 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 : 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇
′ = 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇max 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 = 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶  
Again, it should be noted that 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 and 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇′  are independent of each other. In other words, 
there is no a priori reason to assume that task entropy should be anything but isotropic 
(i.e., 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇′  = 1). Since 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇′  is a fraction, its values range from zero to one. 
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  Results 3.4
First, we discuss the results from the cluster analyses, and the changes that they capture 
in “chunking” of relational information with development. Then we discuss the changes 
observed in entropy reduction with development. Within each age group, cluster entropy 
is discussed first, followed by task entropy. 
 
 Hierarchical clustering 3.4.1
Figure 3.1 illustrates the results from the hierarchical cluster analyses, with each panel 
showing the dendrogram observed for each age group. Five-year-olds’ performance on 
the 16 tasks grouped into 10 clusters (Figure 3.2A). Each set of relational opposites 
(above/below and right/left) clustered according to verbal task condition (production or 
comprehension), forming 4 separate groups. The nonverbal tasks of congruent and 
incongruent formed an additional 2 cluster pairs and 4 single, discrete clusters where each 
relation formed a cluster within the same task condition or held a position adjacent to 
other relations within the same task condition. For 6-year-olds (Figure 3.2B), again, 10 
distinct clusters emerged. These clusters differed from 5 year olds in two ways. Firstly, 
the above/below verbal tasks collapsed into a single cluster and the nonverbal tasks were 
performed more variably so each relation formed separate, distinct clusters to form the 
remaining 7 groups. Few changes appeared between 6 and 7 year olds (Figure 3.2C), 
although nonverbal congruent tasks began to merge with the above/below verbal tasks 
cluster, thus reducing the number of clusters to 9 in the 7 year olds’ cognitive 
organization. For 8-year-olds (Figure 3.2D), all of the verbal tasks aligned closely 
together along the tree’s baseline (horizontal) axis indicating that these were performed 
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 more similarly to each other than to the nonverbal tasks, despite still forming 4 separate 
clusters (i.e., right/left comprehension as one cluster and above/below verbal tasks as a 
second cluster) where production of right and left split off as separate items (or single-
item clusters). Similarly, the nonverbal tasks aligned closely along the tree’s baseline axis 
as they began to collapse together, forming an additional 4 clusters (for 8 groups total) 
according to task condition. For 9 year olds (Figure 3.2E), only 3 distinct clusters 
emerged: right/left comprehension, right/left production, and everything else. Ten year 
olds (Figure 3.2F) had only 2 clusters after comprehending right/left collapsed with the 
other tasks, leaving production of right/left as a single cluster.  
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 Figure 3.2 Hierarchical tree clustering of performances across the 16 tasks for each age group. 
(A) The tree for 5-year-olds. (B) The tree for 6-year-olds. (C) The tree for 7-year-olds. (D) The 
tree for 8-year-olds. (E) The tree for 9-year-olds. (F) The tree for 10-year-olds. Increasing 
chunking (i.e., fewer clusters) can be seen as development progresses from age 5 (A) to age 10 
(F). Clusters were defined as a group of tasks that formed a group below a scale interval of 3 
(blue line). Each color at the bottom of the tree demarcates the distinct clusters. Each task is 
identified by the condition (capital letter) and relation (lower case letter). Key: P-production 
tasks; C-comprehension tasks; N-congruent trials; I-incongruent trials; a-above; b-below; r-right; 
l-left. 
 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the relationship between correct performance, variability, 
and chunking. As expected, overall performance improved with development, and 
became much less variable over the 6-year span (Figure 3.3). We also observed that the 
number of clusters decreased with age (Figure 3.4), thus demonstrating fewer chunks 
with development. Given the diversity of the tasks, this improvement can be viewed as 
the outcome of a process in which the children gradually became experts in spatial 
judgments across relational planes and verbal and nonverbal modalities. A number of 
organizing principles emerged in the tree structures which underlay chunking which can 
be used to characterize how development unfolds.  
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Figure 3.3 Performance as a function of age. Left panel: Correct performance (±SEM) 
increased with age, while variability decreased (error bars). Right panel: Variability in 
performance decreased with increasing age, and as a linear function of mean correct performance 
(r2 = 0.989, P = 0.000044).  
 
 
Figure 3.4 Number of clusters plotted as a function of age. 
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   Cognitive entropy 3.4.2
We quantified the incremental chunking process that emerged from our hierarchical 
clustering analyses using an information-theoretic framework where we measured the 
entropy in the cognitive organization of each age group. From the trees, we calculated 
both the cluster entropy within age group, 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶, and the task entropy, 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇′ . Both 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 and 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇′  
decreased as a quadratic function of age (Figure 3.5A and B, respectively) and were 
positively, strongly and linearly related between themselves (Figure 3.5C). We provide 
an alternative graphical illustration of changing 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 and 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇′  as a function of age in Figure 
7, which may be helpful in visualizing the relationship between the two measures of 
entropy (especially in comparing ages 5 and 6, which have different distributions across 
the same number of clusters). These data also reveal an inflection point which suggests a 
relatively large cognitive gain between the ages of 8 and 9 years. Based on our findings, 
this is a transition to performing nonverbal tasks similarly to each other and similarly to 
above/below verbal tasks. In other words, the nonverbal tasks begin to merge with the 
verbal tasks. 
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Figure 3.5 Relationship of entropy measures to age and to each other. (A) Entropy of 
chunking (𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶) decreased with age. (B) Entropy of tasks across clusters (𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇′ ) also decreased with 
age. (C) 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 and 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇′  were highly correlated (𝑟𝑟 = 0.98). 
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Figure 3.6 Tree representing the development of spatial relational knowledge from 5 to 10 
years of age. Each branch represents one year of age, with 5 years as bottom branch and 10 years 
as topmost branch. Foundational spatial relational knowledge acquired between infancy and 4 
years of age is represented as the trunk, although not investigated in this paper. The treetop and 
owl represent adults and the pinnacle of human spatial relational knowledge. Each fruit represents 
one cluster, the size of the fruit represents the number of items (tasks) within the cluster, and the 
quantity of fruit on each branch represents cluster entropy at each age. The number inside each 
fruit indicates the class of task entropy shown in the legend, which ranges from completely 
homogeneous (2) to completely heterogeneous (5). A cluster was defined as homogeneous if 
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 tasks within the cluster came from the same relational plane, same task condition and same task 
modality. 
 
We found an excellent correspondence between the ranked mean percent correct 
performance and both ranked 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 and 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇′   (Figure 3.7, left and right panel, respectively). 
Although an overall better performance would be expected to be associated with a 
smaller number of clusters, i.e. a smaller 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 (since the clustering is based on variation in 
performance), the anisotropic distribution of tasks among clusters, reflected in 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇′ , should 
be independent of the overall performance level. However, ranked performance scores 
were highly correlated with both 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 and 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇′  (Figure 3.7). 
Figure 3.7 Relationship of performance to entropy measures. Ranked correct performance 
was highly correlated with entropy reduction. Each age group’s correct performance was ranked. 
Its cluster and task entropies were also ranked. These ranks are and plotted against each other. 
(Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient was 0.995 and 0.943 for the left and right panels, 
respectively). 
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  Discussion 3.5
We believe that our analytic approach offers new insights into the process of cognitive 
development; namely, the mechanisms of restructuring (Piaget’s assimilation and 
accommodation) that occur as knowledge is added to the cognitive system. In this paper, 
we have illustrated the application of this new approach using the development of 
relational knowledge in children. Our cluster analyses revealed the progressive treatment 
of different tasks as being similar (i.e., chunking) as these tasks became hierarchically 
organized with cognitive development. Our finding of entropy reduction captures the 
orderly gain of information on spatial relational judgments, as children gradually became 
experts in these judgments as indicated by their increasing performance accuracy. It 
should be remembered that the chunking measured in our cluster entropy cannot, by 
itself, dictate the outcome of our task entropy although the possible distributions of tasks 
across the chunks (clusters) is constrained by the number of available chunks. Taken 
together, our results also point to the operation of a basic “gain-of-knowledge” (i.e., 
reduction of entropy) process that drives both the chunking (𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶) and the anisotropic 
distribution of tasks among the chunks (𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇′ ), as evidenced by the high correlation 
between these two entropy measures. Such a process has been proposed previously on 
behavioral and theoretical grounds (Pascual-Leone 1970; Piaget 1977; Fischer 1980). The 
orderly decrease of the number of clusters with age, their unequal sizes, and the diversity 
of their item membership all point to the chunking of information as a key mechanism of 
cognitive development. It is through consideration of which tasks chunked together at 
each age (i.e., stage of development) from which we can identify the task attributes on 
which the organizing principles act in organizing relational knowledge. 
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With this approach, we were able to capture the organization of relational knowledge as it 
was being built up from poorly connected (isolated pieces of) knowledge at age 5 years to 
nearly unified treatment of the different tasks at age 10 years, with an acceleration of 
chunking occurring between ages 8 and 9 years. Unlike previous studies (Miller 1956; 
Ericsson et al. 1980; Feigenson and Halberda 2008), our results addressed chunking of 
conceptual knowledge, not working memory. Previous work on memory has concentrated 
on children’s (or adults’) abilities to remember given information based on inherently 
chunking information into meaningful units that require fewer memory resources. For 
example, after 230 hours of practice recalling a large list of numbers using mnemonic 
association (e.g., chunking number spans into dates, ages or running times), one man was 
able to increase his memory span from 7 to 79 items (Ericsson et al. 1980). To the best of 
our knowledge, our study is the first to apply this type of analysis to any area of 
conceptual development as a measure of cognitive organization. 
 
Importantly, the diversity of our tasks, along multiple dimensions, provided the requisite 
variety for investigating how uncertainty in performing relational judgments becomes 
reduced with development, while the unevenness of children’s learning of the basic 
spatial relational concepts allowed us to compare the development of these concepts 
across different modalities. If the tasks we chose were less differentiated in performance, 
especially at 5 years of age, then we would have found more chunks early in development 
and, thereby, would have less clarity in how concepts became organized and structured 
together. Crucially, our methods reveal the natural development of cognitive organization 
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 since children’s strategies for each task were self-generated and under voluntary control 
rather than relying on the strategy provided by an adult (e.g., children were not given 
labels prior to any task, except the verbal comprehension task, which were labels they 
themselves produced).  
 
Through our illustrated application, we showed how cluster analyses could be used to 
extract empirically significant information from task performance. Specifically, we used 
children’s performance on 16 tasks to cluster performances and then assessed the clusters 
to discover under what principles performances were being organized and chunked. Our 
findings indicated that once a chunk was formed it was robust, meaning that it was likely 
to appear at each subsequent age and that the chunked items continued to be strongly 
associated. Therefore, once two tasks were performed similarly within one age group, all 
subsequent ages continued to show strongly similar performance on those two tasks. This 
was especially true for the verbal tasks. Furthermore, previous research has shown that a 
chunk can contain any number of concepts that share strong associations to one another 
(reviewed in Cowan 2001). This means that a chunk need not form from purely similar 
concepts (e.g., only verbal tasks or only instances of above), but it does suggest that once 
two items are chunked together then those items should continue to be strongly 
associated and, therefore, chunked. Additionally, the robustness of specific clusters (i.e., 
content) across the ages (e.g., production of above/below) as revealed by the cluster 
analyses adds qualitative support to our quantitative findings from the entropy measures 
(see cluster content in Figure 3). This all points to irreversibility as an important aspect of 
cognitive organization; that once items group, they rarely ungroup. 
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Importantly, this method provides new insights into knowledge development by revealing 
the step-by-step progression of organization across age and illustrating how development 
progresses in an order that does not appear to be logical. To illustrate, the tasks in this 
study could have chunked according to any of 4 attributes – namely, modality 
(verbal/nonverbal), task condition (verbal production/comprehension, nonverbal 
congruent/incongruent), relational plane (above/below, right/left) or relation (above, 
below, right, left). It could be logically assumed that chunks would first form by relation 
if the concept of above is consistent across task conditions and modalities. However, our 
evidence suggests concepts first got chunked by task condition and relational plane 
(where opposites formed a single chunk), and later across task conditions but within task 
modality. For example, chunks at early ages (i.e., 5-7 years) were primarily within task 
condition and within plane, and at later ages tasks began to chunk within modality (i.e., 
nonverbal congruent and incongruent tasks began to merge at 8 years). Our finding that 
the relational planes were important organizing principles for chunking the verbal tasks, 
but not for chunking the nonverbal tasks, suggests that the division between the 
horizontal and vertical planes exists only linguistically, and not nonverbally. Consistent 
with our findings, previous research has suggested that children know that two labels are 
spatial opposites, before they can accurately marry the labels to the concepts (i.e., label 
specific poles, Clark 1972). More broadly, our findings suggest that the verbal and 
nonverbal instantiations of a concept do not follow the same organizing principles, nor 
does it appear that the above/below and right/left relational planes follow similar 
organizing principles as each other. Our findings may suggest that the label plays a role 
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 in restructuring the concept and assimilate them to fit with the label – at least this seems 
to be true for above and below.  
 
Producing the terms right and left remained separate from all other tasks, even for 10-
year-olds. This suggests that production of right and left fails to generalize into a 
common factor with the other tasks and with the production of the terms above and 
below. This may be why adults continue to confuse right and left (Wolf 1973; Hannay et 
al. 1990) at times. It is unclear at what age the production of right and left become 
chunked with the other tasks or whether these terms ever fully merge with their 
corresponding nonverbal concepts. The current decision-making models that have been 
developed to explain spatial relational judgments at the neurobehavioral level (Regier and 
Carlson 2001; Lipinski et al. 2012) do not account for this differential performance across 
the two planes. 
 
Globally, our approach offers a way of operationalizing and quantifying developmental 
processes across all domains of knowledge – spatial, perceptual, linguistic, conceptual 
and social domains – with broad, practical applications. Examples of broad applications 
include discovering which concepts are needed for other concepts to be gained or the 
order in which different elements of cognition (e.g., working memory, self-recognition, 
language, cognitive control, etc.) come online, while more specific applications include 
finding how labels are attached to concepts. In short, our methods could reveal additional 
information on how cognitive abilities are developing and getting honed. By looking at 
the gradual progression of knowledge and skill learning, results from this approach can 
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 unravel developmental processes which can in turn be used to alter educational models to 
coincide more naturally to how children are actually acquiring skills and knowledge. This 
approach can be used to uncover the foundation for all knowledge and this approach 
should be applied within other cognitive domains and across domains. 
 
Specifically, our findings for spatial relational knowledge have immediate, direct 
application in education. For example, knowing how relational skills are built informs 
academic curricula development. Current research suggests that spatial skills are often 
overlooked in curricula creation and implementation, although training in spatial thinking 
can improve achievement in certain disciplines, such as mathematics and sciences (Uttal 
et al. 2013b; Stieff et al. 2014). Specifically, our findings suggest that such training might 
begin by verbally pairing up polar opposites (e.g., above/below, right/left), in 
concordance with previous findings that suggest children learn two words are opposites 
before they fully map the terms to their relations (Clark 1972). Only after opposites are 
mastered children might be taught to make nonverbal perceptual matching judgments, 
like our nonverbal congruent trials. Finally, these congruent judgments should be the 
basis for teaching how to make the more difficult incongruent relational judgments. In 
short, our findings suggest how a unified system of knowledge for making relational 
judgments might be built— by appealing to the natural progression by which these skills 
develop.   
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 Chapter 4 The relationship of verbal and nonverbal 
performance: the possible role of language in the 
development of nonverbal reasoning 
 
 Overview 4.1
In this chapter I investigate the relationship between verbal and nonverbal knowledge 
with respect to the four spatial relations of above, below, left and right. I answer four 
questions in four experiments by measuring the ability of 6- to 7-year-old children to 
remember the position of a dot that was above, below, left or right a line. I also measured 
children’s knowledge of the corresponding words and their abilities to overcome 
incongruent spatial information. The first question concerns which modality of skill is 
learned first is answered in Experiment 1. In this first experiment I tested the abilities of 
5-10-year-olds to validate my focus on 6-7-year-olds in the subsequent experiments; I 
also compared verbal production performance to verbal comprehension to argue for my 
subsequent focus on production. I found that knowledge of the words developed before 
the ability to make accurate nonverbal judgments along the vertical (above-below) plane, 
but not along the horizontal (right-left) plane. In Experiment 2, I answered the question of 
whether my static verbal task was able to capture true verbal ability compared to a 
dynamic verbal task: children performed similarly on the two tasks. In Experiment 3, I 
asked whether children’s performance could improve on the nonverbal task after 
language use was activated in a preceding task and found that it did improve. Lastly, in 
Experiment 4, I responded to the question of whether improved performance in 
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 Experiment 3 was due to a practice effect rather than language activation and found that a 
practice effect could not account for the improvement. Overall, my findings suggest that 
language promotes relational reasoning by helping children encode and process relational 
information. 
 
 Introduction 4.2
The ability to make relational judgments is thought to be central to human intelligence in 
that it promotes higher cognition (Gentner, 2003, 2010; Halford, Wilson, Philips, 2010). 
For example, relational knowledge is central to spatial cognition, which in turn is critical 
for math and science skills (National Research Council, 2006). By some views, 
knowledge of language plays a critical role in this ability. Yet, despite the evidence that 
language affects relational reasoning, it remains unclear exactly how language is helping. 
One possibility is that language acquisition causes improvement in (i.e., leads) nonverbal 
reasoning such that once the terms are available they are accessed automatically, and 
possibly obligatorily (as seen in some Stroop tasks: see Diamond et al. 2002, for 
discussion). Another possibility is that language use is optional and causes improvement 
in nonverbal reasoning only when the labels are accessed. The goal of this study is to 
better understand the role of language in making dynamic relational judgments. We do 
this in two ways. First, we examine developing knowledge of a broader set of relations, 
verbally and nonverbally, across a broader age span than what has previously been 
investigated. This enables us to address the possibility that language acquisition is 
critical. Second, we manipulate the accessibility of language, which sheds light on 
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 whether language use is the critical factor, in spite of the available vocabulary. This 
study, then, builds on the current literature in two critical ways and therein fills an 
important gap in our current understanding of the development of relational knowledge. 
 
 Past evidence on the role of language in relational thought 4.2.1
In trying to understand the development of relational knowledge, many researchers have 
turned to language as a causal factor, but the current evidence regarding the role of 
language in relational knowledge is mixed and controversial.  
 
 Evidence in favor. Some evidence suggests that language, that is, having labels to 4.2.1.1
represent items, consistently precedes the ability to encode and remember relative object 
locations (e.g., Pyers et al. 2010; Shusterman 2006). For example, Loewenstein and 
Gentner (2005) showed that using vertical labels of top/middle/bottom, words that already 
existed in preschoolers’ vocabularies, improved their judgments in a search task: 
researchers hid a sticker on a shelf and children who were provided a relational term 
performed better than children who were instructed with a generic term, like here. They 
argued that labels invited comparison of the two shelves. Hermer-Vasquez, Moffet, and 
Munkolm (2001) provided similar evidence regarding right and left in a reorientation and 
retrieval task. In their study, preschoolers who could correctly produce the terms right 
and left on their own were better at retrieving a hidden object that was to the right of or 
left of a prominent feature in a room than children who did not know these terms. 
Previously, Hermer and colleagues (Hermer and Spelke 1994; Hermer and Spelke 1996) 
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 had shown that younger children (18-24 month olds) could not use a feature as a 
relational guide for their performance and that adults could be made to perform like them 
when their access to linguistic coding was interrupted (Hermer-Vasquez et al. 1999) 
which led the experimenters to conclude that labels served to bind together relevant 
information. Importantly, in both the Hermer and Gentner studies, less specific language 
did not improve performance. Both these studies suggest that having precise relational 
terms in their vocabulary was necessary for children to correctly encode and remember 
the location of hidden objects and that accessibility to linguistic encoding, as evidenced 
by adult performance, was equally important. 
 
Supporting evidence for the increased cognitive power resulting from symbolic 
representation can be found in various animal studies and even studies with infants. For 
example, nonhuman primates show relatively limited capacity for relational coding (Penn 
et al. 2008; for exception, Fagot and Thompson 2011), including the ability to attend to 
more than one relation at a time (Fragaszy et al. 2011), except when trained to use 
symbols (Gillan et al. 1981; see Boysen and Bernston 1995, for similar findings in 
cognitive control). In terms of infants, Casasola (2005) recently found that providing 18-
month-olds with a familiar, precise label (on) enabled these infants to categorize 
instances of support, whereas providing infants with a generic term (Look!) or no term at 
all did not aid infants. Together, these studies of chidren, infants and animals suggest that 
having a precise term or symbol to label something is imperative for successful relational 
reasoning, particularly in categorizing something and for making comparisons. 
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  Language might be doing something, but what? Even among those that agree that 4.2.1.2
language impacts relational reasoning, its specific role is not clear. Particularly 
contentious is whether there is a necessity that the label already exist in a child’s 
vocabulary, as the previous studies suggest. For example, Shusterman, Lee, and Spelke 
(2011) found that language use was helpful for identifying a spatial cue in a reorientation 
task, but that knowing the precise relational term did not affect preschoolers’ 
performances. This suggests that the precise label is not necessary. Additionally, Christie 
and Gentner (2013) found that 3-year-olds were only able to pass a Relational-Match-To-
Sample task when given a label; however, they were similarly successful with familiar 
(same-different) and novel (truffet) labels. Interestingly, Christie and Gentner’s 2-year-
olds who were trained on the familiar relational labels of same and different did not 
perform as well as their age-matches who were given a novel label for the item-to-be-
matched without training on its correct use. This suggests that familiar labels – that is, 
labels which already exist in the child’s vocabulary – were not necessary. This further 
suggests that providing children with a label describing the item to be matched is 
sometimes more helpful than providing a label describing the precise relation to be 
matched (i.e., same or different); thereby putting the emphasis on matching percepts 
rather than matching labels to percepts.  
 
To complicate things more, Son, Smith, Goldstone, & Leslie, (2012) offer 
complementary evidence for the usefulness of novel labels in their label-matching study 
with 4-5-year-olds; however, children in their study performed better with familiar labels 
than with novel labels, even when the novel label mimicked the relational-match in its 
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 structure (e.g., using the label Ko-Li-Ko to designate an ABA relation). Meanwhile, 
Dessalegn and Landau (2008) – who studied 4-year-olds’ ability to remember a patterned 
square – did not find any supporting evidence for novel labels. In their match-to-sample 
study, children saw a square that was divided into a red half and a green half, had to 
remember the layout, and then were asked to recognize the square from a set of three 
options. Unlike Christie and Gentner, they found that children had difficulty 
remembering the specific red-green relation when they were given a novel label to 
describe the square. Their performance only improved when they were told “the red is on 
(the left of) the green” during the sample presentation – despite the fact that these 
children could not assign the correct label to the correct relation – which the researchers 
interpreted as establishing an asymmetrical directional value to the precise relation 
between the colors. Unlike Son et al. (2012), Dessalegn and Landau found that children 
performed best when the linguistic structure matched the relation-to-be-matched. Roth 
and Franconeri (2012) provide supporting evidence from adults for the enhancement 
effects of matching a linguistically structured phrase to relations depicted in a subsequent 
visual stimulus. It therefore, remains unclear how important it is that the label is familiar 
(with or without training) and precise. 
 
Another possible mechanism of language aiding relational judgments is that it invites 
categorization. Studies from both Casasola (2005) and Lupyan (Lupyan & Casasanto, 
2015; Boutennet & Lupyan, 2015) indicate that labels provide a category for creating a 
concept and organizing constituent parts of the relational problem to be solved. 
Casasola’s work supports Gentner’s conclusions that labels invite comparison whereas 
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 Lupyan’s work supports Landau’s conclusions that linguistic structure guides visual 
attention. In short, in studies that have found support for the role of language, it is not 
clear (1) whether knowledge of a specific term is needed, (2) whether that term needs to 
already be in the child’s vocabulary, and (3) how the label directs attention to the relation 
in question. 
 
 Evidence Against. Yet, other findings suggest that language plays a more limited 4.2.1.3
role in encoding and remembering relational information. For example, Hermer and 
colleagues’ (Hermer and Spelke 1994; Hermer and Spelke 1996; Hermer-Vasquez et al. 
2001) conclusions have been challenged by findings that other, nonlinguistic factors also 
affect reorientation and subsequent object retrieval, such as the size of the room where 
the object is hidden (Learmonth et al. 2002; Ratliff and Newcombe 2008). There appears 
to be ample evidence that individuals who do not have access to language or labels can 
make simple relational judgments. For example, when trained to make spatial relational 
judgments monkeys can show remarkable accuracy (Goodwin et al. 2012). Even human 
infants show some limited capacity for encoding simple spatial relations without access 
to or training on labels (e.g., Gava et al. 2009; Quinn 2007). Thus, simple relational 
judgments (with respect to spatial position) are possible without language.  
 
 Issues with Previous Findings 4.2.2
One reason that it is difficult to draw clear inferences from the past studies is because of 
differences across tasks used, relations tested and age groups tested. For example, 
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 Loewenstein and Gentner (2005) studied knowledge of vertical relations (e.g., top, 
middle, bottom) in 4-year-olds, and Hermer-Vasques, Moffit and Munkholm (2001) 
studied knowledge of horizontal relations (e.g., right and left) in 6- and 7-year-olds. 
Loewenstein and Gentner also used a task in which children were to remember the place 
of an object on a bookshelf and match it to an identical bookshelf, while Hermer-
Vasques, Moffit and Munkholm’s (2001) task required children to navigate inside a 
room. Our current paper is more comprehensive than past work because it examines 
verbal and non-verbal knowledge of both vertical and horizontal relations within a single 
group of children who varied from 5 to 10 years of age. In our study, we expected verbal 
knowledge of above and below to be in place for all children but right and left to be more 
variable across age groups, with older children having complete knowledge of the terms. 
If language acquisition is the critical driving factor, we should find better nonverbal 
performance on the vertical plane than on the horizontal plane.  
 
Another issue involving the tasks used in previous work is the degree to which relational 
reasoning was actually engaged. For example the children who were successful in 
Dessalegn and Landau’s (2008) tasks, could have simply been visually matching the 
squares. The evidence from infants is similar in that it involves making a perceptual 
match that does not require the child to ignore any irrelevant, incongruent information; 
rather, the location of stimuli (or parts of stimuli) may contain enough information to 
yield successful performance without cognizing (or labeling). Our work also differs from 
past studies in that we examined the ability to make dynamic relational judgments that 
required flexible relational reasoning by implementing a more complex task than has 
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 been previously employed: our task required children to overcome incongruencies in the 
stimuli’s locations. Such incongruencies have been shown to affect both monkeys’ 
(Fortes et al. 2004) and young children’s (Smith et al. 1988) performances. For example, 
both find it more difficult to judge which of two items is higher when the items differing 
in height appear at the bottom of a board (Smith et al. 1988) or a computer screen (Fortes 
et al. 2004). Examining performance across congruent and incongruent trials enables us 
to examine the ability to make relational judgments that could be based on simple 
perceptual matching (on congruent trials) against those that require more flexible 
relational coding (on incongruent trials). Furthermore, our task did not require non-
relational skills (e.g., motor) or other abilities.  
 
A third question that emerges from past work involves how language was made more 
accessible. In past work (e.g., Loewenstein and Gentner 2005; Dessalagn and Landau 
2008) the precise (and correct) relational term was provided by the experimenters. It is 
not clear whether children spontaneously access and use the terms when they are not 
explicitly cued to do so.  In our study, instead of explicitly providing or training the child 
on a to-be-used label, we primed children to use a self-generated label by having them 
perform a verbal task before performing a nonverbal task. Furthermore, in this way, 
precise, correct labels were not necessarily used (as measured by performance on the 
verbal task). 
 
The final issue with the findings from past studies is the effectiveness of the labels tested. 
First, having the word in the child’s vocabulary was not always enough for successful 
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 performance in each study, particularly in knowing the precise label. Second, different 
types of labels (novel vs. familiar) led to different performances. These mixed findings in 
combination with animal and infant studies suggest that it cannot be that using (precise) 
labels is necessary for the ability to make nonverbal relational judgments to emerge - 
unless monkeys and infants are performing the task qualitatively differently than older 
human children and adults. So, then, how does language help? Must the words be in place 
in the child’s vocabulary before they can make flexible relational judgments? That is, is 
having the words enough (i.e., acquisition-dependent and necessary)? Or, do they have to 
use the words before they can exploit the advantage of language (i.e., acquisition-
independent and optional)? These are the two main questions our study will answer. 
 
 Discovering the role of language 4.2.3
The goal of this study was to offer evidence on how verbal and nonverbal knowledge of 
vertical and horizontal spatial relations (above, below, right and left) develop in children: 
the first study to directly compare these two relational directions across six age groups. 
Remarkably, the ability to make these verbal and nonverbal judgments has not been 
studied in a single experiment within one group of children, let alone across more than 
one age group. Relational knowledge has been shown to develop extensively from ages 4 
to 5 years, when children become more flexible in relational categorization strategies 
(Gentner et al. 2011). In four experiments, we compared within group differences on 
these types of judgments. In the first experiment, we examine a developmental range (5-
10-year-olds) to find the best age group on which to focus the subsequent experiments. 
This experiment indicated that 6- and 7-year-olds, as a group, showed the ideal mix of 
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 knowing and not knowing the relational terms while (unlike 5-year-olds) attaining above 
chance performance on the nonverbal task. Furthermore, this is an age group that has 
been shown to display better verbal knowledge of the terms above and below than right 
and left in previous studies (Clark 1973; Cox and Richardson 1985; Martin and Sera 
2006). This difference in language knowledge within the same group of children should 
constitute a naturally-occurring “manipulation” of language that should be independent of 
more general cognitive skills and is ideal for comparing verbal performance to nonverbal 
performance. Thus, if language systematically precedes and causes the ability of 
nonverbal relational judgments to emerge (i.e., nonverbal performance is language 
acquisition-dependent and language is obligatory), we should find better nonverbal 
performance along the vertical (above-below) plane than the horizontal (right-left) plane. 
It is currently unclear whether there exists a general planar bias in visual cognition for 
above-below over right-left (e.g., Clark 1972; Hayward and Tarr 1995; Landau and 
Hoffman 2005): this study will, in part, clarify this.   
 
Our predictions across the four experiments were as follows. In Experiment 1, we 
predicted that if language was responsible for flexible relational coding, then 
performance on the nonverbal task should parallel performance on the verbal task: 
children who do well on the verbal task should also do well on the nonverbal task. 
Specifically, children who do well on the incongruent trials of the nonverbal task (i.e., the 
trials that require relational reasoning) should also know the corresponding relational 
terms. Another question we addressed involved performance on the horizontal versus the 
vertical plane. Based on evidence from Goodwin and colleagues’ (2012) studies with 
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 monkeys, we would expect to find better performance on right-left judgments, since their 
monkeys were more accurate and faster at making right-left judgments than above-below 
judgments, and since our design is based on their task, but only if performance is tied to 
some evolutionary bias for these relations. On the other hand, we would expect superior 
performance on above-below judgments if monkeys’ performances were based on order 
of acquisition (monkeys learned right-left relations first). In Experiment 2, we predicted 
that modifying the verbal task from a static task to be as dynamic as the nonverbal task 
would not change the patterns of performance observed in Experiment 1, if true 
knowledge of labels was being assessed. In Experiment 3, we predicted that increased 
accessibility to verbal codes would affect subsequent performance on the nonverbal task. 
Importantly, we examined children’s self-generated use of language instead of providing 
them with particular terms and labels as has been typically done in previous studies, 
which makes our study an important addition to the literature. Finally, in Experiment 4 
we examined the potential role of practice on performance. 
 
 EXPERIMENT 1 4.3
 
The goal of this experiment was to examine the relation between the ability to encode and 
remember the relations above, below, right and left nonverbally and knowledge of the 
corresponding words in 5-10 year olds. Previous studies have suggested a strong relation 
between verbal encoding of spatial relations and performance on spatial memory tasks. 
We expect to find differential nonverbal performance of the two sets of relations if such 
knowledge is predicated by knowledge of the corresponding terms. So, if language causes 
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 improvement in the ability to extract and remember these relations, we should find better 
performance for above and below than for right and left in our nonverbal task as well as 
in the verbal task, since knowledge of the words above and below should be firmly in 
children’s vocabulary at these ages while right and left may not be. In order to avoid the 
experiment (and instructions) from activating the precise verbal codes, all children 
participated in the nonverbal task before the verbal task. Our verbal task was modified 
from Cox and Richardson (1985) while our nonverbal task is new and adds an important 
empirical factor that has been missing in the current literature. 
 
 Method 4.3.1
 Participants. These are the same children who participated in the study described 4.3.1.1
in the previous chapter. Their age descriptive are included in Table 1 and are broken 
down by sex and age group.  
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive information of participants. Each group comprised 10 girls and 10 boys 
for a total of 20 children per age group. 
Age 
(year) 
Girls Boys 
Mean 
(months) 
Range SD Mean 
(months) 
Range SD 
5 66.3 60-71 4.03 65.2 61-70 2.74 
6 77.2 72-83 3.33 77.2 72-83 3.49 
7 90.6 86-95 3.92 89.3 84-95 3.62 
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 8 101.3 97-106 3.06 101.2 96-106 4.32 
9 113.2 109-118 3.01 113.7 109-117 2.79 
10 126 122-131 3.30 124.5 120-128 2.59 
 
 Nonverbal relational judgment task. This is the same task described in the General 4.3.1.2
Methods section. 
 Verbal relational judgment task. This is the same task described in the previous 4.3.1.3
chapter. To remind the reader, no training and no feedback were provided; however, for 
the production task, children were encouraged to use precise terms if they first offered 
only a vague term, such as “here” or if they pointed to the board in lieu of producing any 
term. For one child, the experimenter made an error in placing a magnet out of order and 
this case was marked but not removed from analyses. Children’s answers were 
considered correct if they produced the words above, below, right or left, or a closely 
related but equally specific term such as “on top” for above following Cox & Richardson 
(1985) since we were more interested in children’s knowledge of the vertical and 
horizontal spatial relations than on these rather specific and often interchangeable terms. 
“Side” was not accepted as a correct response for right or left, but children were 
encouraged to think of a different word that was more specific since “side” is an 
otherwise accurate but nonspecific spatial term. In the comprehension task, there were 3 
(of 8) locations that would be counted as “correct”: the canonical position (e.g., directly 
above the circle) or two adjacent corners (e.g., top-right corner or top-left corner for 
“above”). Only two children utilized the corners of the board. Chance was set at 37.5% (3 
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 out of 8 possible locations) for the comprehension task, but there was no chance level set 
for the production task since children could produce any number of terms. 
 
 Results 4.3.2
We were interested in two questions: (1) whether performance was consistently better on 
above and below relations than right and left relations across the tasks; and (2) whether 
performance on the verbal task was related to performance on the nonverbal task. For the 
verbal tasks, we compared performance on the two relational planes (i.e., above and 
below as the vertical plane, right and left as the horizontal plane), rather than on each 
relation, since children learn relational pairs together, first learning that they are opposites 
then learning the correct spatial mapping (Clark 1972; Landau and Hoffman 2005); we 
compare performance on each relation separately for the nonverbal task. For each 
analysis, we used nonparametric tests since performances were highly skewed toward the 
extremes and we looked at each age group separately so that we could map the 
developmental trajectory of relational knowledge. We will use these results to focus on 
the most relevant age group in subsequent experiments. Lastly, there were no gender 
differences found for either verbal task or for the nonverbal task; therefore, I will not 
discuss sex differences further.  
 
 Verbal tasks. For the production task, a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test comparing 4.3.2.1
performance on the two planes indicated that performance was better for above-below 
judgments than for right-left judgments in 5-year-olds (Z = -3.5, p < .00), 6-year-olds (Z 
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 = -2.6, p < .01 ), and 7-year-olds (Z = -2.0, p < .05), but not significantly different for 8-, 
9- or 10-year olds. For the comprehension task, a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test indicated 
better performance on above-below judgments than right-left judgments in 5-year-olds (Z 
= -2.7, p < .01), but not for any other age group. The data are plotted in Figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.1 Children's performance on the verbal tasks: verbal production (left panel) and 
verbal comprehension (right panel). There is a steady increase in performance with increasing age 
in both tasks with children attaining ceiling performance around age 8 years. Only the 
comprehension task could be measured against chance (dotted line), which was set at 37.5% (for 
3 out of 8 possible correct locations). [Note: The data points for above and below are highly 
overlapping.] 
 
It is clear from Figure 4.1 that most development is occurring with respect to the terms 
right and left; performance on above and below appear to be at ceiling in all six age 
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 groups. It is also clear from Figure 4 that production and comprehension follow the same 
developmental patterns; however, as has been found in other areas, the ability to correctly 
comprehend terms develops earlier than the ability to correctly produce these terms (e.g., 
Benedict 1979; Clark and Hecht 1983). Moreover, within these age groups, it appears that 
the most development is occurring on the ability to produce the terms, especially right 
and left, while comprehension appears much closer to ceiling from the youngest age. 
Since we are interested in comparing performances of children who know the correct 
relational terms to children who do not know the correct terms on their nonverbal 
performance, we will focus on the task that elicited the most variability in performance in 
subsequent analyses: verbal production. When analyzing the relation between verbal and 
nonverbal performance we operationalized verbal performance with respect to the 
production task. Another reason for examining production (vs. comprehension) is that 
several studies have found that production (and not comprehension) is most closely 
related to nonverbal performance (Hermer-Vasquez et al. 2001; although see Shusterman 
2006).  
 Nonverbal task. We used the results from the verbal production task to divide 4.3.2.2
children into 3 groups: the age preceding knowledge of the relational terms (5 years), the 
age with partial knowledge of the relational terms (6-7 years), and the age with complete 
knowledge of the relational terms (8-10 years). See Figure 4.2 for nonverbal performance 
for the three age groups. To further examine the first question, we conducted a Friedman 
test to determine whether the distribution of performance differed between relations and 
across congruency types. We chose to analyze each relation separately rather than as a 
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 plane to avoid making any assumptions about nonverbal performance on the different 
relations a priori.  
 
For 5-year-olds, results showed that, overall, distributions were significantly different for 
congruent and incongruent above, below, right and left trials (χ2(7)= 42.6, p < .00). The 
associated pairwise comparisons with unadjusted significant levels indicated better 
performance on all congruent trials than all incongruent trials both within and across 
relations. Table 4.2 lists the significant pairwise comparisons with the unadjusted p-
values: we did not adjust for multiple comparisons because they were planned. For 6-7 
year olds, results showed that, overall, distributions were significantly different for 
congruent and incongruent above, below, right and left trials (χ2(7)= 18.4, p < .01). The 
associated pairwise comparisons indicated better performance on most congruent trials 
than on incongruent right trials (above: z = 1.9, p = .052; below: z = 2.7, p < .01; right: z 
= 2.3, p < .05; left: z = -2.2, p < .05) and marginally better performance on congruent 
below trials than on incongruent left (z = 1.9, p < .055). No other comparisons were 
significant; although it is interesting that above and below incongruent trials are tightly 
associated and slightly separated from right and left incongruent trials, which are also 
tightly associated. For 8-10-year-olds, the distributions of congruent and incongruent 
above, below, right and left trials were not significantly different.  
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 Table 4.2 Pairwise comparisons of nonverbal performances for 5-year-olds. P-values are 
unadjusted for multiple comparisons since these were planned comparisons. There were no 
differences within incongruent trials so the results of these comparisons are not shown in the 
table. 
Incongruent 
trials 
Congruent trials 
Above Below Right Left 
 z p z p z p z p 
Above 2.2 <.05 -3.2 <.01 -2.9 <.01 -3.2 <.01 
Below 2.1 <.05 -3.1 <.01 -2.8 <.01 -3.1 <.01 
Right 2.2 <.05 3.3 <.001 2.9 <.01 -3.2 <.001 
Left 2.4 <.05 3.4 <.001 3.1 <.01 -3.4 <.001 
 
It is clear from Figure 4.2 that most development is occurring with respect to incongruent 
trials while performance on congruent trials appear to be at ceiling for all age groups. 
Because congruent trials can be solved by perceptual matching, and incongruent trials 
require flexible relational judgments, we operationalized the ability to make nonverbal 
relational judgments in terms of performance on the incongruent trials in subsequent 
analyses. Furthermore, because above and below are tightly coupled and right and left are 
tightly coupled, we combined the relations within each relational plane in subsequent 
comparisons. 
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 Figure 4.2 Children's performance on nonverbal tasks. Average percent correct on 
nonverbal tasks of Experiment 1 for each age group. Congruent and incongruent trials of 
the nonverbal task are displayed separately. Error bars illustrate a standard error of +/- 1 
of the means. Chance (black line) is set at 50%. 
 
Overall, I did not find that nonverbal performance on above-below trials was reliably, 
consistently better than performance on right-left trials as expected from the hypothesis 
that language acquisition causes improvement in the ability to make nonverbal relational 
judgments. Therefore, I investigated this hypothesis form an alternative approach by 
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 looking at individual performances and directly comparing a child’s verbal performance 
to their nonverbal performance. 
 Comparison across tasks. It could be argued that individual children may be using 4.3.2.3
a linguistic strategy to perform the nonverbal task, if language is accessed automatically. 
For instance, when children see the dot as being to the “right” of the line a linguistic 
representation of “right” may be instantly activated (as has been argued in Stroop tasks; 
Diamond et al. 2002; Dalrymple-Alford 1973; Klein 1964). If children were attaching a 
correct, precise verbal label to the dot-line relation, then we would expect to find a 
predictive relation between verbal and nonverbal performance. This possibility was 
addressed directly by our second question, which asked whether knowing the term for the 
relations was necessary for (or preceded) successful nonverbal performance. To address 
this, we examined whether performance by individual children on the verbal task was 
correlated with their performance on the nonverbal tasks. We compared only the 
incongruent trials of the nonverbal task to verbal production since success on incongruent 
trials reflects flexible relational coding (while congruent trials can be correctly judged 
through perceptual matching) and since children’s abilities to produce the terms were still 
developing. We look at each age group separately since performance varied by age. 
 
Performance was not normally distributed, so we used Spearman’s Rho correlation test 
on the raw percentage scores. Only correlations that matched relations across tasks are 
relevant to our hypotheses since knowing the relational term is expected to improve 
performance for the corresponding relation; however we show all correlations in Table 3. 
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 We found only one relevant correlation of verbal production to the nonverbal incongruent 
trials: producing the term left reliably predicted nonverbal performance on left 
incongruent trials in 8-10 year olds (Table 3). However, children at these ages were at or 
near ceiling for both tasks, so this correlation is likely driven by a few participants; the 
same can be said for the positive relationship between incongruent above trials and 
production of right. Additionally, for the younger ages, only 6-7-year-olds showed a 
(unpredicted) correlation: incongruent below trials and production of left. Because the 
only correlations are with production of right-left, it could be that production of these 
terms shares some cognitive structure with overcoming incongruencies (however, see 
Scott et al. 2015a for further analyses and discussion concerning the relationship between 
these tasks). 
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 Table 4.3 Spearman's Rho correlation of verbal production task to incongruent trials of 
nonverbal task using percent correct performance. Significant values are bolded and marked 
with an asterisk. 
Incongruent 
trials 
Age^ Production Comprehension 
  Above Below Right Left Above Below Right Left 
Above          
 5 .26 .26 -.16 -.1 -.3 -- -.26 -.18 
 6-7 -.13 -.13 .17 .28 -.13 -- -.05 .08 
 8-10 -- -- .3* .17 -- -- .13 .13 
Below          
 5 .03 .03 .12 .18 -.22 -- -.18 -.13 
 6-7 -.13 -.13 .2 .37* .11 -- .02 .18 
 8-10 -- -- -.11 -.11 -- -- -.07 -.07 
Right          
 5 .18 .18 -.14 -.09 -.3 -- -.36 -.27 
 6-7 -.17 -.17 .13 .22 -.17 -- .00 .12 
 8-10 -- -- -.11 -.11 -- -- -.07 -.07 
Left          
 5 .39 .39 .01 .06 -.14 -- .06 .1 
 6-7 -.14 -.14 .17 .27 -.14 -- -.03 .09 
 8-10 -- -- .09 .26* -- -- .21 .21 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
^ Sample sizes for the ages are: 5-year-olds N = 20, 6-7-year-olds N = 40, 8-10-year-olds N = 60 
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  Discussion 4.3.3
We found an advantage for knowledge of the words above-below over the words right-
left for 5-7-year-olds for both production and comprehension, but no difference for 8-10-
year-olds who performed at ceiling on both verbal tasks. We did not, however, find an 
analogous reliable difference in the ability to make nonverbal relational judgments in the 
above-below (vertical) relational plane over the right-left (horizontal) relational plane. If 
language improves the ability to make nonverbal relational judgments, then we should 
have found better performance on nonverbal judgments of both above and below 
compared to right and left. Converging findings for the independence of verbal and 
nonverbal knowledge emerged from our analyses of individual performances. 
Correlational analyses indicated that verbal performance was not systematically related to 
nonverbal performance, overall. As such, for any age group, a child could excel on one 
task yet perform at chance on the other while another child could show the opposite 
performance. Thus, these findings do not support the idea that knowledge of relational 
terms by itself consistently drives nonverbal performance.  
 
However, one possible reason for our results might be that our static verbal task was not 
measuring the same kind of relational knowledge as our dynamic nonverbal task. In our 
nonverbal task, every relation of above-below/right-left appeared in a different position 
on the screen on every trial, thus requiring children to impose and then abandon a 
different reference point on each trial. In contrast, our verbal task (which has been widely 
used by other researchers) only required that children impose one reference point – the 
middle of the tic-tac-toe board – that could have been used on trial after trial. Perhaps it is 
112 
 
 the ability to dynamically impose and abandon relational standards, which language use 
typically requires, that drives the ability to make dynamic relational judgments. We 
addressed this possibility in Experiment 2 with a new production task. Again, we only 
consider production performance in the remaining experiments since verbal production 
performance was still developing while comprehension was relatively at ceiling for most 
children.  
 
Our finding of better performance on comprehension than production corroborates many 
past findings previously published (Clark and Hecht 1983: Li et al. 2007). Furthermore, 
based on the results of our verbal production task, we focus our following experiments on 
6-7 year olds because children at this age are still learning right-left relations and, thus, 
their performances show the full range of knowing and not knowing these terms.  
 
 Experiment 2 4.4
The results from Experiment 1 do not support the idea that knowledge of relational terms 
consistently precedes and, therefore, predicts the ability to make nonverbal relational 
judgments: that language acquisition leads to automatic label access. However, the 
pattern of findings could have been due to the fact that a shifting frame of reference was 
required in one task, but not the other. Therefore, we tested children’s verbal knowledge 
using a task that required dynamic relational judgments. If the strategic tool that language 
offers is a medium for adopting and abandoning (i.e., shifting) relational standards, then 
we might find a systematic pattern of results across both relational planes when both 
verbal and nonverbal tasks require the same dynamic and flexible relational skills. We 
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 use our results from Experiment 1 to validate our focus on verbal production over verbal 
comprehension, for comparing across relational planes within each task, and for our focus 
on 6-7-year-olds.  
 
 Methods 4.4.1
 Participants. Children from 6;0 to 7;6 years of age were recruited from the same 4.4.1.1
population that participated in Experiments 1, but none had participated in the previous 
experiment. Twelve boys (mean age = 80.3 months, std. dev. = 5.44) and thirteen girls 
(mean age = 80.5 months, std. dev. = 5.51) participated for a total of 25 children. An 
additional 2 children were tested but their data were not used because of an error in the 
computerized presentation of the stimuli. We chose to limit the age of 7-year-olds to 7.5 
since children these ages indicated solid knowledge of above and below but were still 
learning right-left terms. For our comparison across experiments, then, we only compared 
performances of the 30 children from Experiment 1 who matched this age range. 
 Nonverbal relational judgment task. We used the same nonverbal task that we used 4.4.1.2
in Experiment 1 and, as in that experiment, children performed this task first.  
 Dynamic verbal task. For this experiment, the verbal production task consisted of 4.4.1.3
a modified version of the nonverbal computer task. However, instead of touching the 
screen to indicate a relational judgment as they did in the nonverbal task, the child was 
asked to label the relation depicted inside the circle. Thus, the final choice screen was 
deleted and the visual static screen was extended from 3 seconds to 9 seconds, for a total 
trial length of 10 seconds. Just as in the nonverbal task of Experiment 1, the reference 
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 object appeared in each of the four quadrants in a random order, thus correct performance 
on this task required flexible and dynamic verbal relational coding.  
 
Unlike the previous verbal task, children were given up to 8 training trials to ensure they 
understood the task; however, they received no feedback. If a child produced a 
nonspecific word during training, like “side” for left or right relations, then they were 
encouraged to “think of a different word that would help someone who couldn’t see the 
screen understand where the dot was”, but they were not told the nonspecific word (e.g., 
“side”) was incorrect. At the end of training, children were asked, “Do you think you 
know how to play the game?” If the child said “yes” then the test trials were started. 
Again, children received no feedback on correctness during the test phase nor were they 
asked to produce a more specific word since a time limit was now imposed on responses. 
 
 Results 4.4.2
We were interested in two questions. The main question was whether we would replicate 
our results of Experiment 1 – of a different pattern between the vertical and horizontal 
relational planes - using a different verbal task. If we found the same pattern of 
performance on the verbal and nonverbal tasks as in Experiment 1, then we would be 
more confident that the results from that experiment and thus, that the static task used in 
Experiment 1 was tapping the same flexible knowledge of the relations. A second, 
related, question was whether performance on the dynamic verbal task would correlate 
with nonverbal performance. Thus, when analyzing performance in Experiment 2, we 
also analyzed how performance on the verbal task in this experiment compared to 
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 nonverbal performance. We also directly compare overall performances in the two 
experiments. 
 Dynamic verbal task. For the verbal production task, a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 4.4.2.1
comparing overall performance on the two planes indicated that performance was better 
for above-below judgments than for right-left judgments (Figure 6; Z = -3.1, p < .01). 
Performances are plotted in Figure 4.3. However, since the dynamic verbal task included 
both congruent and incongruent trials, we conducted a Friedman’s test to determine 
whether the distribution of performance differed across congruency types. Results 
indicated, overall, that distributions were significantly different for congruent and 
incongruent above-below and right-left trials (χ2(3)= 25.2, p < .00). Contrary to our 
findings from the nonverbal task, we did not find differences in distribution between 
congruencies, but rather only between the relational planes: Incongruent above-below 
trials were performed better than incongruent right-left (Z = 3.0, p <.01) and congruent 
right-left (Z = -2.2, p <.05) while congruent above-below trials were performed better 
than incongruent right-left (Z = 2.6, p <.01) and marginally better than congruent right-
left (Z = 1.9, p = .06).Overall, we replicated our findings in Experiment 1 for the verbal 
task; namely, of a different pattern of performance across tasks within the above-below 
relational plane compared to the right-left relational plane, but using a dynamic verbal 
production task. 
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 Figure 4.3 Error plot of percent correct on verbal task in Experiment 2. Congruent and 
incongruent trials are displayed separately. Error bars illustrate +/-1 standard error of the 
means.  
 
 Comparison across verbal and nonverbal tasks. As in Experiment 1, we 4.4.2.2
investigated a potential relation between verbal and nonverbal performance. Because we 
have both congruent and incongruent trials in the modified verbal production task, we test 
these separately; although, it may be expected that verbal incongruent trials would most 
mirror nonverbal incongruent trials. Our hypothesis was that if language knowledge is 
enough to elevate nonverbal performance, then verbal performance should have a reliable 
relationship to (i.e., predict) nonverbal performance, particularly on incongruent trials. 
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 Nevertheless, we use a two-tailed test to account for the opposite relationship: that 
nonverbal performance drives verbal performance. As in Experiment 1, a Spearman’s 
Rho correlation did not indicate a reliable relationship between verbal and nonverbal 
performance. Table 4.4 shows the correlation table  
 
Table 4.4 Spearman's Rho correlation of nonverbal incongruent trials and verbal 
production taskin Experiment 2. Both  congruent and incongruent trials of the (modified) verbal 
task are included. 
Nonverbal-
Incongruent  
Production-Congruent Production-Incongruent 
 Above Below Right Left Above Below Right Left 
Above         
 .16 .50* -.02 -.06 -.14 -- -.12 -.00 
Below         
 .12 .26 .09 .09 -.15 -- -.03 -.16 
Right         
 .06 .41* .19 .14 -.19 -- .05 .23 
Left         
 .31 .36 .03 -.05 -.17 -- -.08 .10 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
 Comparison between dynamic and static verbal tasks. The impetus for this 4.4.2.3
experiment was to check if the verbal task used in Experiment 1 was sufficient to tap into 
true verbal relational knowledge. To this point, we have generally replicated our results 
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 from Experiment 1. Nevertheless, with respect to performance across the two 
experiments, the most important comparison involved our manipulation of the verbal 
production task. For comparison purposes, we combined over congruent and incongruent 
trials of the modified verbal task to get a total performance on each relational plane. A 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the distributions yielded no significant differences between 
experiments (see Figure 4.4).  
 
With regards to performance on the nonverbal tasks, we expected no difference in 
performance since in both experiments the nonverbal task was performed first, and 
therefore, not affected by the nature of the subsequent verbal task. A Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test on the distributions to check that the samples were from the same 
population indicated no significant differences, so we considered the two experimental 
groups to be equivalent. 
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Figure 4.4 Box plot of percent correct on nonverbal and verbal tasks for 6-7.5-year-olds in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Congruent and incongruent trials of the nonverbal task are displayed 
separately, but congruent and incongruent trials of the verbal task are averaged for an overall 
score. The median is displayed as a black line inside the box. Outliers are displayed as a symbol 
and a numerical tag (to include overlapping scores). 
 
 Discussion 4.4.3
After changing the nature of the verbal task from a static to a dynamic one, we replicated 
our finding in Experiment 1: namely, of a different relation between verbal and nonverbal 
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 performance for each relational plane. We changed the verbal task to include the ability 
to impose and abandon different frames of reference, but our analyses indicated that this 
was not a factor in children’s ability to name the relations. Additionally, despite the 
greater computation and attention required to succeed in the dynamic verbal task (as 
compared to the static verbal task used in Experiment 1), performance on these two 
verbal tasks were not significantly different from each other. Therefore, the static task 
that has been previously used seemed to tap into the same flexible knowledge of the 
relations as the dynamic task and accurately measured verbal knowledge. One new 
finding was that congruency did not affect verbal performance, despite it having a 
significant effect on nonverbal performance. This finding suggests that children can 
overcome incongruencies when using linguistic labels to judge spatial relations. 
 
As in Experiment 1, we tested for a reliable relationship between performance on the 
verbal production task and the nonverbal incongruent trials and again found none. In 
other words, we did not find that knowledge of the words systematically co-varied with 
the ability to make the nonverbal judgments, not even when comparing incongruent 
verbal trials to incongruent nonverbal trials. Overall, these results, again, do not support 
the idea that knowledge of the corresponding relational terms, by itself, (i.e., acquisition) 
consistently (and obligatorily or automatically) affects the ability to make nonverbal 
dynamic relational judgments in the two relational planes studied. 
 
Nevertheless, although the role of language seems not to be that of causing the ability to 
make nonverbal relational judgments emerge, its role may be that of providing an 
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 efficient strategy for encoding and remembering relational information. Perhaps verbal 
knowledge by itself does not lead to improved nonverbal performance, meaning simply 
having the words in one’s vocabulary is not enough. Rather, it is only when verbal 
knowledge is utilized that it simplifies relational judgments, possibly by allowing 
children to ignore irrelevant details of the stimuli, as suggested by the results of our 
modified verbal task. If children use category labels for unifying all instantiations of a 
relation into a single category (i.e., all above), regardless of its location on the screen 
(i.e., congruency type), then children’s performances should converge to be nearly 
similar (thus reducing variability in performances) and the difference between 
performance on congruent and incongruent trials might completely disappear. Based on 
the finding of no effect of congruency in the verbal task, we had reason to believe that 
labels provide a mechanism for ignoring salient but inappropriate visual details (i.e., 
overcoming incongruencies). In Experiment 3, we attempted to naturally activate the 
category labels during the nonverbal task by having children perform the verbal task first.  
 
 Experiment 3 4.5
It may be that knowing labels (i.e., having labels available) and accessing them are 
separate abilities (see Brod et al. 2013 for similar argument of distinguishing between 
availability and accessibility). If language’s role in encoding and remembering relational 
information is to offer a strategy for abandoning frames of references, then we should 
find better performance on a nonverbal task when category labels are made more 
accessible. To increase accessibility, we had children perform the verbal task before the 
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 nonverbal task and examined whether nonverbal performance became less variable across 
children compared to Experiments 1 and 2, particularly on the incongruent trials.  
 
One potential problem of having children perform the verbal task first is that children 
might not use the relational terms intended (above, below, right or left); however, 
evidence from other studies indicates that using terms which are less specific (e.g., side, 
other side) or consistently using the same (but wrong) terms to label relations (e.g., say 
left for right and vice versa) may nonetheless improve performance on a nonverbal task 
(e.g., Shusterman et al. 2011). Additionally, based on the correlation analyses from our 
previous experiments, knowledge of the correct, precise terms should not matter, anyway. 
Nevertheless, we again assess the degree to which use of precise labels influenced 
performance by analyzing performance on the nonverbal task as a function of 
performance on the verbal task. If specifically coding the dot as to the side of the line is 
equivalent as coding it to the right of the line then, we should see no difference in 
performance on the nonverbal task as a function of the specific words used in the verbal 
task.  
 
 Methods 4.5.1
 Participants. Children from 6;0 to 7;6 years of age were recruited from the same 4.5.1.1
population that participated in Experiments 1 and 2, but none had participated in either of 
the first two experiments. A total of 25 monolingual, native English-speaking children 
with no known cognitive differences were tested. Eleven boys (mean age = 81.5 months, 
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 std. dev. = 6.36) and fourteen girls (mean age = 82.4 months, std. dev. = 3.57) were 
tested. An additional 3 children were tested but their data were not used; 1 due to parent 
interference and 2 due to computer failures. 
 Nonverbal relational judgment task. We used the same nonverbal task that we used 4.5.1.2
in Experiments 1 and 2, except in this experiment the task was performed second. 
 Verbal relational judgment task. We used the same verbal task that we used in 4.5.1.3
Experiment 2. The only difference was that participation in this task preceded the 
nonverbal task. It is important to note that, as in the Experiment 1 and 2, no feedback was 
provided during the testing phase of this task. 
 
 Results 4.5.2
We were interested in two questions. The main question was whether we would find 
improved performance on the incongruent trials of the nonverbal task as compared to the 
previous two experiments. A related question was whether performance would vary 
systematically on the nonverbal task as a function of performance on the verbal task. 
With regard to the second hypothesis, we would expect to continue to not find a 
correlation if the exact term is not necessary for improving performance and if it is rather 
more an effect of using some label. 
 Nonverbal task. We conducted a Friedman’s test to determine whether the 4.5.2.1
distribution of performance differed between relational planes and across congruency 
types. Results indicated that, overall, distributions were not significantly different for 
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 congruent and incongruent above-below and right-left trials (χ2(3)= 1.6, p = .66). Figure 
4.5 illustrates performance means and standard error. It appears that by performing the 
verbal task first, children were able to overcome the congruency effect in the nonverbal 
task, making the nonverbal task look more like the verbal task but without the effect of 
relational plane. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Error plot of performance on nonverbal and verbal tasks in Experiment 3. 
Congruent and incongruent trials are displayed separately. Error bars illustrate +/- 1 standard 
error of the means.  
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  Comparison across experiments. To test for differences in patterns of 4.5.2.2
performance across the three experiments we compared the variance in performances 
using Levene’s test for equality of variances. The most important comparison involved 
performance on the incongruent trials (Figure 4.6). If nonverbal performance was 
enhanced in Experiment 3 by virtue of performing the verbal task first, then we should 
observe better, more consistent overall performance (i.e., less variable) on incongruent 
trials of Experiment 3 than Experiments 1 and 2 combined. Indeed, overall (F54,24 = 12.0, 
p < .001), there was significantly less variable performance on the nonverbal incongruent 
trials in Experiment 3 than in Experiments 1 and 2 (above-below: F54,24 = 15.3, p < .00; 
right-left: F54,24 = 8.0, p < .01). Recall there was no significant difference of performance 
on incongruent trials between Experiments 1 and 2. Furthermore, the range of scores for 
children in Experiment 3 was much smaller: children in Experiment 3 did no worse than 
40% correct performance, whereas children in Experiments 1 and 2 performed as low as 
0% correct. 
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 Figure 4.6 Boxplots of performance of children on nonverbal incongruent trials across 
Experiments 1 and 2 and Experiment 3. The variance in performances was significantly different 
between the three experiments. The median is displayed as a black line inside the box. Outliers 
are displayed as a symbol and a numerical tag (to include overlapping scores). 
 
 Comparison across tasks. The finding that children performed less variably, and 4.5.2.3
better overall (the lowest performance in Experiment 3 was 40% compared to 0% in the 
other experiments), on the incongruent trials in Experiment 3 than in Experiments 1 and 2 
does not identify the specificity of the language effect. Did coding a relation with any 
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 label (e.g., to the side) improve performance? Or did children need to code the location of 
the dot with the specific label (e.g., to the right) to improve their performance (harking 
back to our original question)? In order to address this question, we examined 
performance on each task for each relation. Thus, as in Experiment 1, we investigated 
whether performance on one task was related to performance on the other task. If 
knowing the precise relational term, and using it correctly, was responsible for improved 
performance on the nonverbal task from Experiments 1 and 2 to Experiment 3, then we 
should find a positive correlation between verbal production and performance on the 
nonverbal incongruent trials. In short, children who accurately produced the terms right-
left (or above-below) in the verbal task should have done better on these relations in the 
nonverbal task than children who used other terms. 
 
A Spearman’s Rho correlation on the raw percentage correct indicated that only one 
relevant correlation of verbal production to the nonverbal incongruent trials: production 
of incongruent right was correlated with nonverbal incongruent right trials. As before, 
only correlations that matched relations across tasks are relevant to our hypotheses since 
knowing the relational term is expected to improve performance for the corresponding 
relation; however, again, we show all correlations in Table 4.5. Overall, we found little 
evidence that precise coding of the relations was responsible for improved performance. 
Thus, our findings suggest that the improvement we found on the incongruent trials (for 
both relational planes) was due to increased accessibility to labels, even imprecise ones.  
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 Table 4.5 Spearman's Rho correlation of performance on nonverbal incongruent trials and 
verbal production congruent and incongruent trials in Experiment 3. 
Nonverbal-
Incongruent  
Production-Congruent Production-Incongruent 
 Above Below Right Left Above Below Right Left 
Above         
 .08 -.13 .16 .14 -.14 -.28 .13 .10 
Below         
 -.05 -.25 .56* .54* -.34 -.34 .62* .46* 
Right         
 .17 -.14 .39 .42* -.11 -.27 .44* .34 
Left         
 .33 .25 .24 .30 .27 .10 .33 .25 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
 Discussion 4.5.3
We found that asking children to produce the relational terms before they performed the 
nonverbal task led them to make more successful nonverbal relational judgments, 
especially on the incongruent trials. We believe that by having children perform the 
verbal task first, they became accustomed to using linguistic labels, and used this same 
strategy to encode and remember the relation between the dot and the line on the 
incongruent trials as well as the congruent trials of the nonverbal task. Furthermore, we 
found that even if the information contained in the verbal codes was not accurate – based 
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 on verbal production performance – the use of such codes (i.e., any code) was enough to 
increase performance. These findings suggest that children of this age can use language 
as a strategy for solving problems in an otherwise nonlinguistic task, but may typically 
fail to use these strategies spontaneously. It seems, then, that language is not accessed 
automatically once the terms has been acquired, but rather that these terms must be 
accessed before they can be applied to an otherwise nonverbal task. 
 
Furthermore, the finding that verbal performance was not reliably correlated to nonverbal 
performance on the incongruent trials lends support to the conclusion that knowing the 
exact terms is not what helped children perform the nonverbal task, but rather having 
language as a more accessible strategy for encoding the location of the dot to the line was 
what led to better perform the nonverbal task. Therefore, we provide some evidence that 
having a system of contrasting terms (i.e., opposites) may be important in successful 
nonverbal performance, even if the system is imperfect (i.e., the terms are not used 
consistently or accurately). We want to emphasize the natural discovery of language as a 
strategy by these children. Without performing the labeling task first, children of this age 
did not seem to automatically access labels for use in the nonverbal tasks. 
 
A final concern that arises is the degree to which our findings may reflect practice effects. 
To address this concern, we conducted a final experiment where children performed a 
modified version of the dynamic task before they performed the regular nonverbal task 
used in previous experiments. If children do not perform better on the nonverbal task in 
130 
 
 Experiment 4, then the improved performance in Experiment 3 cannot be explained by a 
practice effect (i.e., by virtue of performing the regular nonverbal task second). 
 
 Experiment 4 4.6
If the improved performance on the incongruent trials of the nonverbal task can be 
attributed solely to having performed the nonverbal task second (a practice effect), then 
we would expect to find equally improved performance on those trials without of a verbal 
task being performed first. In this experiment, we gave children a non-verbal version of 
the dynamic verbal task performed by children in Experiments 2 and 3. In the modified 
version, we asked children to perform it nonverbally, thus taking away the chance for 
verbal priming that was provided in Experiment 3. We kept all other aspects of the task 
(i.e., no feedback and immediate response) the same as in previous experiments, which 
served to differentiate it from the “regular” nonverbal task (i.e., the nonverbal task used 
in the previous experiments) that followed. 
 
 Methods 4.6.1
 Participants. Children from 6;0 to 7;6 years of age were recruited from the same 4.6.1.1
population that participated in Experiments 1, 2 and 3, but none participated in any of 
those experiments. A total of 25 monolingual, native English-speaking children with no 
known cognitive differences were tested. Thirteen boys (mean age = 80.3 months, std. 
dev. = 3.92) and twelve girls (mean age = 82.6 months, std. dev. = 4.91) were tested. An 
additional 5 children were tested but their data were not used; 3 were due to over-
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 scheduling and 2 were due to inattentiveness during the tasks. We excluded the children 
who were overscheduled in order to maintain similar age distributions across experiments 
and to use only the first children tested to satisfy age-matching requirements. The data 
was collected only to avoid cancelling appointments (and potentially disappointing 
families who were gracious enough to volunteer their time).  
 
 Nonverbal relational judgment task. We used the same nonverbal task used in 4.6.1.2
Experiments 1, 2 and 3. As in Experiment 3, this task was performed second. 
 
 Modified relational judgment task. We modified the verbal task used in 4.6.1.3
Experiments 2 and 3, so that children could respond nonverbally. As many parameters as 
possible were kept the same. For example, children were able to respond immediately 
and were not provided any feedback as to the correctness of their responses; however, 
instead of the white noise screen being extended to 9s and replacing the two-colored 
response screen, those screens were switched so that the white noise screen did not 
appear and the two-colored response screen appeared immediately after the stimulus 
screen and was available for up to 9s. Like in the previous studies, children were 
provided with practice trials to ensure they understood the instructions associated with 
the task.  
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  Results 4.6.2
The critical comparison for this experiment is performance on the incongruent trials as 
compared to the previous experiments. We compared the variances as these were shown 
to be different between Experiments 1 and 2 and Experiment 3. Levene’s test for equality 
of variances for the incongruent trials of Experiment 4 compared to Experiment 3 
indicated a significant difference in the variances (F24,24 = 4.3, p < .05; Figure 4.7). It 
seems, then, a practice effect cannot account for the improved performances found in 
Experiment 3.  
 
Figure 4.7 Boxplot of performance on nonverbal incongruent trials across Experiments 3 
and 4. The variance in performances was significantly different between experiments, with 
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 Experiment 3 resulting in the lowest variance. The median is displayed as a black line inside the 
box. Outliers are displayed as a symbol and a numerical tag (to include overlapping scores). 
 
 Discussion 4.6.3
In this experiment, children were not primed to use the verbal labels attached to each 
relation. Similar to Experiment 3, they performed the regular nonverbal task second, but 
we did not find an equal improvement in the performance of incongruent trials. 
Therefore, we did not find a practice effect. This finding lends support to our conclusion 
in Experiment 3 that priming children to use verbal labels significantly improved their 
performance in a subsequent task. Labels, then, seem to provide a mechanism for 
ignoring salient but inappropriate visual details and thus moving from a perceptual 
matching strategy to a flexible, relational one. 
 
 General Discussion 4.7
Understanding the order in which different aspects of relational knowledge develop can 
shed light on how these skills interact in development (Scott et al. 2015a). The purpose of 
this study was to shed light on the role of language in making flexible relational 
judgments by examining the relation between verbal and nonverbal abilities as they co-
develop in children. Previous work has suggested that language enhances relational 
reasoning in human adults beyond the limited capacities observed in animals and young 
children, but there is currently no consensus on the specific role that language plays in 
achieving this enhancement. Findings such as Gentner’s (Gentner 2003; Loewenstein and 
Gentner 2005) and Hermer and colleagues’ (Hermer and Spelke 1994; Hermer and 
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 Spelke 1996; Hermer-Vasquez et al. 1999) suggest that the acquisition of relational terms 
is the critical piece; yet, other findings suggest that verbal knowledge by itself is not so 
critical (e.g., Ratliff and Newcombe 2008) or has only a temporary effect (see for review 
Landau and Lakusta 2009). Our findings suggest that knowing relational terms by itself 
does not consistently improve the ability to make different flexible relational judgments, 
but accessing labels is what matters (for a similar conclusion regarding the relation 
between plural morphology and number memory see Ettlinger et al. 2014). Corroborating 
this interpretation is the literature on relational concepts in nonhuman primates which has 
shown that those animals with knowledge of symbols (and who have been trained to 
implement them) perform relational judgments better than those without symbolic 
experience, even though the exact role that symbols play remains unclear (Thompson et 
al. 1997). Our findings suggest that symbolic representation, including language, may 
work in improving relational reasoning beyond what is typically possible by promoting 
categorization and helping to ignore salient but irrelevant information. It seems that using 
symbols to facilitate relational judgments is a skill that develops even in humans and is 
neither automatic nor obligatory. Children first learn language, then, they gradually come 
to use it. 
 
Furthermore, in this study we were able to distinguish between two viewpoints of 
language’s role in cognition: 1) that language is automatic and obligatory used once 
acquired versus 2) that language is optional and must be activated. Language-as-
obligatory assumes that verbal and nonverbal systems are intertwined such that nonverbal 
reasoning is dependent upon language acquisition wherein the activation of linguistic 
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 processing is automatic, while language-as-optional considers them as separate systems 
that must be co-engaged such that success in one modality is relatively independent of 
success in the other. While our findings that children’s nonverbal performance was 
improved when they were primed to use language leads us to conclude that language is 
optional and need not be precise, our analyses of the lack of correlation between verbal 
and nonverbal performance suggest that verbal and nonverbal knowledge are separate 
systems that must be co-engaged. Gleitman (Gleitman and Papafragou 2005; Snedeker 
and Gleitman 2004) has made similar arguments that language and other cognitive 
systems are separate but intertwined wherein language maps onto, otherwise separate, 
concepts.  
 
I began by asking how language might enhance relational coding. I believe our evidence 
indicates that by accessing language and applying a linguistic strategy the child’s 
attention is directed to the relevant relation. In this way, the perceptually salient but 
irrelevant information is more easily ignored and the incorrect frame of reference is 
abandoned. In this case, language may provide a unifying mechanism for bridging the 
perceptual gaps between different instances of relational similarity: what is seen and the 
concept to which it is tied. In their work, Hermer-Vasquez, Spelke, and Katsnelson 
(1999) suggested that language is necessary to bind together different types of 
information into a unitary representation, perhaps by acting as a scaffold for building 
these unified representations. It may do so by making the abstract relational codes more 
robust, and in our tasks, provide a memory trace of the stimulus to compare to the 
response screen. In this view, then, language may only have an effect after the stimulus is 
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 experienced rather than altering the stimulus experience upfront, although additional 
evidence will need to be collected which addresses this potential more directly. 
 
From this argument, then, language could be acting on two levels: encoding the stimulus 
and remembering the relevant information.  Thus, once a unified representation has been 
constructed, language would further act in working memory by structuring a comparison 
to some other representation, be it linguistic, logical or perceptual (e.g., Dessalegn and 
Landau 2008; Christie and Gentner 2013; Loewenstein and Gentner 2005). The 
comparison process could be sequential (where objects are selected individually over 
time) or simultaneous (where objects are selected concurrently), but these possibilities 
need further investigation. It is also unclear in what manner attention was directed for 
selection of the relevant stimulus elements. Although it is not tested here, there is 
evidence to suggest such selection, at the stimulus level, occurs sequentially (Franconeri 
et al. 2011). This could explain why linguistic structure, in particular, has been shown to 
facilitate subsequent relational judgments.  
 
Alternatively, language, when it is applied, could alter the stimulus experience upfront by 
providing a mode of thinking (Slobin 1987). Language may, then, provide a category into 
which the problem constituents can be parsed (e.g., Lupyan and Casasanto 2015) which 
in turn directs attention to the relevant elements (Boutennet and Lupyan 2015) from the 
outset, making the process more holistic and ecological. Cross-linguistic studies, 
particularly on color categorization, have been used to make this argument (see Lupyan 
2012 for discussion). In terms of the process, Lupyan (2012) has argued that language 
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 works by having a top-down, warping effect on perceptual representation which pushes it 
closer to the abstract category representation, yet is a transient process that can be 
interrupted under the right conditions. He argues that language operates “online” to 
modulate the ongoing (separate) cognitive and perceptual processes, although its effects 
are task-dependent and therefore flexible. This view helps explain the mixed results and 
different interpretations reached by various researchers; it also potentially describes the 
mechanism by which attention is directed. Also in line with this view of the 
interrelatedness of language and cognition, aside from promoting categorization into 
existing categories, is the idea that language facilitates the creation of new categories 
(e.g. Gopnik and Meltzoff 1986; Li and Gleitman 2002; Snedeker and Gleitman 2004). 
This possibility may explain why in our study, when applying a label, any label was 
successful in improving performance, particularly for those children who could not 
correctly label right-left relations.  
 
Another, interpretation of the potential mechanism of language effects is that labels 
simply provide a robust memory trace of the to-be-remembered relation. It could be 
effective at reifying the goal wherein the instructions for the task are better remembered 
or simply effective in marking the to-be-remembered relation. In this way, then, language 
would be acting as a memory strategy more than as a reasoning strategy, per se. 
Language would still be acting across both the encoding and remembering phases of the 
task, but it would be acting only as a place-holder and not as a reasoning device; 
therefore, its effects would occur after encountering the stimulus. This interpretation is 
simpler than thinking of language as a cognitive strategy acting independently and 
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 provides a mechanism for language interacting in concert with other cognitive processes. 
In this way, the effects of language would be indirect since language would not be 
directly involved in the comparison of different representations; however, this 
interpretation is not necessarily in opposition to the first possibility described above. 
Consistent with this view is evidence linking language skills with working memory 
capacity (Baddeley 2003; Just and Carpenter 1992; MacDonald and Christiansen 2002). 
 
Although this experiment cannot point to the exact mechanism of the influence of 
language, it does suggest that language is not directly linked to nonverbal knowledge nor 
is it automatically engaged in nonverbal tasks, but rather that it is optional (for the age 
groups studied) and must be activated before it can influence nonverbal judgments. 
Furthermore, our research suggests that it works by focusing attention on the relevant 
information and allowing the irrelevant information to be ignored. We believe, also, that 
part of its influence is from creating a robust memory to guide future action. Further 
research must be conducted on the intricacies of linguistic support to determine whether 
language has multiple mechanisms for influencing reasoning, which may depend on and 
vary by the task at hand.  
 
In short, there are four aspects of our study that separate it from previous work. The first 
is that we examined the ability to make verbal and nonverbal dynamic relational 
judgments for four relations (above, below, right and left) that had not been previously 
studied together and directly compared (with the exception of Scott et al. 2015a). The 
second way our work differs from past studies is that we examined the ability to make 
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 dynamic relational judgments that required flexible relational reasoning. The third is that 
we examined children’s self-generated use of language instead of providing them with 
particular terms and labels. Finally, children’s relational judgments in our tasks were not 
influenced by non-relational skills (e.g., motor) abilities involved in navigation or 
orientation tasks.  
 
In examining the ability to make all four types of relational judgments together, our study 
speaks directly to the inconsistencies found in the previous studies. By examining verbal 
and nonverbal abilities in both vertical and horizontal relational planes within the same 
group of children, our findings may help clarify the reasons behind the mixed results. We 
found that knowledge of the words above and below were firmly in place before 
knowledge of the words left and right, as well as the ability to make any nonverbal 
incongruent relational judgments. Much of the work suggesting a central role for 
language has involved the vertical plane (Clark 1973; Gentner 2003). Research involving 
relational judgments along the horizontal plane has yielded much more mixed results. 
Our findings suggest that knowledge of the words above and below is clearly established 
before children can successfully make nonverbal relational judgments across a variety of 
stimuli, but knowledge of the words left and right is still developing and appears to be 
doing so in parallel. This suggests that understanding how the ability to make relational 
judgments along the vertical and horizontal relational planes may require different 
explanations (for similar conclusions see Landau and Hoffman 2005). This may help 
explain why some researchers have found that knowledge of relational labels leads the 
ability to make nonverbal relational (Loewensteing and Gentner 2005) and spatial 
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 (Hermer and Spelke 1996; Hermer-Vazquez et al. 2001) judgments whereas other 
researchers have failed to find such effects (e.g., Ratliff and Newcombe 2008). 
 
The second way that our work differs from past work is that we were able to contrast 
simple perceptual matching strategies (i.e., performance on congruent trials) with more 
flexible (i.e., incongruent) and truly relational judgments in our dynamic tasks. Previous 
studies that have examined knowledge of these same relations have used tasks that 
required relational coding with respect to a single, static frame of reference (Dessalegn 
and Landau 2008; Quinn 2007), much like our congruent trials, which can be solved by 
simple perceptual matching (or mismatching in the case of dishabituation results). In our 
incongruent trials, children had to be flexible enough to abandon the potentially incorrect 
but more salient frame of reference (i.e., the position of the stimulus on the computer 
screen) for the correct one (i.e., the relation of the dot to the line). In our study, then, if 
children relied on the incorrect frame of reference, they would solve all of the congruent 
trials correctly. This is essentially a perceptual matching strategy and one that cannot be 
ruled out in some previous work. If this strategy were applied to the incongruent trials, 
then children would attain 0% correct performance. Only a flexible strategy, that is a 
truly relational, would lead to perfect performance on both congruent and incongruent 
trials in our task. We found that both children who had and had not acquired relational 
terms could use the relational strategy but did so in a fragile manner. They used it, on 
average, about 75% of the time in the incongruent trials of Experiments 1 and 2. 
However, when use of a verbal code was more accessible in Experiment 3, the use of the 
relational strategy became more robust and less susceptible to interference from the 
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 perceptual matching strategy. In fact, correct performance went up to 90% in this 
condition. Perhaps children (and nonhuman primates) who perform nearly perfectly on 
tasks of relational reasoning are spontaneously using symbolic coding to bolster their 
performance.  
 
The third aspect of our study that is unique is that we allowed children to use any strategy 
in the nonverbal task, and never directly suggested a specific strategy: this includes the 
choice of label to apply, if any. Instead we led children to better performance by having 
them engage with a linguistic strategy in a preceding task. In contrast, for example, 
Loewenstein and Gentner (2005) provided children with a label upfront during their 
encoding period and as the experimenters hid the object on a shelf. Furthermore, by never 
providing corrective feedback children were free to use a label of their choosing 
throughout the experimental task, regardless of its preciseness or correctness, and to 
abandon and switch labels as they found suitable. Thus, our results reflect children’s self-
generated use of relational terms in nonverbal reasoning rather than an experimenter-
guided solution, and is, therefore, more reflective of everyday performance outside of the 
laboratory. This approach also gave us the opportunity to compare the correctness of self-
generated labels to performance on the nonverbal task. 
 
Our fourth and final contribution is that our findings complement previous works since 
our results do not reflect any added demands that might have been factors in previous 
studies – such as navigation, search or object matching. Thus, our tasks measure a more 
pure and isolated ability to make relational judgments. Importantly, the ability to make 
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 relational judgments needs to be studied with techniques that capture neural correlates 
such as fMRI and MEG among others (discussed in Chapter 5). Indeed our task was 
designed to be used in conjunction with these paradigms as well as with animals.  
 
Finally, one aspect of our findings raises the possibility that the same underlying 
mechanisms may not be recruited in relational reasoning by humans and monkeys, if 
monkeys’ performances were not linked to order of acquisition. Unlike Goodwin and 
colleagues (2012), we did not find better performance on right and left judgments than on 
above and below judgments. However, because the monkeys in their study were trained 
on left-right relations first, then their findings could reflect an order of acquisition effect, 
and thus our findings may not be so inconsistent from theirs. Examining the neural 
correlates of performance would also shed light into whether the same underlying neural 
mechanisms are being recruited to perform the task by different species, particularly in 
terms of how each plane is coded: above-below in the adult human brain should parallel 
right-left in the brain of these monkeys, if order of acquisition drives neural coding. 
Alternatively, if symbolic coding is the key to differential performance on above-below 
and right-left then the neural mechanisms should not be similar since these monkeys were 
not trained to use symbols. 
 
In conclusion, our findings are consistent with the idea that language strengthens basic 
relational reasoning abilities. Using language to encode and remember stimulus attributes 
(e.g., spatial relations) expands the capacity for relational reasoning, and may free up 
resources to solve other problems. See Scott et al. (2015a) for a more expanded proposal 
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 of how these spatial abilities might unfold over a 6-year age range. Clearly, many 
questions remain regarding the role of language in the evolution of human intelligence, 
and these findings offer a solid step towards better understanding the continuities and 
discontinuities that exist.  
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 Chapter 5 Effects of Handedness on Verbal and 
Nonverbal Relational Judgments 
 
 Overview 5.1
Handedness is often linked to hemispheric specialization, particularly to speech 
processing. One reason is because each side of the body is controlled by the opposite side 
of the brain. Another reason, is because humans have evolved both the tendency to be 
right-handed and have language: two skills typically controlled by the left hemisphere. In 
this chapter, I describe a study which investigates the degree of handedness with both 
verbal and nonverbal spatial relational abilities in 5-10-year-olds. One hypothesis is that 
handedness promotes verbal performance such that children showing stronger laterality 
will show better verbal performance since laterality is thought to promote hemispheric 
development; however, nonverbal performance may also be promoted since spatial 
processing, generally, is also highly lateralized – albeit, in the right hemisphere. 
However, I found few consistent significant correlations between handedness and either 
verbal or nonverbal performance. 
 
 Introduction 5.2
The left and right sides of the brain have been shown to perform different functions, and 
there is some evidence that this specialization leads to optimal processing of such 
functions (Levy 1976; Vallortigara 2006). For example, the left brain has been tied to 
language and general reasoning, while the right brain has been tied to emotional and 
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 spatial processing (Hellige 2001). Additionally, the left and right sides of the brain are 
responsible for the contralateral side of the body in terms of motor actions. This means 
that right-handed dominance is controlled by the left brain while left-handed dominance 
is controlled by the right brain. Handedness has been tied to brain lateralization, where 
right-handers and left-handers show different levels of abilities and generally utilize the 
hemispheres slightly differently. For example, the majority of right-handers use their left 
brains for language whereas left-handers are slightly less likely to use their left brains 
exclusively for this skill. However, one study showed that 27% of left-handers processed 
speech in the right-hemisphere as did some strong right-handers (4%) and ambidextrous 
people (15%): this indicates that handedness and speech lateralization are relatively 
independent of each other on the individual level, although there is almost a linear 
relationship between the two measures (Knecht et al. 2000b). 
 
Many aspects of relational reasoning have been linked to left-hemisphere processing 
(Bunge et al. 2005, Christoff et al. 2001); however, many neural studies exclusively test 
right-handers because of their greater within-group consistency of left-hemisphere 
processing. That being said, Niebauer (2001) suggests a left hemisphere advantage for 
processing categorical relations (i.e., is a dot above/below a line) and a right hemisphere 
advantage for processing coordinate spatial relations (i.e., is the dot near/far from a line). 
Therefore, if lateralization of hand dominance is directly linked to lateralization of the 
brain, then I might expect to see a bias towards better performance on the nonverbal task 
for children who are more lateralized. However, the importance of brain lateralization on 
the development of cognition continues to be a debate, even in the animal research (e.g., 
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 Hopkins et al. 2007) as animal studies do not always corroborate the human evidence 
(Vauclair et al. 2006).  
 
Some researchers have proposed that the population-level right-handedness of humans is 
a consequence of the evolved ability to produce and process language (Annett 2002), 
while others maintain that these two abilities evolved independently of one another 
(Kinsbourne 1997; Witelson 1990; in Michel et al. 2013). A number of species show 
handedness preferences (chimpanzees: Hopkins et al. 2007; capuchin monkeys: Phillips 
and Thompson 2013; kangaroos: Giljov et al. 2015; however, see Smith and Thompson 
2011 for lack of evidence in saki monkeys), and at least nonhuman primates show 
associated hemispheric asymmetry. Moreover, there may be a link between right-hand-
use and communicating in some animals (chimpanzees: Hopkins et al. 2005; nonhuman 
primates: Meguerditchian et al. 2013).  
 
Many species also show eye dominance (e.g., Vallortigara 2006) which may support the 
claim for the evolution of asymmetry as a selected trait both at the population-level – an 
individual is more likely to survive an attack when their whole group moves in the same 
direction – and at the individual-level – an individual is better able to defend themselves 
from their dominant side. In terms of human cognition, some work suggests that children 
who are left-lateralized (left dominance in either eyedness or handedness) make more 
reading mistakes than right-lateralized children (Muehl 1963). 
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 Sex differences have been shown in humans for language skills and lateralization for 
language, with women exhibiting stronger skill and men exhibiting greater left-
lateralization (McGlone 1980); however, these findings have not always been replicated 
(e.g., Knecht et al. 2000a; Knecht et al. 2000b; Sommer et al. 2008; see Plante et al. 2006 
for discussion). Additionally, more men are left-handed than women (Sommer et al. 
2008). Studies with children have indicated sex differences in linguistic performance 
from an early age (e.g., Rome-Flanders and Cronk 1995; Bauer et al. 2002; Martin and 
Hoover 1987), but concordant neural studies have failed to show significant differences 
in laterality (Plante et al. 2006). Therefore, if sex differences affect brain organization for 
language in children, then we might expect girls to show less of an effect of handedness 
relative to boys on verbal performance.  
 
Michel and colleagues (Michel et al. 2013) have provided evidence that infants who 
showed a preference for one hand in object retrieval were more advanced on their 
language skills as 2 year olds than children who had not exhibited handedness as infants. 
Furthermore, studies that have found the strongest connections between handedness and 
communication skills have been reported for ages of significant language development 
(in Michel et al. 2013: e.g., Vauclair and Imbault 2009; Bates et al. 1986). In my study, I 
test much older children (5-10-year-olds) for direct connections between hand dominance 
and language ability (spatial relational term use) as well as nonverbal spatial relational 
reasoning. Because previous findings suggest that individuals become more handed with 
age (Porac and Cohen 1981 in Gabard et al. 1991), I will test if strength of handedness 
continues to strengthen from 5 to 10 years.  
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Furthermore, knowing that one has a preferred hand and being able to correctly identify 
that hand as the right or left hand may provide a good strategy for making left-right 
judgments. Therefore, I will check for a correlation between knowing the correct label for 
the preferred hand and performance on the verbal task. Since children had unlimited time 
to respond in the verbal task, labeling the hands first then mapping these labels to the 
board would be a successful strategy. It may be unlikely, however, that I will find a 
correlation with knowing the preferred hand and performance on the nonverbal task since 
this task had a tight time limit which may have constrained the ability of children to map 
the hand to the dot’s relative location. I will check for a correlation between knowing the 
correct hand and nonverbal performance, anyway. 
 
Footedness is also connected to brain lateralization and neuropsychological functioning 
(Chapman et al. 1987; Peters 1988), with each foot controlled by the contralateral 
hemisphere. Some researchers suggest that footedness becomes lateralized later in life 
than handedness since up to a quarter of the populations tests showed no dominance at 
the age of 5 years (Belmont and Birch 1963; Gabard et al. 1991; Porac et al. 1980) with 
little change in dominance from 3 to 8 years of age (Gabbard et al. 1991; Gentry and 
Gabbard 2001) followed by an increased tendency for right-footedness from 11 years of 
age into adulthood (Bell and Gabbard 2000; Gentry and Gabbard 2001). Footedness does 
not appear to be tightly tied to handedness considering children show much more mixed 
preferences for foot dominance and, once established, is less likely to be right-lateralized 
than is handedness (Gabbard et al. 1991); however, it does not appear that many studies 
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 have directly correlated these two measures. Although footedness has not been connected 
to communication processing, it is still an indicator of brain lateralization, so I include it 
as measure in our analyses despite not having any specific hypotheses regarding it. I will 
also measure concordance of hand preference and foot preference, as well as eye 
preference, within individuals. 
 
I had a number of hypotheses which I tested. First, I expected to see a correlation 
between strength (absolute handedness) or degree (extent of right- or left-handedness) of 
handedness and performance on the verbal or nonverbal tasks if lateralization of the brain 
(as measured by handedness) accompanied improving relational coding performance. 
Strength of handedness provides an indication of lateralization and hemispheric 
specialization whereas degree of handedness provides a measure of left-hemispheric 
advantage, assuming that left-handers are less left-lateralized. Degree of handedness also 
provides a means of comparing performance of left-handers to right-handers. Secondly, 
since eyedness and footedness have also been implicated in previous work, I also checked 
for correlations between absolute footedness and performance on verbal and nonverbal 
tasks as well as between degree of eyedness and performance on verbal and nonverbal 
tasks. Third, I compared performances of children who knew or did know the correct 
label for their preferred hand with the assumption that knowing that you are right- (or 
left-) handed serves as an explicit strategy for making either verbal or nonverbal 
judgments: the first hypothesis covers the possibility that this serves as an implicit 
strategy. My fourth hypothesis is that handedness strengthens with age, so I will correlate 
children’s age (in months) with their strength of (absolute) handedness. Finally, I will 
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 compare boys and girls for differences in the correlations between their strength of 
handedness and performance on the verbal task under the assumption that girls may be 
less lateralized than boys in terms of hemispheric specialization and, therefore, it should 
be less likely that I would find a positive correlation between handedness and 
performance for girls. 
 
Again, the rationale is that, in terms of brain lateralization, as a child becomes more 
“handed” (especially right-handed) then the left side of the brain may become “stronger”, 
and, therefore, the language centers additionally benefit from more connections. 
Following from this, I especially expected to see these correlations with performance on 
the verbal task, but if a similar strengthening were occurring in the right hemisphere, then 
it should be expected that performance on the nonverbal task should improve as well. 
Footedness, then, should similarly follow the pattern seen in handedness but the degree of 
handedness should follow a separate pattern in that previous work has shown effects on 
eye dominance rather than strength of laterality. In terms of knowing which hand is 
which, this is a labeling skill, so I expected to see a correlation with verbal skills; 
however, strong correlations with nonverbal performance may indicate a language 
advantage in these children such that either they are applying labels in the nonverbal task 
or their knowledge of the correct labels is promoting nonverbal performance in some 
other way. Overall, if laterality has an effect, then I should find significant results for left-
right judgments, in particular: it will be more difficult to interpret correlations with 
above-below judgments since these directions do not map onto laterality.  
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  Methods 5.3
 
 Participants 5.3.1
The same 120 5-10-year-olds described in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.2 were included in 
this study. 
 
 Degree of handedness test  5.3.2
In this game, children were asked to perform the actions when “Simon says” (Table 5.1, 
see Appendix B for test sheet example). I used Oldfield’s (1971) Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory, but modified two of the categories (strike a match and hold a knife) because 
these were unlikely events for children. I replaced these two events with “open a bottle” 
and “hammer a nail” since these were likely more familiar events and ones children had 
participated in before. For each child, the order of actions was pseudorandomized 
between actions requiring the hands, feet or eyes: this was done in an attempt to get the 
truest evaluation of a side preference without the confound of repeating a just performed 
action. The degree of handedness, footedness and eyedness were calculated according to 
Oldfield (1971) and values range from -100 to +100 for each measure. Strength of 
handedness and footedness were also calculated: since these are measures of absolute 
values, the resulting values range from 0-100.  
 
Following the end of the game, the child was asked whether they knew if they were right 
or left handed and their response was recorded. Regardless of their response, the child 
was then asked to raise either their right or left hand and this was also recorded. 
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 Responses were recorded as a “1” if children could correctly identify each measure or a 
“0” if they could not correctly identify these. 
 
Table 5.1 List of tasks used to measure handedness, footedness and eyedness. The last two 
actions in the table were requested four times so that strength of footedness and eyedness, 
respectively, could be assessed most accurately. 
TASK LEFT RIGHT 
Write your name in the air   
Draw a smiley face in the air   
Throw a ball   
Use scissors to cut a piece of paper   
Brush your teeth   
Hammer a nail   
Eat ice cream with a spoon   
Sweep the floor with a broom   
Open a pop bottle (twist)   
Take the lid off of a box   
Kick a ball   
Keep one eye open   
 
 Analyses 5.3.3
I measured the correlation between degree (left, right or mixed) and strength (absolute 
value) of handedness and performance on each relation in both the verbal and nonverbal 
tasks as well as the relatedness of these measures to foot preference and eye preference. I 
will also test for effects of age, sex and knowing the label for each hand. The data were 
highly skewed toward right-handedness, therefore correlations were conducted using 
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 Kendall’s tau-b. Although they produce similar results, Kendall’s tau is better with small 
group data than Spearman’s Rho and is better at dealing with tied ranks. However, 
Kendall’s tau provides results in terms of the probabilities of observing consistency in 
ranks, whereas Spearman’s Rho is a measure of the variance explained.  All 
performances are in percentages; however, the correlation analyses order these and 
therefore all statistics are conducted on ranks. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
 Results 5.4
 
 Correlations between age, handedness, footedness and eyedness 5.4.1
In relating degree and strength of handedness with age (in months), I found no evidence 
that either measure of handedness increases with age. Furthermore, there was no 
correlation of age in months or handedness to strength of footedness or degree of 
eyedness. I analyzed strength of footedness to test for effects of overall lateralization and 
I analyzed degree of eyedness to test for effects of left hemisphere specialization since 
eyedness has been connected to language, specifically and footedness has not. These 
results suggest that any age-related changes in verbal performance (i.e., increases in 
verbal performance with age found in Chapter 4) are not linked to increased right-
handedness or increased lateralization more generally. 
 
 Handedness and Performance 5.4.2
Despite not finding a correlation between handedness and age, I looked at both the whole 
group and the individual age groups for correlations to performance. The first reason for 
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 doing this is that if handedness is a strong driver of performance, then the whole group 
analysis should be sufficient in finding a correlation. The second reason is that if there are 
maturational effects outside of lateralization, then only correlations conducted at the age 
group level will result in a relationship between handedness and performance. 
 Whole group. When looking at the whole group, there were no reliable 5.4.2.1
correlations of strength of handedness and performance on the verbal tasks. Only a few 
nonverbal task conditions (congruent trials: right: τb = 0.18, p < 0.05; above: τb= 0.15, p 
< 0.01) were correlated to strength of handedness. Degree of handedness was only 
correlated to congruent right trials (τb= 0.15, p < 0.05). This finding offers limited 
support for an effect of handedness on nonverbal performance, likely only for the side 
ipsilateral to the preferred hand since the population tested was predominately right 
handed. 
 Age groups.  5.4.2.2
When looking at the three age groups separately (5-year-olds, 6-7-year-olds, 8-10-year-
olds; as defined in Chapter 4) different correlations emerged. Five year olds showed 
significant negative correlations of strength of handedness and comprehending the terms 
right (τb= -0.445, p < 0.05) and left (τb= -0.421, p < 0.05); but, there was no correlation 
with producing the terms. Additionally, 5-year-olds had a reliable correlation between 
degree of handedness and comprehension of right (τb= -0.51, p < 0.01) and left (τb= -0.48, 
p < 0.05). Performance by 6-7-year-olds did not reliably correlate with either strength of 
or degree of handedness. However, 8-10-year-olds, somewhat similar to 5-year-olds, 
showed significant correlations of strength of and degree of handedness to verbal 
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 performance. Unlike 5-year-olds, 8-10-year-olds had negative correlation of strength of 
handedness to producing the term right (τb= -0.23, p < 0.05) and reliable negative 
correlation of degree of handedness to production of right (τb= -0.25, p < 0.05) but only 
marginal correlation to production of left (τb= -0.21, p = 0.054). Additionally, strength of 
handedness was reliably positively correlated to nonverbal congruent right trials (τb= 
0.25, p < 0.05) for this older group. 
 
In consideration of these findings, although the significance was not large, there is a trend 
for right judgments to be correlated with strength of (absolute) and degree of handedness. 
This bias likely is related to the right bias of the world in which children are developing, 
but further studies must be performed before this can be concluded. 
 
 Knowing correct hand and performance 5.4.3
I conducted a Mann-Whitney U test on the whole group to compare performances of 
those children who could and could not label their preferred hand. I chose the Mann-
Whitney U test because of differences in sample sizes (110 vs. 10, respectively). Children 
who could correctly label their hand were better at producing the terms for right (U= 
1012; p < .00) and left (U= 958; p <.00), and were better at comprehending the terms 
above (U= 600; p < .05), right (U= 882; p < .00) and left (U= 831; p < .00). In terms of 
the nonverbal task, children who could correctly label their hand performed better on 
incongruent below trials (U= 803; p < .01) and congruent right trials (U= 748; p < .05), 
and only marginally better on incongruent left trials (U= 711; p = .07). Thus, it appears 
that children who can correctly label their hands have an advantage over children who 
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 cannot. This is supported by the behavioral observation that some children used 
mnemonic devices to label the sides, such as forming a “L” with the left hand or referring 
to their dominant hand then correctly recalling the label they had been told referred to 
their handedness (i.e., “I know that I am right-handed, this is the hand I use, therefore, 
this is my right hand). 
 
 Correlations of performance to footedness and eyedness 5.4.4
For the whole group performance analysis, the only correlation to footedness was for 
comprehending above (τb= 0.179, p < 0.05). There were no reliable correlations of 
eyedness to performance; however, there was a marginal correlation with comprehending 
the terms right (τb= -0.16, p = 0.063) and left (τb= -0.16, p = 0.053). 
 
For the three age groups, a few additional correlations emerged. For 5-year-olds, strength 
of footedness was positively correlated to comprehension of above (τb= -0.69, p < 0.01), 
while only marginally correlated to nonverbal incongruent right trials (τb= -0.4, p = 0.06). 
With respect to eyedness, 5-year-olds showed positive correlation with incongruent 
above trials (τb= 0.43, p < 0.05) and incongruent right trials (τb= 0.52, p < 0.01). For 6-7-
year-olds, only strength of eyedness and nonverbal congruent above trials (τb= 0.286, p < 
0.05) were correlated, while no performances were correlated to footedness. No 
correlations between performance and either foot or eye preference were detected for 8-
10 year olds. 
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  Sex differences 5.4.5
When the group was divided by sex, no reliable correlations emerged for strength of 
handedness and verbal performance. Furthermore, there were no significant differences 
between the mean strength or degree of handedness using independent samples t-test. 
Similarly, there were no differences in the distribution of these measures between the 
sexes, using Mann-Whitney U tests. There were no sex differences for strength of 
footedness or degree of eyedenss according to a Mann-Whitney U test. 
 
 Comparison of right-handers and left-handers performances 5.4.6
Since I found a correlation between degree of handedness and performance on right 
judgments, I compared performances of right-handers (N = 101; index scores of +25 to 
+100) and left-handers (N = 11; index scores of -25 to -100) on the nonverbal and verbal 
tasks using a Mann-Whitney U-test. I chose this test because of difference in sample 
sizes. There were no reliably significant differences between these two groups in 
performance on any of the relations in the verbal or the nonverbal tasks. These results 
suggest that handedness is generally not associated with verbal or nonverbal left-right 
knowledge; specifically, that left-handers are generally more confused than right-handers 
on these relations. 
 
 Discussion 5.5
One idea promoting an effect of handedness was that right and left are visually 
symmetric, but an asymmetry is created when one hand is favored over the other. 
Therefore, I hypothesized that children who are more asymmetric in their hand use (i.e., 
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 stronger handedness) would find it easier to map right and left onto their right and left 
hands. It turned out that being able to correctly label the hands was more useful to 
children than strictly having a preferred hand. Previous studies have found age and sex 
differences in handedness, but I found neither in my sample of 120 children. 
Furthermore, I did not find age effects for foot or eye preferences and I found few 
correlations of dominance of any type (including handedness) to performance on the 
verbal or nonverbal tasks. However, when reliable correlations were found, these tended 
to involve right judgments, which suggest that right-handed children and more lateralized 
children are more sensitive to these judgments. However, contrary to expectations, these 
correlations were negative, indicating that performance was worse on these judgments 
than children who used their two hands more equally (i.e., were less lateralized). 
 
I expected to see a correlation between strength of handedness and performance on 
right/left decisions if lateralization of the brain accompanied hand preference, particularly 
for verbal tasks with respect to left-hemisphere specialization. Although I did find that 
both degree and strength of handedness were correlated with performance on right 
congruent trials, these correlations were generally negative: the opposite direction 
expected. Furthermore both degree and strength of handedness were both correlated with 
comprehending and producing the term right for 5-year-olds and 8-10-year-olds, 
respectively. Again, these correlations were negative, which was opposite of what I 
expected: if lateralization of the brain promotes both language skill and hand dominance, 
then these correlations should have been positive. Overall, I did not find that handedness 
was related to nonverbal or verbal reasoning. 
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It does appear that knowing which-hand-is-which affects performance, but mainly for the 
verbal tasks. Children who could correctly label their hands were better at producing and 
comprehending left-right relations than children who could not attach the correct label. 
Again, it does not appear that laterality – in terms of the body’s asymmetry or in 
recognizing the asymmetry – has a reliable effect on nonverbal relational reasoning. 
Although I did find a few correlations with the nonverbal task - with incongruent below 
and congruent right trials – there was no clear pattern of relationship; therefore, I cannot 
draw strong conclusions. One reason why knowledge of which–hand-is-which (a labeling 
skill) helped performance in the verbal tasks could be that these children knew right from 
left in any situation, although it could also be due to the lack of a time constraint in 
responding which allowed children more opportunity to reason about their judgments. 
However, behavioral observation supports the conclusion that some children used 
mnemonic devices to correctly label the sides, such as forming a “L” with the left hand or 
referring to their dominant hand then correctly recalling the label they had been told 
referred to their handedness (i.e., “I know that I am right-handed, this is the hand I use, 
therefore, this is my right hand). 
 
In line with other studies, I did not find a sex difference in handedness or footedness 
(Gabbard et al. 1991). Unlike previous studies, I did not find an increase in laterality with 
age (Gentry and Gabbard 2001; however, see Gabbard et al. 1991 for corroborating 
evidence). Adding to the literature, I did not find a correlation between strength of 
handedness and strength of footedness nor did I find a correlation between degree of 
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 eyedness and degree of handedness: most studies I have reviewed only looked at 
consistency in laterality. Lastly, unlike previous research (Muehl 1963), I did not find 
differential performance between right- and left-handers on the different tasks, although 
my findings did suggest a slight effect of eyedness with left-dominance marginally 
correlated with better performance on left-right comprehension. 
 
In terms of brain lateralization, we assumed that as a child becomes more handed 
(especially right-handed) then the left side of the brain becomes ”stronger”, and, 
therefore, the language centers benefit from more connections, as well. We especially 
expected to see these correlations with performance on the incongruent trials in the 
nonverbal (computer) task. However, few of the expected correlations were found. 
Overall, handedness does not seem to promote relational reasoning. 
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 Chapter 6 Neural Correlates of Relational Judgments 
 
 Overview 6.1
 
Children learn the words for above-below relations earlier than for left-right relations, 
despite treating these equally well in our dynamic nonverbal task. Additionally, children 
struggle when a spatial relation is depicted in a spatially incongruent manner with respect 
to its position on a screen, as we illustrated in Chapter 4. In this study, I investigated the 
neural correlates of encoding and maintaining above-below and left-right relations in 12 
adults using magnetoencephalography (MEG) in order to discover whether the verbally 
later-learned relations of left and right are represented by the brain differently than the 
verbally earlier-learned relations of above and below. I additionally compared neural 
activity associated with congruent and incongruent judgments. Adults performed 
perfectly on the task behaviorally, so any differences in neural activity were attributed to 
the stimuli’s cognitive attributes. In comparing above-below to left-right relations during 
encoding, I found the greatest differences in neural activity in areas associated with space 
and movement. In comparing congruent to incongruent trials, I found the greatest 
differential activity in premotor areas. For both comparisons the brain areas activated in 
the encoding phase remained active during the maintenance phase of the task: this 
provides evidence that those brain areas are particularly important in representing the 
relational planes or congruency types. When comparing the relational planes in working 
memory additional right posterior areas were implicated, whereas the congruent-
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 incongruent contrast implicated additional bilateral frontal and temporal areas. These 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the later-learned relations (left-right) are 
represented differently than the earlier-learned relations (above-below). 
 
 Introduction 6.2
Human adults live in a three-dimensional world in which they constantly make decisions 
relating to the spatial relations they share with the objects with which they interact. Yet, 
adults sometimes confuse left and right spatial relations (Hannay et al. 1990; Jordan et al. 
2006) despite never confusing other spatial relations, such as above-below, up-down or 
forward-backward. This differential confusion exists linguistically in children, as they 
learn the labels for these spatial relations, but not non-linguistically (Scott et al. 2015b). 
For example, children learn terms for above-below around the age of 3 years, but learn 
the terms for left-right around ages 6 or 7 years (Cox and Richardson 1985; Martin and 
Sera 2006). On the other hand, children have been able to categorize things as “to the 
left” or “above” since early infancy (Gava et al. 2009; Quinn 2007). Categorizing and 
compartmentalizing space is important not just for navigating in a three-dimensional 
world, but for promoting other cognitive skills, such as structuring comparisons and 
quantification (Stieff et al. 2013; Uttal et al. 2013; Verdine et al. 2014; Vendetti et al. 
2015). Although there is a wealth of behavioral data supporting the idea that differences 
exist between the horizontal (left-right) relational plane and the vertical (above-below) 
relational plane (Cox and Richardson 1985; Landau and Hoffman 2005; Dessalegn and 
Landau 2008), there is a dearth of neural studies seeking evidence of such differences. 
Our (Scott, Sera, Leuthold, Georgopoulos, submitted)3 study investigates whether 
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 differential neural activity exists for above-below compared to left-right spatial 
judgments.  
 
Human infants seem to come prepared to recognize and categorize spatial relations (Gava 
et al. 2009; Quinn 2007). Infants can make correct visual matching judgments of above, 
below, left and right relative positions; yet, once they reach childhood they seem to have 
difficulty matching the relational category to the verbal label. Much of the literature 
concerning the development of spatial relational knowledge describes a “privilege” of the 
vertical axis (i.e., above-below) – especially the positive direction (i.e., “top” or “above”) 
– in verbal labeling (Clark, 1973; Clark 1980; Cox and Richardson 1985; Landau and 
Hoffman 2005). This “privilege” can sometimes be found in children’s non-linguistic 
matching performance where performance on the horizontal axis (i.e., left-right) is worse 
than performance on the vertical axis (i.e., above-below) in both typically developing 
(Dessalegn and Landau 2008) and children with Williams Syndrome (Landau and 
Hoffman 2005; Semel and Rosner 2003).  
 
It is also apparent that when observing an object, adults automatically assign a “top” to 
the object, although this judgment is somewhat dependent on the item’s spatial 
orientation (e.g., Carlson et al. 2002). Together, these studies suggest that the above-
below is treated differently from the left-right plane early in life in terms of attention and 
cognition, even in a disordered population, and this differential accessibility seems to 
persist into adulthood. What seems to develop, then, is the ability to label and remember 
spatial relations, rather than the ability to partition a space into categories, with the 
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 different relational planes following different trajectories. How this is realized in the 
brain is yet to be determined; however, we set out to describe the end-state of these 
relations as represented by adult neural activity. 
 
There has been little research on the neural correlates of encoding or remembering the 
spatial relations of above, below, right and left. The majority of studies investigating 
relational reasoning have focused on a general type of reasoning, such as analogical 
reasoning (Bunge et al. 2005; Wright et al. 2008) or matrix reasoning (Christoff et al. 
2001; Crone et al. 2009; Baldo et al. 2010), or set out to differentiate between the 
different steps in the reasoning process (Krawczyk et al. 2011; Wendelken et al. 2012). 
Each of these studies has focused on the prefrontal cortex (PFC), and many have 
attempted to differentiate the specific areas within PFC that are responsible for specific 
aspects of reasoning. One study which did investigate neural correlates of spatial 
relations (Damasio et al. 2001) looked at the whole brain but relied on verbal retrieval 
and did so in the context of object recognition and tool use. Furthermore, they did not 
differentiate between the different sets of relations (i.e., relational planes). Nevertheless, 
Damasio and colleagues (2001) found neural activity specific to spatial relations in left 
frontal operculum, left posterior middle frontal gyrus, left inferior temporal cortex (when 
subtracting the control condition from the spatial relations condition), left inferior 
temporal cortex, right supramarginal gyrus (when subtracting activity from naming 
spatial relations using abstract shapes from naming spatial relations using tools/utensils), 
and left supramarginal gyrus (when subtracting the naming of implements from the 
naming spatial relations).  
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A recent study with monkeys (Goodwin et al. 2012), using a simple relational task similar 
to our own, directly compared above-below to left-right relations. In their study, two 
monkeys made simple relational judgments as their neural activity was recorded from 
prefrontal (along the principal sulcus) and parietal areas (along the intraparietal sulcus). 
The monkeys performed better at and had stronger neural activity – particularly in 
parietal areas – associated with left-right decisions compared to above-below decisions; 
however, it should be noted that both monkeys learned to differentiate right from left 
before learning above from below so the results may indicate an order of learning effect 
rather than a deeper evolutionary root of differential neural activity. These two possible 
outcomes represent a developmental effect and a phylogenetic effect, respectively: we 
will consider both possibilities in our results. Combined, these studies suggest that 
prefrontal areas will be activated in our spatial relational task, but it is not clear whether 
we will find differential activity in this area, as previous work has generally not 
compared activity associated with specific relations. The work of Goodwin and 
colleagues does suggest that we may find differential neural activity in parietal areas; 
however, their data acquisition was through single cell recording and relied on temporal 
differences, so these detailed techniques may not translate to similar findings in our study 
which used more holistic analyses and a different neural recording technique, 
magnetoencephalography (MEG). 
 
In an MEG study by Franciotti et al. (2013) participants saw a pair of animals and had to 
judge whether a subsequent pair of the same animals shared the same spatial relations or 
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 if these had changed with respect to spatial category or coordinate distance. The 
subsequent pair could be categorically different if one animal was facing a different left-
right direction from before, coordinately different if the two animals were closer together 
than in the sample, or there could be no change in their spatial relations. The researchers 
saw increased activity in visual cortex, superior parietal lobule, inferior parietal lobule 
and middle frontal gyrus for categorically different pairs compared to coordinately 
different pairs and exact matches. Left inferior parietal lobule appeared to be particularly 
important for categorical judgments considering the researchers found differential 
activity between different types of cues within these judgments, while right inferior 
parietal lobule was differentially activated within coordinate judgments. This left-
lateralized specialization for categorical spatial relations (and right-lateralization for 
coordinate spatial relations) is supported by other studies (Amorapanth et al. 2009; Baciu 
et al. 1999; Kosslyn et al.1998; Slotnick et al. 2001). Furthermore, a study by 
Amorapanth et al. (2009) suggested greater activity in superior and inferior parietal 
cortices (especially on the left) and posterior middle frontal cortices bilaterally when 
participants were asked to attend to the categorical spatial relations compared with the 
identity of objects; they verified the left-lateralization of categorical relations with a 
lesion study. Although our designs differ, the results from their study can be used to 
predict neural areas that we may expect to see differentially activated for the two 
relational planes, if the two relational planes are represented by the same networks but by 
different activity levels.    
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 Behaviorally, there is no difference in the performance of above-below judgments from 
left-right for human adults in a simple relational task (Hayward and Tarr 1995). 
Therefore, to capitalize on establishing differential neural activity in our study without 
the confound of differential performance, we used the same relational task that we 
developed for children, one in which adults encoded the relation of a dot to a line, 
remembered the relation for three seconds and then responded by reporting the relation 
via a button press. While adults performed the task, their neural activity was recorded 
using MEG. 
 
 Our broad predictions are, then, that these two sets of spatial relations (above-below vs. 
left-right) are represented in the brain differently despite a lack of matching differential 
results in performance (i.e., adults should perform a simple relational task perfectly). 
Specifically, we expect to find areas of the brain that are differentially activated for one 
set of relations compared to the other set. Since few studies have explored a similar line 
of inquiry, we do not make predictions regarding specific areas of differential neural 
activity, although we may expect to find similar areas as described in Damasio et al. 
(2001) or Franconeri et al. (2013) if the areas implicated in their studies are accessed to 
different extents for the different planes (i.e., by increased or decreased activity).  
 
In addition to comparing neural activity for the relational planes, we compared neural 
activity for congruent to incongruent – where the relative position of something doesn’t 
match its global position – trials. As discussed in the General Introduction of this thesis, 
two common tasks used to test congruency effects are the spatial Stroop and Simon tasks. 
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 Neural imaging studies using spatial Stroop and Simon tasks suggest that neural areas 
activated for overcoming incongruency include: anterior cingulate, supplementary motor 
area, visual association areas, inferior temporal cortex, inferior parietal areas, dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal areas, and caudate nucleus (Peterson et al. 2002). 
However, one study investigating neural areas activated by the Simon task indicated 
similar, but adjacent areas: pre-supplementary motor area, superior parietal lobule and 
cuneus (Wittfoth et al. 2006).  
 
Furthermore, we will attempt to explain our findings with respect to the currently 
available literature. For example, one proposition regarding why left-right relations are 
confused is that symmetry tends to occur across the horizontal direction rather than the 
vertical direction, especially in nature, and the human visual system is adapted to detect 
left-right symmetry (Brandt and Mackavey 1981). This theory rests on the explanation 
that asymmetry in neural functioning (hemispheric specialization) provides better 
discrimination ability (in Brandt and Mackavey 1981: Mach 1897; Coballis and Beale 
1970). It might be the case, then, that left-right reasoning may tap into the same neural 
areas used in reasoning about incongruencies. In this case, it may be that the relative 
relationship objects share in the left-right direction sometimes mismatches with the 
viewer’s own egocentric frame of reference (Li and Gleitman 2002) and additional 
processing is necessary to overcome an initial judgment (e.g., change the frame of 
reference to map onto the object(s) to be judged). Therefore, we might find that similar 
neural areas are differentially activated in a congruent-incongruent comparison as for a 
spatial relational set comparison. On the other hand, early-learned words have been 
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 shown to activate different neural areas than later-learned words – specifically in the 
precuneus and lateral inferior PFC areas (Fiebach et al. 2003) – so we may garner similar 
findings in both these brain areas in the relational plane contrast.  
 
One last comparison I will draw is between the encoding and working memory (or 
maintenance) phases of the task. In the encoding phase, as you may recall from Chapter 
2, the stimulus is presented for 1 second. It is at this point in the trial when categorization 
should occur and there may be differential activation of attentional networks, such as the 
dorsal attention network which is thought to be responsible for focusing attention on a 
task via top-down processing and consists of bilateral intraparietal sulcus and frontal eye 
fields (Farrant and Uddin in press) or the orienting network which comprises the superior 
parietal cortex, temporoparietal junction and frontal eye fields (Pozuelos et al. 2014). In 
the working memory phase, the participant must maintain the spatial relation for 3 
seconds before they are able to respond. It is during this point in the trial where we 
should see visuo-spatial working memory network activity: bilateral visual association 
cortex, bilateral posterior cingulate and bilateral medial frontal gyrus (Ruff et al. 2003). 
Activity associated with reasoning and maintenance often overlap, but when compared, 
maintenance requires greater activity in right inferior partietal gyrus, right precuneus and 
an area in the junction of the left middle temporal and inferior parietal gyrus (Ruff et al. 
2003). It is possible that motor planning will be differentially activated within each of 
these phases if one set of contrasts (relational plane or congruency) is judged more 
automatically than its comparison set of trials.  
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  Methods 6.3
 
 Participants 6.3.1
Twenty-six right-handed adults from 20-39 years of age (Female = 10; Male = 10) were 
recruited from the Twin Cities metro area. Only a subset of 12 participants were included 
in the analyses (Female = 4; Male = 8) and these individuals had a mean age of 27 years 
(± 5 years, standard deviation). The remaining participants were excluded due to a 
malfunction in the eye-tracking system (N=8) or due to artifacts in the neural signaling 
(e.g., dental work, non-removable metallic substances, N=6). The Montreal Cognitive 
Assessment (MoCA) was given to each participant to ensure they had normal cognitive 
functions; subjects averaged a score of 28 out of 30 (± 1.6). Participants also filled out a 
handedness survey to ensure they were right-hand dominant (Oldfield 1971): unlike the 
survey given to children, adults filled out the sheet on their own and were not asked to act 
out any of the actions. The twelve adults ranged in handedness values from 67-100 (85 ± 
15).  
 
This study was approved by the University of Minnesota and Minneapolis Veterans 
Affairs Medical Center institutional review boards and informed consent was obtained 
from all individual participants included in the study. All participants were paid for their 
time. 
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  Task design 6.3.2
Participants performed the same computerized nonverbal task used in other studies. In 
this study, a trial progressed as a series of 3 screens, followed by 1 second of empty black 
screen: (1) the stimulus appeared against a black background for 1 second (the stimulus 
encoding phase), (2) replaced by static white noise for 3 seconds (the working memory 
phase), (3) replaced by a response screen (the response phase) that disappeared after a 
response was given or after 5 seconds had passed. The response screen comprised a 
single orange line against a black background: the line bisected the entire screen in the 
same direction as the line that had bisected the circle earlier in the trial. Responses were 
provided via a button box onto which the relations directly mapped (i.e., right button = 
right, top button = above, etc.). No training was provided. Participants received only 
verbal instructions and received no feedback on any trial to avoid eliciting an 
experimentally irrelevant neural response. Responses were provided for every trial and 
we recorded whether participants pressed a button prior to the appearance of the response 
screen (this occurred only 6 times over 576 trials: about 1% of all trials). 
 
 Equipment and set-up 6.3.3
Participants performed the nonverbal task while their neural activity was recorded using a 
248-channel axial gradiometer magnetoencephalography system (MEG: Magnes 
3600WH, 4-D Neuroimaging, San Diego, CA). MEG signal was sampled at 1017.25 Hz 
and filtered down to 0- 400 Hz during acquisition. The MEG was located in a shielded 
room that reduced electromagnetic and environmental noise. Participants lay supine on a 
172 
 
 bed with their head inserted into the cryogenic helmet-shaped dewar which housed the 
248 sensors.  
 
During trial presentation, the images were projected into the MEG room via a projector 
and periscope mirror system onto a screen that subtended approximately 10 degrees of 
visual angle. The screen was positioned 62 cm in front of the participant. The button box 
was placed on participants’ right sides, since all were right-handed. Participants were 
instructed to use only their pointer finger for pressing buttons. 
 
Participants’ eye positions were tracked using a nonmagnetic eye tracking system (RK-
726PCI Pupil/Corneal Reflection Tracking System, model ETL-400, ISCAN, Inc., 
Burlington, MA). The system captures pupil/corneal reflection using a video feed 
(sampled at 60 Hz). Eye positions were calibrated before and after the experimental task. 
 
 Data analysis 6.3.4
 Task phase analysis. First, we used a noise reduction technique to decrease 6.3.4.1
variance in the signal. Then, we accounted for covariation of neural signal with 
experimentally extraneous variables, then we averaged the MEG signal over each trial 
period of interest. To account for the variation in neural signal due to experimentally 
extraneous variables, we performed a multivariate general linear model (SPSS v20) 
where the sensor was the dependent variable and the covariates were (1) the x,y 
coordinates of the circle on the screen, and (2) the x,y coordinates of the eyes; we saved 
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 the unstandardized residuals to use as the dependent variables in subsequent analyses. We 
then averaged the adjusted neural data (e.g., the residuals) for each trial for each subject 
so that we had a single value for the encoding phase of the trial (1 second of stimulus 
appearance) and for the working memory phase of the trial (3 seconds of static white 
noise). In this way, the data were detrended and any relationship between neural activity 
and task parameters could be assumed to be real and unaffected by the position of the 
stimuli, by eye movements, or by nonstationarity of the neural signal. Furthermore, 
because the response was not included in the analysis, the results are not confounded by 
motor activity. 
 Relation of neural activity to task parameters. The main objective of this study 6.3.4.2
was to assess the relation of neural activity to two sets of spatial relations (i.e., relational 
planes) as well as the neural activity associated with incongruency (as compared to 
congruency). We used the same statistical analyses to assess both comparisons. For our 
analyses, we ran a univariate ANOVA for each MEG sensor for each trial, where the 
sensor was the dependent variable and the independent variables were (1) relational plane 
and (2) congruency. Therefore, we had two sets of comparisons: (1) differential activity 
for congruent versus incongruent trials and (2) differential activity for the left-right 
versus the above-below trials. Subjects were included as random factors in this univariate 
model. Univariate ANOVAs were run for the entire subject group and for each gender 
separately. Interactions were not included as they are difficult to interpret. 
  Localization of neural activity. The low frequency, sustained activity of interest in 6.3.4.3
this study does not lend itself well to source reconstruction techniques, but the region of 
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 sensitivity for the gradiometer coil used here is substantially more compact than for 
magnetometer MEG coils or for EEG leads. To localize the neural source for MEG 
sensors that indicated differential activation, we recreated sensor space over the cortical 
space of a representative cortical surface reconstruction and noted the cortical area each 
gradiometer coil is pointed toward. Our recording method primarily records only from 
the cortical surface and not from deeper structures. We used BESA/Brain Voyager for the 
cortical surface reconstruction and to overlay sensor locations on that image, then rotated 
the brain/sensor space for each sensor to obtain a viewpoint that aligned the sensor with 
the neural area over which it was positioned, eliminating parallax error. There is a small 
region of maximum sensitivity for each gradiometer coil, around the identified cortical 
location for that coil.  We report both the probable sulci and gyri over which the sensor 
was pointed. In this way, we could report the general area of the brain from which the 
neural signal originated, with the caveat that these are approximations. We used 
Damasio’s (2005) brain atlas to identify the indicated brain areas. 
 
 Results 6.4
 Behavioral performance 6.4.1
All participants performed the task without any errors. There was no significant 
advantage in reaction time for either relational plane (one-way ANOVA: F1,574 = 2.13, p 
= .15) or congruency type (one-way ANOVA: F1,574 = .40, p = .53). When men and 
women were analyzed separately, there continued to be no significant reaction time 
advantage; however, generally, men showed much larger, though not significant, 
differences in reaction time in both comparisons than did women. 
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 Neural activity contrasts 6.4.2
F-values taken from the univariate ANOVAs of each sensor were used to plot the 
comparison results in MATLAB. F-values are plotted in a heatmap to account for 
variance emanating from the sensor for relational plane differences (Figure 6.1) and 
congruency differences (Figure 6.2), separately. All analyses are uncorrected. Each 
heatmap is scaled to its maximum F-value then down to 0. See Table 1 for the implicated 
brain areas and their associated significant F-values. Because we were localizing the 
source of signal for each sensor but did not have accompanying MRIs, Art Leuthold and I 
independently mapped the location of the probable neural source. In comparing the 
mapped sources, we each pointed to the same location for 28 out of 38 neural sources. Of 
the 10 time there was not agreement, the disagreement was over which side of a sulcus 
the source had originated. In these instances, we listed both potential sources in Table 
6.1. 
 Above-below vs. left-right trials. For the encoding phase (Figure 6.1, left panel), 6.4.2.1
differential neural activity was found around the areas of the right cerebellum, right 
superior temporal gyrus and left temporal-parietal-occipital junction areas; particularly, 
between the left superior temporal sulcus, anterior occipital sulcus and transverse 
occipital sulcus. For the working memory phase (Figure 6.1, right panel), differential 
neural activity was found in 7 of the 9 areas indicated in the encoding phase, including 
the same inferior parietal areas, right superior temporal areas, right cerebellum and along 
the left temporo-occipital junctions. Additional areas of differential activity during the 
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 working memory phase include the left inferior temporo-occiptial areas, right superior 
frontal areas, and a focused area of the right parietal lobe. Unlike congruency contrasts, 
the strength of differences was slightly higher for the encoding phase than the working 
memory phase. See Table 6.1 for a more precise description of the differentially activated 
areas. 
 
 
Figure 6.1Heatmap of relational plane contrast based on F-values. Values are scaled and 
represent differential neural activity for encoding (left panel) and working memory (right panel) 
phases of trials. 
 
 Congruent vs. incongruent trials. For the encoding phase (Figure 6.2, left panel), 6.4.2.2
differential neural activity was found exclusively on the left side of the brain in two areas 
of the frontal lobe and one area of the parietal lobe. The frontal areas included activity 
around the precentral sulci, over the most posterior areas of the middle frontal gyrus and 
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 possibly the most posterior and inferior portion of the superior frontal gyrus. This likely 
is premotor cortex. The parietal area included an area around the postcentral sulci over 
the supramarginal gyrus of the inferior partietal lobule. For the working memory phase 
(Figure 6.2, right panel), differential neural activity was mostly bilateral (but not 
symmetrical) and spread across similar frontal areas, inferior and posterior temporal 
areas, near the temporal-parietal-occipital junctions, and cerebellum. Two of the three 
areas indicated in the encoding phase remained differentially activated in the working 
memory phase (one of the frontal sensors showed only marginally significant differences; 
F1,562 = 3.4, p = .065), and many of the sensors indicated in the working memory phase 
were located nearby and covered additional extents of the same neural areas. It is of 
notable interest that the strength of differential activity (as indicated by the F-value) is 
higher in the working memory phase compared to the encoding stage. See Table 6.1 for a 
more precise description of the differentially activated areas. 
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Figure 6.2 Heatmap of congruency contrast based on F-values, which are scaled and represent 
differential neural activity for encoding (left panel) and working memory (right panel) phases. 
 
Table 6.1 List of probable brain areas involved in contrasts. This list is divided by task phase: 
encoding or working memory (WM). Sensors which indicated significantly different activity 
between contrasts are included, as is the degree of significance. 
Contrast Task 
phase 
Sensor Region F-value 
Above-Below 
v.  
Left-Right 
Encoding 
130 Left superior temporal sulcus; middle or 
superior temporal gyrus 
4.1* 
132 Left superior temporal sulcus; inferior 
parietal lobule or lateral occipital area 
8.1*** 
Encoding 
& WM 
101 Left transverse occipital sulcus/lateral 
occipital sulcus; angular gyrus 
6.4*/ 
5.7* 
133 Left transverse occipital sulcus; angular 
gyrus or superior occipital 
4.2*/ 
4.9* 
160 Left angular gyrus 7.1**/4.7* 
161 Left lateral occipital sulcus; lateral 
occipital gyrus 
9.2***/ 
8.0*** 
172 Right superior temporal gyrus 6.3*/ 5.4* 
203 Left calcarine fissure; occipital pole 6.1*/ 5.9* 
239 Right cerebellum 4.9*/ 4.8* 
WM 
16 Right middle frontal sulcus/longitudinal 
fissure; superior frontal gyrus 
4.2* 
79 Right inferior parietal sulcus; inferior 
parietal lobule or temporo-occipito-
5.3* 
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 parietal junction 
183 Left calcarine fissure 4.9* 
186 Left or right lateral fissure 4.3* 
214 Left cerebellum 3.9* 
217 Left cerebellum 4.7* 
234 Left cerebellum 5.7* 
236 Left cerebellum 5.3* 
Congruent v. 
Incongruent 
Encoding 41 Left precentral sulcus; middle frontal 
gyrus or precentral gyrus 
5.1* 
Encoding 
& WM 
22 Left precentral sulcus; middle or superior 
frontal gyrus 
4.8*/ 5.1* 
43 Left postcentral sulcus; supramarginal 
gyrus 
3.9*/ 
7.7** 
WM 
34 Right mid frontal sulcus or superior 
frontal suclus; superior frontal gyrus  
4.4* 
54 Right central sulcus; postcentral gyrus 4.5* 
114 Right central sulcus; precentral gyrus 6.4* 
148 Right inferior frontal gyrus 4.1* 
159 Left angular gyrus 5.0* 
162 Left transverse occipital sulcus; lateral 
occipital gyrus 
4.2* 
169 Right lateral occipital sulcus/anterior 
occipital sulcus; temporo-occipital 
junction 
5.1* 
180 Left inferior temporal gyrus  5.3* 
190 Right anterior occipital sulcus; lateral 
occipital gyrus or temporo-occipital 
junction 
4.7* 
198 Left inferior temporal gyrus or fusiform 
gyrus 
4.3* 
199 Left lateral occipital gyrus 5.2* 
209 Right inferior temporal gyrus or fusiform 
gyrus 
5.0* 
210 Right inferior temporal sulcus; inferior 
temporal gyrus 
5.5* 
225 Right cerebellum 3.9* 
231 Left lateral temporo-occipital sulcus; 
inferior temporal gyrus or temporo-
occipital gyrus 
4.9* 
232 Left lateral temporo-occipital sulcus; 
temporo-occipital gyrus or inferior 
temporal gyrus 
5.6* 
242 Right cerebellum 7.0** 
246 Right inferior temporal gyrus 5.8* 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .005 
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 Sex differences in neural activity. Because sex differences have been shown in 6.4.2.3
brain lateralization, particularly for language processing, we analyzed the data for the 
men and women separately. Our findings suggest that these group plots may be largely 
driven by the male participants. Women, when analyzed separately, showed non-
overlapping areas of differential neural activity from men which were largely bilateral 
and in fewer areas. Additionally, women showed a much smaller difference effect, with 
an F-value of only 4, suggesting that women are largely treating the opposing conditions 
(within each comparison set) similarly. However, since the sample size was small and 
skewed toward men (N = 8; women: N = 4) we do not show the data here. Nevertheless, 
we mention this potentially interesting and important sex difference to encourage further 
work on parsing out these differences, especially considering that there were no 
performance differences. 
 
 Discussion 6.5
This study is the first to implicate differential neural activity for two sets of spatial 
relations. We also observed differential activity for congruent trials compared to 
incongruent trials in approximately the same number of areas that were indicated in the 
relational plane contrast. Some of the implicated areas for the two contrasts overlapped, 
although the precise sensor differed which indicates that the exact neural source was 
different. For each contrast, most of the neural areas consistently showed differential 
activity across both the encoding and working memory phases of trials, suggesting these 
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 areas are especially important for making those (relational plane or congruency) 
judgments. Overall, it was a rule rather than exception that the working memory phase 
included an expanded area of differential activity compared to the encoding phase. It 
should be noted that from our results we cannot point to directionality in terms of which 
set of relations (or congruency type) drove the observed differences and we cannot 
distinguish whether these differences in activity are due to increases or decreases from 
baseline activities; therefore, we cannot speak to whether these differences are due to 
separate cognitive systems or changes in activation within a single system. Despite this 
caveat, we can make a number of coherent conclusions, and align these to the current 
literature. 
 
The first conclusion is that the two sets of spatial relations we examined have distinct 
neural signatures. Our relational plane contrasts indicated differential activity mostly over 
left occipital-parietal-temporal junction areas, and cerebellar areas. Additional areas 
included single parts of the right superior temporal gyrus, right frontal gyrus, and right 
cerebellum. The importance of left inferior parietal lobe in categorical relations, 
generally, is supported in the literature (Amorapanth et al. 2009; Damasio et al. 2001; 
Franciotti et al. 2013), although we are the first to show that this area is differentially 
activated for different sets of spatial relations. Furthermore, our findings support 
Damasio et al.’s (2001) results for the importance of right inferior parietal lobule (in their 
study, the supramarginal gyrus); however, in our study the differential activity was due to 
working memory processes while in their study it was due to differences from naming 
spatial relations using abstract shapes and naming spatial relations using implements 
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 which may suggest that our participants were accessing labels in this phase of the trial or 
otherwise doing something similar to Damasio et al’s participants. We did not, however, 
match previous findings of left superior parietal activity or left posterior frontal 
(Amorapanth et al. 2009; Damasio et al. 2001) or middle frontal activity (Franciotti et al. 
2013); although we did find minimal difference in right frontal activity.  
 
In comparison to other studies, it has been suggested that the right superior temporal 
gyrus (STG) subserves spatial awareness and encoding (Karnath et al. 2005) as well as 
shifting attention (Yantis and Serences 2003), while the left STG contributes to language 
processing: any of these attributes could explain why STG was differentially activated in 
our study, but future investigations are needed to address this issue. Differential 
activation of left temporal-parietal areas could be explained by increased activity for left-
right judgments compared to above-below since this area (the angular gyrus, specifically) 
has been implicated in left-right confusion (Gertsmann 1940; Hirnstein et al. 2009). This 
finding may be due specifically to left-right incongruent trials if these trial types required 
additional processing that above-below incongruent and left-right congruent trials did not 
require, possibly due to automaticity of those other judgments. Our parietal findings 
match those of Goodwin and colleagues (2012), which indicated stronger neural activity 
for one set of relations over the other. Their results (Goodwin et al. 2012) pointed to 
stronger activity for left-right judgments – the spatial relations learned first for two 
monkeys – than for above-below judgments. However, Goodwin and colleagues also 
reported differential activity in prefrontal areas: areas which we did not find any 
differential activity. In fact, prefrontal areas were not implicated in either of our contrasts. 
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The second conclusion is that congruency contrasts implicated areas that have been 
previously shown to be involved in overcoming incongruencies as well as areas 
associated with motor planning and visual spatial working memory. Areas previously 
indicated for overcoming incongruency include inferior temporal cortex, inferior parietal 
areas and inferior frontal areas (Peterson et al. 2002). Furthermore, the areas implicated 
in our study have been linked to object-based and perspective-based transformations, 
including the areas in occipital, temporal, parietal, and posterior frontal cortices, and a 
substantial portion of the cerebellum (Zacks and Michelon 2005), which may be 
important in adjusting category assignment. For the encoding phase of the task, 
specifically, premotor areas were differentially activated which may suggest that some 
motor planning was affected more for one congruency type than the other. A likely 
explanation is that the congruent trials promoted an automatic response and therefore led 
to a stronger, sustained motor planning signal than the incongruent trials – which likely 
had a delayed motor response. However, these frontal areas are also associated with 
visual working memory, so the activation could just as likely be due to early engagement 
of working memory processes. During the working memory phase additional neural areas 
were activated. Additional areas included mostly bilateral temporo-occipital areas as well 
as right cerebellum and singular parts each of the right superior frontal gyrus and left 
angular gyrus. Bilateral temporo-occipital areas, including fusiform and inferior temporal 
gyri, have been implicated in survey encoding (Shelton and Gabrieli 2002), topographical 
memory (Corkin 2002), and object processing (Damasio et al. 2001): it may be that 
incongruent trials necessitate these kinds of additional processing (or strategies) in order 
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 to make the correct judgment whereas congruent trials are processed and remembered 
automatically and without further processing. Both the left supramarginal and left angular 
gyri have been implicated in left-right confusion (Gertsmann 1940; Hirnstein et al. 2009) 
but it is not clear whether left-right incongruent judgments are driving this result 
considering these same neural areas also showed differential activity in the relational 
plane contrast. Finally, superior frontal sulcus, which divides the middle and superior 
frontal gyri, is associated with working memory (Klingsberg et al. 2002) and although the 
same sensors were not implicated in both contrasts, these sensors were adjacent to each 
other suggesting that a similar function may have been performed in each condition. 
 
Contrary to our hypothesis, there was no evidence for differential activity in the expected 
areas for early (above-below) compared to later (left-right) learned words. Specifically, 
we expected to find differential activity in the lateral inferior prefrontal cortex and 
precuneus (Fiebach et al. 2003). One possible reason why we did not see differential 
activity in these areas is because of our method. First, Fiebach et al.’s (2003) study 
subtracted from baseline activity whereas we differenced between conditions. Secondly, 
our design did not investigate linguistic strategy use explicitly or in any way prime 
participants to use a linguistic strategy (as the afore-referenced studies did). Behaviorally, 
language has been implicated in the encoding and retrieval of spatial information, 
elsewhere, but with mixed results (Hayward and Tarr 1995; Hermer-Vasquez et al. 1999; 
Loewenstein and Gentner 2005; Dessalegn and Landau 2008). So, although it may be 
true that language use helps in terms of strategy use, it does not appear that language is 
differentially accessed for the two relational planes or congruency types in adults. Our 
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 findings may still support the hypothesis that later-learned words (left-right) are neurally 
represented differently than earlier-learned words (above-below) despite comparable 
performance and even though the implicated areas differ from those suggested by 
Fiebach and colleagues (2003). Another possible reason is that labels were not utilized by 
our participants and so those neural areas were not activated. We use caution when 
assigning function to cortical areas since there is a rarely a 1-to-1 mapping (Price and 
Friston 2005), but would nevertheless expect to see differential neural activity if these 
areas were involved in the cognitive systems tapped for our task.  
 
Another hypothesis that was not validated was that relational planes map to similar neural 
areas as congruency. We did not find overlapping areas of differential neural activity for 
the relational and congruency contrasts as expected if symmetry was a factor (for 
supporting behavioral evidence see Sholl and Egeth 1981). However, this could be 
because our stimuli were simple and did not have (biologically) relevant axes onto which 
a canonical top could be assigned or front-back could be distinguished. Future work 
should consider if similar differences are found for oriented faces, bodies or other 
biologically relevant stimuli.  
 
Our third conclusion is that the consistency in differential activity across encoding and 
working memory phases indicates neural areas that are imperative for representing one 
condition over the other. For the congruency contrast, one of the left premotor areas and 
an area of the left supramarginal gyrus was consistently differentially activated. Similarly 
for the dimension contrast, nearly all the areas differentially activated in the encoding 
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 phase were also differentially activated in the working memory phase. These areas, in 
particular, should be further examined in future work that is focused on congruency 
(perhaps as it relates to relational complexity) or spatial relations. 
 
Our fourth, and last, conclusion is that gender differences may exist neurally despite 
concurrent performance differences and this contrast should be pursued in future studies. 
Our findings may support previous findings that the two sexes utilize different strategies 
and/or that they have differences in brain use efficiency. On the one hand, previous work 
– such as that work on spatial navigation – has indicated that men and women apply 
different strategies for the same task; specifically, women are more likely to use an 
analytic, or landmark-based, strategy, whereas men are more likely to use a holistic, or 
Euclidean, strategy (Wang and Carr 2014; see Thomsen et al. 2000 for similar 
conclusion). Such differences in strategy have been linked to differing ratios of 
visuospatial working memory to verbal working memory (Wang and Carr 2014) or 
differences in social skills, such as empathy or embodiment (Kessler and Wang 2012). 
However, for our task, it may be the case that women are applying a single strategy to the 
simple relational task while men may be using an array of strategies, varying according to 
the specific condition. Alternatively, it has been shown that women are more efficient 
than men in terms of neural processing in a visuospatial task without concurrent 
performances differences (Christova et al., 2008). Furthermore men and women appear to 
differentially activate the two hemispheres in certain tasks, further providing supporting 
evidence of a difference in strategy use (Georgopoulos et al. 2001). Additionally, it has 
been shown that sex differences may exist across a number of cognitive tasks despite 
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 performance differences, with men showing stronger neural signals and signals in a larger 
number of areas (Bell et al. 2006; Weiss et al. 2003; Thomsen et al. 2000), similar to our 
findings. 
 
In light of our overall findings, it may be tempting to conclude that relational reasoning is 
left lateralized in the brain; however, the importance of brain lateralization on the 
development of cognition continues to be a debate, even in the non-human research (e.g. 
Hopkins et al. 2007). Niebauer (2001) suggests a left hemisphere advantage for 
processing categorical relations (i.e. is a dot above-below a line) and a right hemisphere 
advantage for processing coordinate spatial relations (i.e., is the dot near/far from a line; 
see also Franciotti et al. 2013 for similar findings). Our current study echoes this left 
hemisphere processing of categorical relations. 
 
Considering our overall findings more generally, and in the context of other studies, our 
conclusions add to the current literature on relational reasoning despite not being able to 
corroborate all the previous findings. This may be due to our methods of neural recording 
and analysis or to differences in task requirements. Many studies of relational reasoning 
have focused on the connections between prefrontal cortex and parietal areas and these 
fronto-parietal connections are well documented and central to spatial encoding in both 
humans (Krawczyk 2012; Wendelken et al. in press) and monkeys (Chafee et al. 2007; 
Goodwin et al. 2012). Our current analysis did not investigate these connections, 
specifically, or in terms of their temporal coordination, but we will investigate these in 
future analyses. In terms of localization, prefrontal areas were not differentially involved 
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 in either of our experimental contrasts, although parietal areas were. Left prefrontal 
cortex has been pointed to as an important center for judgments of relational complexity 
(frontopolar cortex; Bunge et al. 2005), for manipulating self-generated information and 
integrating the outcomes of two or more cognitive operations (rostrolateral prefrontal 
cortex; Christoff et al. 2001; Crone et al. 2009), as well as for evaluating whether 
relations match (monitoring and manipulating representations held in working memory) 
and mediating reasoning processes by supporting analogical mappings (dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex; Bunge et al. 2005). The lack of differentiated activity in our study 
suggests that these cognitive resources were not tapped more for one contrast than for the 
other; the performance results corroborate this conclusion. 
 
In summary, we provide the first evidence for differential neural activity for two sets of 
spatial relations. Due to our approach, it is unclear whether these differences are due to 
separate cognitive systems or to changes in activation within a single system; therefore, 
further work is needed. In terms of localization of neural signals, fMRI or other neural 
imaging technique would contribute necessary supporting evidence. Future steps should 
also include investigating the strength and timeline of connectivity across brain regions. 
We predict that left-right relations likely require increased activity in the indicated areas 
compared to above-below if these relations are truly more difficult. Furthermore, to get 
closer to the answer of whether left-right relations are the more difficult relations to 
judge, a future study should require participants to respond as fast as possible rather than 
allowing a response delay as in our study: faster response times for above-below 
judgments would be expected if left-right judgments are more difficult. Our findings 
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 suggest that future work also should be aimed at further discerning and discovering 
gender differences in neural signaling, without concurrent performance discrepancies. 
The current analysis was largely exploratory, so few a priori hypotheses were formed 
regarding what neural areas should show differential neural activity. This was largely the 
case because there were no precedents to suggest differential neural activity for above-
below versus left-right judgments; therefore, further inquiry into this line of questioning 
and further analyses of the implicated neural areas are causes worthy of further pursuit. 
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 Chapter 7 General Discussion 
 
 Discussion 7.1
The impetus of this thesis was to investigate relational reasoning in humans in terms of 1) 
its development, 2) its reliance (or lack thereof) on language, 3) its connection to 
lateralization, and 4) the neural mechanisms underlying it. Previous studies have 
suggested that relational reasoning is a specific kind of mental computation that develops 
slowly in humans and so late in primate evolution as to perhaps be unique to humans 
(e.g., Christoff et al. 2001; Penn et al. 2008; Halford et al. 2010). Some researchers tie 
relational reasoning to language and have gone so far as to suggest that it is dependent 
upon language (Gentner 2003; Baldo et al. 2010). Our work, in consideration of Goodwin 
et al. (2012) – the work that inspired it – suggests that relational reasoning is not as 
dependent on language acquisition as previously thought, but instead language can be 
engaged as a strategy for dealing with relational judgments. This is an important 
distinction with three implications: 1) animals can learn to make these judgments if 
properly trained (e.g., Fagot and Thompson 2011; Goodwin et al. 2012), 2) animals 
trained to apply symbols to representations should outperform non-symbol-trained 
animals, and 3) humans exhibit superior performance only when they apply a linguistic 
(or symbolic) strategy, not by virtue of having language alone. This is an important 
distinction because it supports the idea of continuity between humans and other animals – 
that human cognition is not different from animal cognition in kind but rather in degree 
(Darwin 1871) – that some researchers dispute (e.g., Penn et al. 2008). 
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 In collating my specific findings, I have provided ample behavioral evidence that the 
same underlying cognitive mechanisms are at play in the ability to extract the spatial 
relations above, below, right and left using a nonverbal task by humans (both children 
and adults). However, the neural evidence suggests that differences emerge at the neural 
level, although it is unclear whether the difference is in the neural network involved or 
the degree to which a single network is activated. In consideration of our behavioral 
evidence (and the neural evidence provided by Goodwin et al. 2012), I suggest that the 
difference lies in the degree to which a single network is activated. Previous work has 
suggested that more challenging tasks require increased neural activation in the areas 
responsible for that particular ability (relational reasoning: Crone et al. 2009; Wendelken 
et al. 2008; flow: Ulrich et al. 2014; bimanual coordination: Ullen et al. 2003); therefore, 
it is likely that left-right relational judgments required greater activation, which drove the 
difference in activations. This conclusion is partially supported by the idea that order of 
acquisition affects neural activation, a finding that is suggested in Goodwin et al. (2012) 
and some behavioral studies with typically developing children (Dessalegn and Landau 
2008) and children with Williams syndrome (Landau and Hoffman 2005).  
 
In support of my conclusion that language acquisition, alone, is not responsible for 
enhanced reasoning ability, I did not find superior nonverbal performance on above-
below judgments compared to left-right judgments in children or adults. This is despite 
finding that knowledge of the words above and below precedes the ability to accurately 
extract the relations in a nonverbal task: strong evidence for the idea that the ability to 
extract the relations is linked to language should have yielded better performance in the 
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 nonverbal task for above and below in comparison to right and left (as found in Landau’s 
studies). However, there was evidence that knowledge of which hand is which (a labeling 
skill) does seem to help performance in both modalities, though much more on the verbal 
tasks where children had no time constraint in responding. One reason for this finding 
could be that children who knew the correct label had enough time in the verbal task to 
reason through their judgment, since this task had no time constraint. There is evidence 
for this from the observation that many children who performed well on the verbal task 
would hold out their hands and label each one before making a verbal judgment (often 
using the “my left hand forms an L” strategy). Final support is evident in the finding that 
many children who did not know the correct label for each hand still did well on the 
nonverbal task (the critical comparison); therefore, the effectiveness of language was 
evident mostly in its use and less so in the sheer act of having it.   
 
Further evidence against the reliance of nonverbal relational reasoning on verbal ability 
rests on our study of the order of skill acquisition (Chapter 3). In that study we offered 
new insights into the process of cognitive development; namely, the mechanisms of 
restructuring (Piaget’s assimilation and accommodation) that occur as knowledge is 
added to the cognitive system. Our analyses revealed the progressive treatment of 
different tasks as being similar (i.e., chunking) as these tasks became hierarchically 
organized with cognitive development. We found that, first, verbal tasks became 
clustered – each cluster beginning as a pair of antonyms within a specific task – and, 
then, slowly the nonverbal tasks became chunked. Although this finding supports the idea 
that verbal knowledge is attained first, followed by the consolidation of nonverbal 
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 knowledge, our correlational analyses provided the necessary support to show that these 
two skills are not dependent on one another. So, although one skill may precede the other, 
our results suggest that they are fairly independent processes, at least at the age groups 
tested. 
 
That being said, I want acknowledge that these processes can be used to enhance one 
another (e.g., Gopnik 2001). Previous work has suggested that learning new words can 
create the opportunity for concept-formation (which is a nonverbal process: Waxman and 
Markow 1995; Casasola 2005; Lupyan and Casasanto 2015). In my own work, I have 
shown that language can enhance nonverbal reasoning when labels are utilized as an 
encoding and memory strategy. I have argued that by accessing language, and applying a 
linguistic strategy, a mechanism is provided to direct attention to the salient information, 
and therefore to ignore the irrelevant information. It could be that the activation of a 
linguistic strategy biases perception (or search strategy) toward the category which it 
labels; however, my studies cannot speak to that interpretation.  
 
Based on my findings, I suggest that the role of language is to provide a unifying 
mechanism for bridging the perceptual gaps between different instances of relational 
similarity: what is seen and the concept to which it is tied. This tying together of different 
visual information and concept by way of a label can work by switching the roles of 
concept and label, which supports previous work (Snedeker and Gleitman 2004). 
Therefore, my findings do not discount the possibility for perceptual warping (as argued 
by Lupyan 2012), but rather speak only to the later-occurring comparison step of 
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 relational reasoning. Further work is necessary to explore the possibility of linguistic 
effects in early processing; however, based on the current literature, I think that it is 
likely that effects from language can be seen either at early processing or later in 
processing, or perhaps even at both levels of reasoning. 
 
In short, my findings are consistent with the idea that language can strengthen basic 
relational reasoning abilities such that using language to encode and remember stimulus 
attributes (e.g., spatial relations) expands the capacity for relational reasoning, and may 
free up resources to solve other problems. In this way, then, once language skills are 
strong enough (perhaps when all verbal instantiations form a single concept in the child’s 
cognitive architecture) then adequate resources are freed up for other aspects of reasoning 
(such as overcoming an incongruence): a mechanism which is suggested in our cognitive 
organization study. Furthermore, it may be that language is being used as a strategic tool 
for adopting and abandoning (i.e., shifting) relational standards: a possible explanation 
which is supported by our finding of similar performance across both relational planes 
when a “linguistic” strategy is applied in the nonverbal task.  
 
Coming back to the underlying neural mechanisms, it may be tempting to conclude that 
relational reasoning is left-lateralized in the brain: that it drives left brain activation. Both 
contrasts of relational plane and congruency indicated significant differential activity in 
mostly the left hemisphere for encoding the stimulus, although working memory was 
much more bilateral. However, since we did not compare neural activity to a baseline, we 
cannot say whether the left-hemisphere is truly predominant for this type of reasoning or 
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 whether only areas in the left-hemisphere were differentially activated. It should be kept 
in mind that all the adult participants were right-handed, so I cannot eliminate the 
possibility that some of the left-hemisphere activity was due to motor responses, at least 
for the relational plane contrast since each relation required a unique finger movement. 
Motor response cannot account for the congruency effects since all four finger motions 
are represented in these samples. Bringing in the findings from the handedness study, and 
working from the assumption that children’s neural activity highly corresponded to 
adults’ neural activity (Wendelken et al. 2011; Wright et al. 2008), I can infer that 
lateralization (handedness) did not drive performance on the relational planes. Therefore, 
relational reasoning may drive left-hemisphere specialization, but the reverse is not true. 
However, it could be that lateralization did drive verbal performance, although this would 
need to be specifically tested in a future study. 
 
Keeping those concerns in mind, there are a few conclusions that I can draw concerning 
the left-lateralization of brain activity in relational judgments. The most significant left-
hemisphere specialization findings from other studies involved categorization task 
(compared to coordinate judgment tasks) and PFC activation. With respect to 
categorization, generally speaking, my task was a categorization task. This may explain 
why I found differential activity predominately in the left hemisphere. With respect to 
PFC activations being predominately left-lateralized, since I did not find differential 
activity in the PFC in either the left or the right hemisphere, it may be that my task did 
not tap into the specific aspects of relational reasoning that have been associated with 
PFC activity (see Appendix C for list of PFC-associated cognitive processes). For 
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 example, it could be that my task was simple enough for human adults to not require 
much integration of object or relational information. Furthermore, it is possible that my 
task did not require semantic retrieval or that the two contrasts did not differ in their 
requirements of working memory. 
 
My last general conclusion is that gender differences may exist neurally despite a lack of 
concurrent performance differences. My study with adults suggests this finding, but 
follow-up studies should be conducted with a larger sample of adults and with children. 
Previous work with adults has suggested that men and women engage different neural 
patterns on the same task (Bell et al. 2006; Weiss et al. 2003; Thomsen et al. 2000) 
without differences in performance (Christova et al. 2008); however, it is yet unclear 
whether boys and girls engage different neural patters on the same task with similar 
performances. Sex difference in performance in children can be manipulated to emerge or 
disappear, so any study would need to be careful in its instructions and to avoid 
empowering biases (Baennenger and Newcombe 1995; Stieff et al. 2013; Uttal et al. 
2013a). These differences should be investigated in future studies.  
 
 Implications 7.2
 
The implications for this research are vast. First, this research sheds new light on the 
relationship between language and cognition, especially in terms of concept development 
and retrieval. Because relational reasoning is so important for building math and science 
skills (National Research Council 2006; Vendetti et al. 2015), it is critical that relational 
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 reasoning (in all its manifestations) be taught in the classroom. Our study on the order of 
development of relational reasoning skills suggests that  classroom training might begin 
by verbally pairing up polar opposites (e.g., above/below, right/left), in concordance with 
previous findings that suggest children learn two words are opposites before they fully 
map the terms to their relations (Clark 1972). Only after opposites are mastered children 
might be taught to make nonverbal perceptual matching judgments, like our nonverbal 
congruent trials. Finally, these congruent judgments should be the basis for teaching how 
to make the more difficult incongruent relational judgments. In short, our findings 
suggest how a unified system of knowledge for making relational judgments might be 
built— by appealing to the natural progression by which these skills develop. 
 
Furthermore, overcoming incongruency is an equally important skill to learn, which 
requires children to ignore irrelevant information. For example, in analogical studies, 
children have been shown to be highly susceptible to irrelevant perceptual features 
(Ratterman and Gentner 1998; Richland et al. 2006) which distract them from the 
relevant relationships at the core of the analogy. Our study on the co-development of 
verbal and nonverbal relational knowledge suggests that labels may help children attend 
to the key relationships and draw their attention away from the irrelevant information. 
Although perceptual similarities may serve as a distractor, they can also be used to 
scaffold learning by drawing attention to the key elements of the stimulus or task (Namy 
and Gentner 2002; Gentner et al. 2007), particularly when these features share a label, 
which is useful in a classroom setting (reviewed in Vendetti et al. 2015). In fact, simply 
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 providing detailed instructions to children can be enough for them to overcome 
incongruencies (Theeuwes et al. 2014).  
 
Our neural study has implications for discovering the role of biology and physiology over 
the role of experience in spatial relational judgments. From my work, it is unclear 
whether attentional networks play a role in differentiating one pole from the other (in 
either the vertical or horizontal directions), although future work could determine the 
involvement of these networks. In terms of everyday implications, knowing one’s left 
from right and being able to tell above from below is an extremely important ability to 
have. In fact, this ability has important implications for navigation, particularly for 
individuals working in environments that lack environmental or gravitational cues that 
parse these directions from each other, such as pilots, divers and astronauts. It is 
interesting to note that nautical and aeronautical directions avoid left-right terms and 
instead implement the terms port and starboard, respectively. Historically, humans 
appear to be less able to tell left from right than other directions such as above and below 
and our neural evidence supports this observation. Further research as to why these 
differences exist could have important implications for training individuals (particularly 
drivers, pilots and captains) to have higher efficacy in identifying these directions, 
particularly the left-right directions. 
 
 Future directions 7.3
We designed our nonverbal task to be used in future cross-species studies. In fact, the 
potential to apply this task in different animal studies was a major factor in choosing to 
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 model it from Goodwin et al.’s (2012) task. Of particular interest is to further explore the 
effects of language on nonverbal reasoning ability. Specifically, it would be ideal to 
follow previous attempts to identify differences in ability between symbol-trained and 
non-symbol-trained animals. If symbolic representation (of which language is a type) 
truly promotes relational reasoning, then we should find, as others have, a performance 
advantage for those animals that have access to symbols. 
 
As thinking for saying follows different pathways in the brain than thinking for doing we 
would expect, in humans, to find an erosion of the latter by the former when the task 
becomes more reliant on language. In spirit of this prediction, future studies include 
manipulations in the task such as more explicit directions on how to perform the task or 
how to respond (i.e., repeating the answer silently to one’s self rather than eliciting a 
motor response). Another manipulation is that we may also want to examine whether 
language affects the length of time that the relations are encoded or remembered because 
past work suggests that language’s effects are most apparent when longer times are 
required between relational coding and a behavioral response (e.g., Hermer and Spelke 
1996). However, it would be equally interesting to speed up the task such that engaging a 
linguistic strategy would be impossible: if language’s effect is weak (as we suggest) then 
performance should not be affected, although there is a possibility that the neural 
pathways involved will be different. This is an important question to answer and gets 
more specifically at the role of strategy in performance. 
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 Our study on the neural components of relational reasoning suggest that gender 
differences emerge at the neural level, but without differential performance on the task, 
we cannot identify in what ways their reasoning differs (if at all). It could be that men and 
women differ at the neural organization level rather than at the strategy level, but this is a 
difficult argument to make in terms of how those differences would have evolved. 
Further work should concentrate on determining whether gender differences actually 
exist. One important finding of this future work is discovering the biological versus the 
environmental component of such a difference (if one exists). For example, Piaget’s 
developmental theory proposed that cognitive development is based on sensori-motor 
activity through endogenous and biologically determined cognitive processes 
(accommodation, adaptation) that drive children through a series of universal stages. 
Since individuals of both sexes go through these stages it is difficult to argue that they 
utilize their environments differently; however, studies on play suggest that children 
might actually do this (Fagot 1974). Gender differences have important implications for 
learning, not just at school but also at home, particularly for how children should be 
encouraged to play with both gender-specific and gender-neutral toys. We are currently 
experiencing this shift at the national level, with many programs pushing girls to pursue 
STEM education (Uttal et al. 2013a; Uttal et al. 2013b); therefore, this is an important 
line of research to pursue. 
 
Our current analysis did not investigate neural activity with respect to temporal 
coordination of different brain areas, but this is an important avenue to pursue. We 
currently have the data needed to analyze cortical relationships, but have yet to find the 
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 best approach. Once these analyses are performed, it would be of utmost importance to 
compare the temporal information to the temporal information examined in Goodwin et 
al.’s monkeys. Few studies, if any, have directly compared human and monkey neural 
activity as it progresses from cortical area to cortical area across time. This type of 
analysis would be eye-opening with respect to the evolution of the primate brain and 
cognition and would fill an important gap in the literature. 
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  Notes 
1 There are many ways to talk about the role of language, and particularly the mechanism 
by which it exerts an effect on reasoning. One way is to talk about when in reasoning an 
effect of language can be observed. As I argue in the main text, some researchers 
conceptualize language as emitting an effect only during the reasoning phase, when 
different kinds of information are being manipulated (Hermer-Vasquez et al. 1999; 
Loewenstein and Gentner 2005), while other researchers argue that language is less of an 
“add-on” or mediating feature and more of a blended, modifying feature the effects of 
which can be seen at both early (perceptual) and late (reasoning) cognitive processes 
(Lupyan 2012). However, the timing of the effect is not the only way to investigate the 
role of language. It is also useful to think about how language affects reasoning, which 
requires an investigation into whether language is mediating, modifying or one and the 
same as reasoning. Yet a different approach is to investigate whether language can affect 
multiple levels of reasoning (which aligns with looking at both the perceptual and 
reasoning aspects of language’s effects). 
 
In discussing the how of language’s influence, I find it easiest to borrow from 
Loewenstein and Gentner (2005; reiterated from Gentner and Goldin-Meadow 2003): 
The language as lens view is the classic Whorfian hypothesis that the 
grammatical structure of a language shapes its speakers’ perception of the 
world. At the other extreme, the language as category shifter view 
maintains that conceptual categories are universal, but language can 
influence their boundaries. In the language as tool kit view, language 
provides concepts and strategies that augment, but do not supplant, other 
methods of representation and reasoning. This view is related to 
Vygotsky’s (1962) claim that language is instrumental in learning to direct 
mental processes, but differs in emphasizing specific semantic and 
grammatical devices. 
Loewenstein and Gentner verify that they are in the language as tool kit camp, which is 
the camp most everyone I cite in this thesis would likely agree to be in, including 
Lupyan. However, I do not think that Lupyan would with Gentner’s ideas about the 
timing of the effect. I also feel that Lupyan and Gentner are discussing different levels of 
reasoning in interpreting their results and also in designing their studies. These two 
research groups again seem to be at odds when the role of language is approached in yet a 
different way. 
 
This different way of conceptualizing the role of language is to consider how language 
affects concept categories. As discussed in Hayward and Tarr (1995), language (or spatial 
terms) function to map onto existing category, or to create a new category, or are 
essentially the same as the concept category. Landau and Hoffman 2005) similarly 
discussed the possible co-structure of verbal and nonverbal reasoning (including 
dependence of one on the other) versus the independence of these modalities. In this 
thesis, I provide evidence supporting a probable role of language as mapping to an 
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 existing category (see Gleitman and Papafragou 2001; Snedeker and Gleitman 2004) as 
well as that language can help create new categories (Casasola 2005), but not for 
language and nonverbal knowledge as being one and the same. Even my own findings 
suggest that language and nonverbal reasoning likely share some structure, but are 
otherwise independent. Overall, this conceptualization of language-dependence or 
independence approaches the problem from a different point of view, one that is at the 
same time more focused (on categories) and generic (it does not consider timing effects). 
Further exploration by way of this approach would need to consider how linguistic 
descriptors can be coarse or precise in representing space, which leads down a whole new 
path from the one I have forged in this thesis, but is important nonetheless. 
 
One last consideration is how language is defined. If language is considered under the 
umbrella of symbols (as it should be), then isolated symbols, such as labels, should also 
show effects on reasoning. In this thesis I have given examples of how propositional 
strings affect nonverbal reasoning (Dessalegn and Landau 2008; Franconeri et al 2012). I 
have also provided evidence of solitary symbols (such as labels, Arabic numerals or 
tokens) aiding in reasoning (Thompson et al 1997; Casasanto 2005). Since these tokens 
are acting to represent the to-be-reasoned-about concept, then there is no need to assume 
propositional encoding is occurring at all, which has implications for the extent of 
language’s reach. Taken together, then, different conclusions can be drawn on the role of 
language. The evidence for isolated symbols does not necessarily support the claims of 
Dessalegn and Landau (2008) and Premack (1976, 1983). Etc. that “language” proper 
(propositional strings) is the key factor promoting nonverbal reasoning, but rather 
suggests that having some place holder is good enough to promote reasoning to some 
higher level, likely because cognitive resources have been freed-up. A process of freeing-
up of resources was described in Chapter 3, where concepts became clustered together as 
a single “chunk” of information. Perhaps, then, language is just one mechanism by which 
information gets chunked, subsequently freeing-up resources which leads to the effects 
found by other researchers.  
 
In summary, it is difficult to compare and contrast researchers’ stances when they do not 
specify when in a trial they expect to see an effect and/or then design a task which 
actually tests that specific hypothesis, when they use their own terminology in discussing 
the potential role of language, when they do not specify what level of analysis they are 
investigating (which affects how results can be interpreted), and when they define 
language differently than their peer researchers. 
 
 
2 It was suggested by one reader that I explain why infants do not talk despite the 
language areas being more-or-less developed. One reason is that much development is 
still occurring in the white matter pathways, particularly within hemispheres (Perani et al. 
2011). These pathways are important for linking up distant areas of the brain, including 
Broca’s Area and Wernicke’s Area, which are in the frontal and posterior temporal lobes 
respectively. Although white matter tracts between these areas are evident from birth, 
these connections will continue to grow and be defined with maturation. Furthermore, 
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 infant brains respond to phonemic information early on, but not to lexical or syntactic 
information. Therefore, these language pathways are servings specific purpose at 
beginning, and will only later on take on new aspects of language learning as the 
pathways continue to develop. So, in the beginning, infants are primarily listening; later 
on, they will begin to speak. 
 
3 This paper has since been published (as of October 2015) in modified form: Scott NM, 
Leuthod A, Sera MD, Georgopoulos AP (2015) Differential neural activity patterns for 
spatial relations in humans: a MEG study. Exp Brain Res 10.1007/s00221-015-4467-6 
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  Appendix A: Development as a moving window 
 
On a different scale, I show the average performance of children on each task 
within a specified age group using a sliding window approach (i.e. a Loess graph). This 
approach calculates the average performance of the youngest 36 children in the sample 
(i.e. n1:n20) and represents that average as an unfilled circle (see Figure A1), then the 
window slides over to include the next older child and calculates an average performance 
for that child and the 35 children immediately younger (i.e. n2:n21). This approach 
smooths out individual differences in performance and finds the average for the age 
group, thus making the data easier to interpret and generalize. Indeed, the pattern of 
performance illustrated in these plots indicates that verbal ability does appear to lead 
nonverbal ability but only slightly. In fact, this rendering (Figure A1) also suggests a 
third factor that accompanies the development of both verbal and nonverbal abilities. 
These graphs of Loess curves indicate that verbal comprehension precedes verbal 
production and success on congruent trials in the nonverbal task precedes success on 
incongruent trials. There, again, appears to be a difference between the above/below 
relational plane and the right/left relational plane. In the above/below relational plane 
both verbal abilities precede both nonverbal abilities; however, in the right/left relational 
plane verbal comprehension and success on congruent trials precedes verbal production 
which increases alongside success on incongruent trials until about the age of 80 months, 
at which point verbal production reaches ceiling performance but absolute success on 
incongruent trials has not yet been attained. 
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 Figure A1: Scatterplots of performance on the nonverbal and verbal tasks according to 
age in months. Each directional relation is represented in a separate plot. The two tasks 
are divided into two subtasks: congruent and incongruent trials for the nonverbal task and 
production and comprehension of the linguistic term for the relation for the verbal task.  
Each circle captures the performance of an individual child.  The blue, green, yellow and 
purple lines reflect the best-fitting regression line that captures the developmental 
trajectory of performance on each task. The vertical red lines indicate the age at which 
performance changes to near perfect on all tasks (i.e. 72-84 months). 
 
 
  
233 
 
  Appendix B: Edinburgh Inventory scoring sheet 
 
EDINBURGH HANDEDNESS INVENTORY
SURNAME: FIRST NAME:
DATE OF BIRTH: SEX:
Results of the 'Simon Says'  game played at start of participation study.
* means repeated task
Task Left Right
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
* i
* ii
L.Q. DECILE
From RC Oldfield, 1970
One eye open
Write your name in air
Draw a smiley face in air
Throw a ball
Scissors
Toothbrush
Hammer a nail
Spoon
Broom (upper hand)
Open a (pop) bottle
Open a box (lid)
Kicking a ball
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 Appendix C: Regions of interest and their observed functions 
BRAIN REGION SIDE TASK NOTES REFs 
FRONTAL     
Superior frontal 
sulcus 
B 
 
WM; visual spatial and visual 
nonspatial 
correlated w? WM & age Klingberg, Forsserg, and Westerberg, 
2002, J COG NEUROSCI (+ others, see 
their REFs) 
Precentral sulcus 
(anterior side) 
B WM; visual spatial and visual 
nonspatial 
correlated w? WM & age Klingberg, Forsserg, and Westerberg, 
2002, J COG NEUROSCI (+ others, see 
their REFs) 
Superior frontal 
sulcus 
L WM correlated w? WM capacity 
& WM activity 
Klingberg, Forsserg, and Westerberg, 
2002, J COG NEUROSCI 
orbitofrontal 
cortex 
 moral judgements; personal 
social conduct 
 Dolan, 1999 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 
anterior inferior 
PFC 
L controlled semantic retrieval activity modulated by 
associative strength of word 
pairs 
Bunge, Wendelken, Badre, Wagner, 
2005, CEREBRAL CORTEX 
frontopolar 
cortex 
L integration & evaluation; 
relational complexity 
word pair association task 
(analogy); episodic details 
Bunge, Wendelken, Badre, Wagner, 
2005, CEREBRAL CORTEX; Christoff et al, 
2001, NEUROIMAGE 
frontopolar 
cortex 
R integration & evaluation 
based on familiarity 
conceptual or perceptual 
episodic gist 
Bunge, Wendelken, Badre, Wagner, 
2005, CEREBRAL CORTEX; Wagner et al. 
1998 
dlPFC R response selection; WM challenging tasks Bunge, Wendelken, Badre, Wagner, 
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 monitoring & manipulation 2005, CEREBRAL CORTEX; Owen, Evans, 
Petrides 1996 in D'Esposito 
anterior 
cingulate 
 ToM; reason underlying motor 
intention 
 see Vogeley & Fink 2003 for refs 
principal sulcus, 
Lpfc 
 working memory monkey single cell recording 
studies 
see D'Esposito et al 1998 
middle frontal 
gyrus 
 spatial working memory animal studies Goldman-Rakic 1987 (in D'Esposito et al 
1998) 
inferior frontal 
gyrus 
 nonspatial working memory animal studies Goldman-Rakic 1987 (in D'Esposito et al 
1998) 
inferior frontal 
gyrus 
L late learned words visual & auditory lexical 
decision task 
Fiebach et al 2003 
ventral PFC R spatial working memory info received from posterior 
assoc areas; comparisons 
made 
D'Esposito et al 1998 
inferior frontal 
gyrus - caudal 
R intention encoding understanding motor acts 
(fMRI) 
Iacoboni et al 2005 (in Rizzolatti 2010 
NATURE NEURO) 
inferior frontal 
gyrus 
L integration process in 
language 
 (Hagoort 2005) in Spotorno et al 2012 
NEUROIMAGE 
ventral PFC L nonspatial working memory info received from posterior 
assoc areas; comparisons 
made 
D'Esposito et al 1998 
anterior insula L late learned words visual & auditory lexical 
decision task 
Fiebach et al 2003 
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 rlPFC L relational integration & 
reasoning; manipulating self-
generated info 
RPM 2-relational problems; 
further abstracting new info 
Christoff, Prabhakaran et al 2001 
NEUROIMAGE 
rlPFC R epidodic retrieval; evaluation 
of self-generated info 
 Cabeza & Nyberg 2000 (in Christoff, 
Prabhakaran et al 2001 NEUROIMAGE) 
vmPFC  emotion & decision making 
link 
 Waltz, Knowlton, Holyoak et al. 1999 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE (see refs) 
vmPFC  ToM processing  (Ma et al 2011) in Spotorno et al 2012 
NEUROIMAGE 
mPFC  general inference making  (Ferstl & von Cramon, 2002) in Spotorno 
et al 2012 NEUROIMAGE 
mdlfc  monitoring  Champod &  Petrides, 2007 
anterior cortex L personal body space (imaging 
body rotations) 
clinical pop. see Brandt & MacKavey, 1981 
     
PARIETAL     
Intraparietal 
sulcus 
B WM; control of visual 
attention; any modality cues 
correlated w? WM & age Klingberg, Forsserg, and Westerberg, 
2002, J COG NEUROSCI (+ others, see 
their REFs) 
Intraparietal 
sulcus 
B body schema? Integration of 
extra- & peri-personal space 
Japanese macaques Iriki, Tanaka & Iwamura, 1996 
Intraparietal 
sulcus 
B perception of spatial positions 
in egocentric frame of ref 
humans/# objects in scene wolbers, hegarty et al 2008 NATURE 
NEURO 
Intraparietal L WM; response correlated w? WM capacity Klingberg, Forsserg, and Westerberg, 
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 sulcus preparation/temporal & 
motor orienting 
& WM activity 2002, J COG NEUROSCI (+ others, see 
their REFs); Cotti…Coull, 2011 
NEUROIMAGE 
Inferior parietal 
cortex 
L WM; control of visual 
attention; any modality cues; 
spatial categorical judgments 
correlated w? WM capacity 
& WM activity 
Klingberg, Forsserg, and Westerberg, 
2002, J COG NEUROSCI (+ others, see 
their REFs); Cotti…Coull, 2011 
NEUROIMAGE; Franciotti et al 2013 
PONE 
Inferior parietal 
cortex 
R egocentric calculations; spatial 
coordinate judgments 
with allocentric spatial info Maquire et al 1998 (in Vogeley & Fink 
2003); Franciotti et al 2013 PONE 
medial parietal 
cortex 
B ego-movement egocentric calculations + 
allocentric spatial info? 
Maquire et al 1998 (in Vogeley & Fink 
2003) 
precuneus B early learned words visual & auditory lexical 
decision tasks 
Fiebach et al 2003 
precuneus B inspection of internal images; 
construction of internal rep 
construction in spatial 
context, spatial updating 
indpendent of upcoming 
action 
Burgess et al 2001 (in Vogeley & Fink 
2003); Wolbers, Hegarty et al 2008 
NATUR NEURO 
precuneus  integrating a sentence into 
context 
situation model upating (Speer et al, 2007) in Spotorno 2012 
NEUROIMAGE 
superior parietal 
lobule 
B perception of sptial positions 
in egocentric frame of ref 
humans/# objects in scene wolbers, hegarty et al 2008 NATURE 
NEURO 
superior parietal 
lobule 
R shift attention (to new object 
or location) 
transient activation (to 
modulate synchrony?) 
Yantis & Sperences 2003 CURRENT 
OPINION NEUROBIO 
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 superior parietal 
lobule 
B 1-relational decisions ? compared to no relations or 
2-relations 
Christoff, Pabhakaran et al 2010 
NEUROIMAGE 
caudate -head B relational reasoning with increasing complexity Christoff, Pabhakaran et al 2010 
NEUROIMAGE (and see refs) 
posterior parietal  manipulation with working memory Zacks & Michelon refs; Champod & 
Petrides, 2007 
posterior cortex L extrapersonal space 
(orientation/ imagining 
rotation) 
clinical pop. see Brandt & MacKavey, 1981 
inferior parietal 
lobule 
 spatial neglect? Hemianopia when lesioned; ;humans 
and monkeys 
see Karnath, Ferber, and Himmelbach 
2001 NATURE 
supramarginal 
gyrus 
L left-right confusion Gerstmann's syndrome 
(neurological) 
Gerstmann 1940 (in 
Hisnstein….Hausmann 2009 CORTEX) 
angular gyrus L left-right confusion Gerstmann's syndrome 
(neurological) 
Gerstmann 1940 (in 
Hisnstein….Hausmann 2009 CORTEX) 
angular gyrus R out of body experience focal lesion studies see Blanke 2012 NATURE NEURO 
     
TEMPORAL     
temporo-parietal 
junction 
 orienting; reason underlying 
motor intention; body self-
consciousness 
experimental & clinical 
(heautoscopy) 
temporo-parietal junction 
temporo-parietal 
junction 
R ToM with diff 1PP from 3PP see Vogeley & Fink 2003 
parahippocampal R spatial memory lesion sudies  Bohbot et al (1998) in Corkin, 2002 
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 cortex NATURE 
parahippocampal 
gyrus 
 receives spatial info from 
poserior partietal cortex 
direct connection Suzuki et al (1994) in Corkin, 2002 
NATURE 
hippocampus  conscious recollectionof the 
learning episode 
complex picture recognition 
task 
see Corkin 2002 NATURE 
perirhinal cortex  familiarity judgements (w/out 
episodic content) 
complex picture recognition 
task 
see Corkin 2002 NATURE 
superior 
temporal gyrus 
R spatial neglect; multimodal 
sensory convergence 
when lesioned; BA 22 & 42; 
'where' & 'what' streams 
diverge 
Karnath, Ferber, and Himmelbach 2001 
NATURE 
superior 
temporal gyrus 
L language in humans see Karnath, Ferber, and Himmelbach 
2001 NATURE 
inferioral 
parietal lobule 
 spatial neglect? Hemianopia when lesioned; ;humans 
and monkeys 
see Karnath, Ferber, and Himmelbach 
2001 NATURE 
temporo-parieto-
occipital junction 
 spatial neglect? Hemianopia when lesioned; humans and 
monkeys 
see Karnath, Ferber, and Himmelbach 
2001 NATURE 
temporal 
operculum 
L early learned words visual lexical decision task Fiebach et al 2003 
anterior superior 
temporal sulcus 
 iconic memory visual shape processing? Keysers et al 2005 COG NEUROPSYC 
inferior temporal 
cortex 
 iconic memory visual shape processing? reviewd in Keysers et al 2005 COG 
NEUROPSYC 
posterior 
superior 
B self-location & 1st person 
perspective 
out of body experiences see Blanke 2012 NATURE NEURO 
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 temporal gyrus 
p inferotemporal 
cortices 
L object processing, name 
retrieval at subconscious 
level? 
 Damasio, Grabowski et al 2001 
NEUROIMAGE 
     
NETWORKS     
allocentric 
coordinate 
system 
 right hemisphere structures, right 
post-parietal cortex 
 McNaughton et al (1991) in Corkin 2002 
NATURE 
topographical 
memory 
 rRetrosplenial cortex, 
pCingulate G, 
occipitotemporal area 
parahippocampal G, 
rHippocampus,mParietal L 
see Corkin 2002 NATURE 
first-person 
perspective 
 amPFC, mParietal, pCingulate 
cortex, lateral 
temporoparietal cortex 
 see Vogeley & Fink 2003 TRENDS IN COG 
SCI 
spatial 
navigation 
 mParietal, Rinferior Parietal, 
pCingulate cortex, 
hippocampus 
 Maguire et al 1999 (in Vogeley & Fink 
2003) 
route encoding  MTL, anterior superior parietal 
cortex, postcentral gyrus 
areas not included in survey 
encoding 
Shelton & Gabrieli 2002 JNEUROSCI 
survey encoding  B fusiform and inferior 
temporal gyri, pSuperior 
parietal cortex 
also found in route 
encoding, but in greater 
activation 
Shelton & Gabrieli 2002 JNEUROSCI 
spatial working R parietal cortex projections to  see D'Esposito et al 1998 COG BRAIN RES 
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 memory DlPFC 
nonspatial 
working memory 
L temporal cortex projections to 
VlPFC 
 see D'Esposito et al 1998 COG BRAIN RES 
illusotry limb 
ownership 
 bilateral PMC, IPS, insula, 
sensorimotor cortex, 
cerebellum, SMA, aCingulate, 
posterior parietal 
 see Blanke 2012 NATURE NEURO 
self-
identification 
 IPS, PMC, possibly: 
sensorimotor cortex, EBA and 
temporopartietal cortex, 
putamen 
 see Blanke 2012 NATURE NEURO 
third-person 
perspective 
 right TPJ, IPS, precuneus, 
parahippocampal gyrus 
imagined spatial 
environment 
see Blanke 2012 NATURE NEURO 
limbic/core 
affect generation 
 MTL, Subgenual ACC, OFC emotion, pain, motivated 
behavior, autobio memory 
see Lindquist & Barrett 2012 TRENDS 
salience/body-
directed 
attention 
 aMCC, dorsal anterior Insula, 
frontal operculum 
emotion, aversion, 
romance, pain, language, 
atteniton 
see Lindquist & Barrett 2012 TRENDS 
default network  mPFC, retrosplenial area, 
PCC/precuneus, MTL, STS 
emotion, self, autobio 
memory, ToM, moral, 
context-sensitive self 
see Lindquist & Barrett 2012 TRENDS 
executive control  dlPFC, inferior parietal lobe & 
sulcus, precuneus, mCC 
task switching, alerting, WM see Lindquist & Barrett 2012 TRENDS 
visuospatial  FEF dpParietal cortex, fusiform top-down control of see Lindquist & Barrett 2012 TRENDS 
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 attention gyrus, area MT+ visuospatial attention 
attentional 
control 
 PFC to SPL (switch attn) to IPS 
and extrastriate (maintain 
attn) 
model of top-down control 
of attention (spatial & 
object) 
see Yantis & Serences 2003 CURRENT 
OPINION 
theory of mind  mPFC, precuneus, b-ITPJ, and irony? Some aspects of 
language processing? 
see Spotorno et al 2012 NEUROIMAGE 
knowledge-
building? 
 mPFC, MTL/HC emergence & application of 
prior knowledge 
 
spatial relations  b IPL, bMFG,mSPL, visual 
cortex 
MEG cluster of activation 
(diff't timespans) 
Franciotti et al 2013 
reasoning ability 
(devel'pt) 
 L RLPFC, L IPL see model in paper Wendelken…Bunge, 2015 CER CORTEX 
reasoning v. 
maintenance 
 R anterior cingulate/MFG, L 
MFG, B Insular cortex, L STG; R 
cerebellum 
comparison design Ruff et al 2013 NEUROPSYC 
maintenance v. 
reasoning 
 R IPG, R precuneus, L MTG comparison design Ruff et al 2013 NEUROPSYC 
reasoning vs. 
rest 
 B MOG, B cuneus, L posterior 
cingulate, B precuneus, B 
precentral gyrus, B mFG, R 
parahippocampal gyrus 
 Ruff et al 2013 NEUROPSYC 
maintenance v. 
rest 
 L MOG, R IOG, B poserior 
cingulate gyrus, B m/SFG, B 
mFG 
 Ruff et al 2013 NEUROPSYC 
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 alerting network  locus coeruleus, frontal & 
parietal cortices 
 Peterson & Posner 2012 (in 
Pozuelos…Rueda 2014 DEV PSYCH 
orienting 
network 
 superior colliculus, SPL, 
temporopartietal junction, FEF 
 Peterson & Posner 2012 (in 
Pozuelos…Rueda 2014 DEV PSYCH 
executive 
attention 
 anterior cingulate cortex, lPFC, 
vPFC, basal ganglia 
 Peterson & Posner 2012 (in 
Pozuelos…Rueda 2014 DEV PSYCH 
semantic > 
fixation 
 bDLPFC, rVLPFC, rIPL, 
premotor & visual cortices, 
basal ganglia 
children activate subset of 
these 
Wright..Bunge et al 2008 FRONTIERS 
analogy > 
semantic 
 bVLPFC, parietal & visual 
cortices, basal ganglia 
children activate subset of 
these 
Wright..Bunge et al 2008 FRONTIERS 
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